

# The Church Quarterly Review

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Edited by Philip Usher.

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ART. I.—CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY: IV. AUTHORITY

IN the preceding chapters an attempt has been made to examine the sources from which a knowledge of religion, and in particular the Christian religion may be obtained. They are natural religion and revealed religion. The one tells us of those answers to the problem of religion which have been discovered by human reason, the other of that knowledge of divine things which it is maintained has been given to mankind through revelation. We find on enquiry that as a matter of fact there has been great variety of belief in religious matters not only in the world generally, but in the particular sphere of Christianity and the question must inevitably arise, By what process am I able to discover which of these various beliefs are true and which of them I ought to adopt? Is it necessary for me to examine all these different forms of belief or is there any authority which will put before me clearly and definitely what is the true religion. Is the basis of Christian belief reason or authority? What is the relation that these two sources of human knowledge have to one another in relation to religious matters?

I.

Let us begin by investigating the relation of these two sources of knowledge in the common affairs of life. It is sometimes maintained that it is the duty of an intelligent man to regulate his life and form his opinions entirely by reason, that it is true indeed that a large number of matters

come to us on the authority of others, but that this is an inferior sort of knowledge, that we must think everything out for ourselves and free ourselves from the fetters and chains of authority. Now very slight consideration will show us that this is not possible, nor would it be wise to attempt it. It is not possible because in our daily life and customs, in our relations with one another, in political and social life, in our business, trades and professions there are many beliefs, in fact a large proportion of our knowledge which we have not either the time, or the opportunity, to investigate. Nor would it be wise, because the great mass of people when they begin to reason independently arrive at conclusions which are found to be undoubtedly incorrect.

Let me quote a striking passage from Lord Balfour's work on *The Foundations of Belief* in which he describes the important part played by Authority in regulating our conduct and belief.

“When we turn, however,” he writes, “from the conscious work of Reason, to that which is unconsciously performed for us by Authority, a very different spectacle arrests our attention. The effects of the first, prominent as they are through the dignity of their origin, are trifling compared with the all pervading influences which flow from the second. At every moment of our lives, as individuals, as members of a family, of a party, of a nation, of a Church, of a universal brotherhood, the silent, continuous, unnoticed influence of Authority moulds our feelings, our aspirations, and what we are more immediately concerned with, our beliefs. It is from Authority that Reason draws its most important premisses. It is in unloosing or directing the forces of Authority that its most important conclusions find their principal function. And even in those cases where we may most truly say that our beliefs are the rational product of strictly intellectual processes, we have in all probability only got to trace back the thread of our inferences to its beginnings in order to perceive that it finally loses itself in some general principle which,



describe it as we may, is in fact due to no more defensible origin than the influence of Authority."<sup>1</sup>

He then proceeds to estimate the value of Authority.

"It is true no doubt that we can without any great expenditure of research accumulate instances in which Authority has perpetuated error and retarded progress ; for unluckily none of the influences, Reason least of all, by which the history of the race has been moulded have been productive of unmixed good. The springs at which we quench our thirst are always turbid. Yet if we are to judge with equity between these rival claimants, we must not forget that it is Authority rather than Reason to which in the main we owe not religion only but ethics and politics ; that it is Authority which supplies us with essential elements in the premises of science ; that it is Authority rather than Reason which lays deep the foundations of social life ; that it is Authority rather than reason which cements its superstructure. And though it may seem to savour of paradox, yet it is no exaggeration to say, that if we would find the quality in which we most notably exceed the brute creation, we should look for it, not so much in our faculty of reasoning, as in our capacity for influencing and being influenced through the action of Authority."<sup>2</sup>

Now what does this Authority mean ? It means I think the sum of human achievement. It means what the human race has attained up to any given time in capacity for living, in skill in the arts and crafts, in knowledge of the world and of itself. As the attainments of each nation and people are different, authority speaks with a different voice in different places. There is general authority, the authority of the whole community, there is the local authority of the town or village, and there is the special and particular authority of every trade, profession, or group. For instance a boy

<sup>1</sup> *The Foundations of Belief*. By the Right Hon. Arthur James Balfour. London, Longmans, 1895. Pp. 227-8.

<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.* pp. 229-30.

who is going to be a joiner or a blacksmith learns on authority the way in which he should do things. Besides these there is up to a certain point, and dealing with some of the more fundamental principles of knowledge, an authority which is common to the whole human race, and arises from the fact that fundamentally the whole race lives in the same environment; that is to say its experience is the same, and it has the same gifts of observation and reasoning, the same wants, passions and desires, and the same emotions.

There are two things that I propose to ask about this authority. The first wherein its power lies, for undoubtedly it has great power and influence in the world; and the second what is the source of the knowledge that it puts before us.

The power of authority is great. For the most part it is very difficult to break down what is accepted as authority. The arguments to prove that it is wrong may appear to the unprejudiced mind quite demonstrative, but they will be found to have little or no weight against authority. The custom that we attempt to break down may be harmful and pernicious but it will continue to survive in spite of continuous attempts to destroy it. The belief that we wish to eradicate may seem to us an absurd superstition, yet we shall find that people continue to hold it tenaciously. Arguments which appear to be sufficient are easily discovered, if it comes to argument, to defend what the mind clings to.

I would suggest three reasons for this power of authority. The first is the force of habit. We may leave it to the physiologist and psychologist to investigate the causes of this, to us it is sufficient that whether in the realm of thought or of action we adhere easily, readily and gladly to that to which we are accustomed. Our mind and our body work in accustomed grooves. Many in fact are quite unable to get out of these grooves at all. The early impressions of life, and the inherited impressions cling to us closely. In fact we cannot change, we are what we are.

Then, secondly, there is the force of public opinion. Even if any individual gifted with superior intelligence or



greater individuality tries to break away from customary habits or beliefs he experiences great difficulty. The collective influence of a body of people with the same inherited beliefs, prejudices, and customs is very great and overpowers any but the strongest minds. Unless circumstances arise to assist the innovator, he remains without support. And this force and power of habit and of public opinion are increased by custom. Inherited ideas become embedded in laws, customs, observances, ceremonial and so on. It becomes the interest of a large body of people to support them. In fact they are generally appointed to do so. The lawyer is appointed to keep up the authority and power of law, the clergyman of religion and morals. Inherited customs also become entwined in all the actions of our daily life. Inherited religion expresses itself in the observation of certain days, in the performance of certain rites, in its particular association with the different crises of our lives, with birth and adolescence, with marriage and death. A change of custom as well as of thought is necessary to break down the power of authority.

A third reason for the power of authority is that experience has proved its value. Not only does its teaching harmonize with our mental equipment, but it is generally found to be right. The innovation is generally wrong. This arises (as will be seen) from the fact that it is itself the result, often the unconscious result, of the experience and intelligence of many generations and that the reasoning power of the average individual human being acting by himself is of small value. Prejudice against change has on its side the fact that the existing custom is generally wiser than any proposed change, that the existing belief is truer, that even if the change be necessary or wise it will eventually be found that it does much harm as well as good. So the natural repugnance to a new course or to new ideas is justified by arguments of considerable value.

It is therefore in periods when external events have altered circumstances that authority breaks down. A great war, the conquest of a country, the spread of commerce,

a great increase of wealth, intercourse between nations, mechanical inventions, the value of which is obvious and the ultimate influence incalculable—all these break down the force of habit and custom and consequently tend to undermine the influence of authority. For example the transformation of the world by the establishment of the Roman Empire, the great changes which inevitably resulted in political ideas, the steady unification of society made the continuance of separate religions for each state and people no longer possible, broke down old beliefs and customs, and prepared the way for a universal religion.

We have thus to recognize the power and, within certain limits, the beneficence of authority.

What is the source then from which this power of knowledge which we have called authority comes? It is partly the cumulative result of the experience and intelligence of the race; beliefs and customs which whatever their origin have gradually and unconsciously been accepted as sound because they have been continually found to be so in practice. Then secondly it represents that part of the attainment of individuals who have informed their contemporaries by their character and ability which has been taken over by society.

All our leading beliefs about the nature of the world in which we live and about human nature come to us through authority. For example the doctrine of the uniformity of nature in the only way in which it is true has become impressed upon us just by this accumulated experience and we always regulate our action by it. The uniformity of nature means that the same antecedent must have the same consequent, and that therefore a variation in the antecedent must mean a variation in the result. That means that the world around us is a Cosmos, not a chaos. Now this truth every woman who cooks knows and acts on instinctively, it is the basis of all the arts of life, and of the whole structure of science. A world might have been conceivably constructed in which this did not happen, but we know that this world is so constructed, and the human



race has proved that it is so through centuries of experience. There are many other things about the world which we receive from Authority. The fundamental basis of all moral action and of speculation about morals is that "the good is good." This is, for example, both the starting point and the conclusion of Dr Rashdall's great book on *The Theory of Good and Evil*. It means ultimately that goodness is a constituent of the nature of things. Now that the human race has discovered, although less thoroughly, perhaps, than our first proposition, through continuous observation and reasoning concerning the experience of life. So the leading ideas which form the basis of our political, social and religious life—less universal and more precarious—are yet the result of the accumulated experience, of the race, of the civilized world or of a particular nation. There is continually going on a gradually increased acquaintance with the reality of the conditions under which we live and an adjustment of our ideas to them which builds up our tradition of life.

Then the next source of Authority is the individual who has proved to society that his skill or his knowledge exceeds that of others. It is obvious that it is necessary that we should accept the great mass of our knowledge on the authority of others, because no individual could possibly either discover or unify for himself any but a very small part of the knowledge he requires. That has always been the case, and is increasingly so at the present day; in fact now we accept more things on the basis of authority than ever before. So Mr Henry Sidgwick writes :

"It is sometimes said that we live in an age that slights authority. The statement thus unqualified seems misleading. Probably there never was a time when the number of beliefs held by each individual undemonstrated and unverified by himself was greater. But it is true that we are more and more disposed to accept only authority of a particular sort. The authority namely that is formed and maintained by the unconstrained agreement of individual thinkers, each of

whom we believe to be seeking truth with single-mindedness and sincerity and declaring what he has found with scrupulous veracity and the greatest attainable exactness and prevision."

I am not sure that this is not a somewhat idealized account of what happens even in the present enlightened days. But undoubtedly the influence of those who have proved themselves or have seemed to prove themselves capable in any particular sphere has had great influence on the community, and the sum of human knowledge is largely made up of the attainments of those who have succeeded in impressing their generation. Often the influence of such authorities has excessive weight.

Authority then is the chief source of our beliefs, customs and habits. It means the accumulated knowledge of the race. It has wide experience behind it. It is the result of the continuous intelligence of countless generations. It has been equally, continuously verified. It has created a system of life adapted to the environment in which we live. But as we have already seen the human mind and human society are tenacious of old customs and beliefs. The environment in which we live is constantly changing. Our generalizations are continually becoming more perfect, but the old beliefs have a tendency to live on. Authority may be a preservative of error as well as a teacher of truth. The pursuit of truth then will mean two things. The first is that whether we are engaged with the study of life as a whole or of any particular department we should be able to start from the position already attained. Each generation, unless it had this accumulated knowledge behind it, would have to start in the position of primitive man. We must start where our predecessors left off. And then secondly, there must be the process of enlarging and correcting this knowledge. If a country or a Church or any other body of men were to accept the whole of its traditions without investigation, correction or independent thought, life and society would become stereotyped and would begin to decay.



The acceptance and the continuous correction of authority are equally necessary for a healthy state of society.

A stereotyped condition of society or thought is far easier to acquire than we are apt to think. For instance, it is a comparatively short time since the medical profession consisted largely of those whose medical knowledge was a matter of tradition, who quoted their authorities rather than investigated nature, and whose methods of treatment were prescribed for them by custom. On the other hand at the present day a certain number of people are killed every year by the employment without adequate experience of new and half-tested remedies. At the present day the study of natural science is pursued with great vigour and intelligence. So it was in the days of ancient Greece. Only twice in human history have there been periods of really independent scientific investigation. It would be very easy for a period of stagnation to follow one of what might seem excessive speculation. Even now there is often a tendency to impose a particular opinion on the world and to resent free investigation and criticism.

An examination then, of the source and character of human knowledge shows that the great bulk of what each individual or society as a whole knows and accepts comes to us not as the result of independent observation and reasoning but simply on authority. We believe what we are told. This authority is the accumulated and accepted attainment of the race. But however valuable this knowledge may be we know that it is not infallible, and that a continuous process of investigation and correction must go on if this knowledge is to be developed and improved and fitted to new circumstances.

## II.

We pass now to the question of Christian authority. We have seen how for each of us Authority is the chief source of our beliefs and customs, and that as it embodies both the accumulated experience of the race and the attainment of the best minds of each generation, it is for most

men the most valuable, often almost the only, source of knowledge. But it can make no claim to anything in the nature of infallibility. Those who wish to advance knowledge must start with what has been already attained, and if they do not do so will be in danger of becoming cranks, but unless there are minds continually working who are capable of advancing and correcting our inherited ideas, knowledge will become obsolete, stereotyped and dead.

When we turn to authority in relation to the Christian Religion, there is another factor to be introduced, for we are concerned with a revelation. So long as the question is one of philosophical or political thought, of scientific truth or of historical research we are dealing with knowledge attained by the human mind by its natural powers, but those who believe in Christianity believe that the knowledge it gives us comes from Revelation. That is to say there is conveyed to mankind by the direct gift of God knowledge which they could not attain by their natural and unaided powers. There must be behind Christian belief an authority different in kind and scope from anything we possess in more secular subjects. But although all Christians alike recognize in some way the existence of such an authority, there is great diversity of opinion both as to where this authority lies and what is its nature. While some types of Christianity have exalted, we might say exaggerated this idea of authority, others have ascribed to it slight influence, and have spoken of Christianity as a religion of the Spirit, and the question has arisen whether the authority lies in the original revelation or in the teaching of the Christian Church inspired by the Holy Spirit. Some again have associated Christian authority with the teaching of strong dogmatic statements, others with liberty and freedom of thought.

Most notable has been in relation to Christianity the desire for an Authority which is certain and infallible. It is a natural tendency of the human mind to seek guidance. Such a desire is especially strong in religious matters; in times of doubt and controversy men seek something which



seems to be certain ; there is a natural indolence which makes the great mass of mankind desire not to have the trouble of thinking. All these motives have created a great desire to find some infallible authority, and this has been found in the Bible, in the Church, and in the Pope. Each of these claims demands some investigation.

The idea of an infallible book written by the finger of God containing an authoritative record of the divine will, and giving to mankind divine knowledge is one that has made a strong appeal, and the belief that the Bible is infallible has prevailed widely in the Christian Church. The reasons why we cannot any longer accept that belief have already been discussed and it is not necessary for us to pursue them further now. The Bible has been proved (so far as demonstration is possible) not to be infallible. Its statements are at times inconsistent with one another, and can be shown to be erroneous on historical points. Its science is inconsistent with scientific discovery, and criticism, literary and historical, has shown that the history of the Jewish people was different to the traditional view. Moreover there are, as was seen even in the second century, inconsistent descriptions of the character of God and of human duty—an inconsistency quite explicable on some principle of development, but not consistent with infallibility. Nor can we accept or be satisfied with any theories which would limit the infallibility to some of its teaching. A book which is sometimes infallible is for us not infallible unless there is an infallible authority to show when it is infallible. No theory of the infallibility of the Bible can be accepted at the present day.

Even when the infallibility of the Bible was accepted it was found ultimately insufficient, because it became clear that Scripture might be interpreted in many different ways, and an infallible authority needed an infallible interpreter. So the idea of an infallible Church grew up and this doctrine is now put forward—by those who still need this feeling of certainty—as a substitute for the doctrine of an infallible Bible.

To study this I will refer you to an interesting controversy between Dr Sanday and Mr N. P. Williams published in a work called *Form and Content in the Christian Tradition*. In this Mr Williams puts forward and defends a belief in the absolute infallibility of the Church, and as it is the ablest defence of that belief it will be convenient to take it as our text book. He begins by stating the basis of his belief :

“ I find myself in need of a religion : that is, of some means of access to God, some means of obtaining help from him towards salvation from sin, and some reliable information about him. For various reasons which I need not go into here, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Bahaism and so forth do not satisfy me. Christianity, therefore, holds the field in default of other claimants. But I no sooner state to myself ‘ I must be a Christian ’ than the question rises up in front of me ‘ What is Christianity ? ’ And at first sight, it would seem reasonable to reply ‘ Christianity is what the great majority of those who profess and call themselves Christian believe it to be ’ ; in other words, what I have designated as ‘ Catholicism ’ .”

The ultimate basis of this belief is that the Holy Spirit has guided the Church, a belief based on intuition :

“ I should admit that my view—the belief in the Holy Spirit as guiding the process of dogmatic evolution specifically and in detail, not vaguely and in a general sense, rests upon an intuition. This intuition whereby the Holy Spirit is given to us in the Church, is (I should say) analogous to that sense of God in nature which comes fleetingly at times to all, and is preserved in fullest measure by the favoured few, poets, prophets and mystics.”

It is not only that the Holy Spirit guides the Church—a belief that many Christians hold, but that the Church thus guided by the Holy Spirit is infallible. So our orthodoxy must be “ uncompromising.”

All our fundamental beliefs rest ultimately on an assumption.



“ You might as well criticize the Laws of Thought, or the axioms of geometry, for being ‘ assumed without proof ’—which is exactly what they are.”

“ The ideas of God, Freedom, Immortality, are matters of intuition rather than demonstration. The belief that God is Love is an intuition. Whatever you teach and whatever you believe takes you back ultimately to certain intuitions : is it in any way a greater demand upon faith to take as your intuition the infallibility of the undivided Catholic Church up to the great schism of 1054 ? ”

The undivided Church puts before us a complete and defined system of faith. This we are to accept as an infallible revelation. It is perfect and complete, and if any one point were found to be untrue, it would make the rest incredible.

“ I believe,” he writes, “ in the Virgin birth (a) because the Church and the Scriptures say that it was so ; (b) because it seems to me appropriate and congruous to the idea of a Divine Incarnation that it should be so ; and (c) because I know of no good reason for disbelieving that it was so ; but if a papyrus were discovered at Nazareth which proved, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that our Lord was not born of a Virgin, I should at once and without hesitation abandon, not merely the belief in the Virgin Birth, but all the rest of Catholic Christianity as well.”

This Catholic Faith then is something whole and indivisible which we have to accept or reject. It is something expressed in Creeds and forms of thought which cannot be changed. These formulas must be taken literally and cannot be altered :

“ This unalterability has in our view two consequences. It means, first, that it is not permissible to substitute other intellectual forms (the verbal expression is often only a secondary matter) for those which the Holy Spirit has once sanctioned, speaking through his organ the Church universal : and it means secondly

that it is not permissible to discard these forms in favour of a formless vagueness—to reject the clear and precise pronouncements of truth which God has given us through his Spirit in the Church and to relapse into the original indefiniteness on the plea of returning more nearly to the conditions of early Christianity or the intentions of its founder. These consequences may not be welcome to the modern mind, but it cannot be denied that they follow irresistibly from the assumption of that peculiarly internal and vital presence of the Spirit in the Church.”

I think that the above extract gives a sufficient account of the position that is held by those who in the Church of England base their beliefs on the infallibility of the Church. It is held that there is a definite body of doctrine and teaching, accurately formulated, unchangeable, unalterable, containing real truth, handed down to us in the Christian Church, to which we must adhere.

Now on examination it will be apparent that there are serious difficulties in such a position. It is quite correctly pointed out that if an authority claims to be infallible, the disproof of any one article in its teaching destroys our faith in the whole. If the Church claims to be infallible, and if it teaches the doctrine of the Virgin Birth and if that doctrine were disproved, then the infallibility of the Church would be clearly disproved also. It is not probable, I doubt if it is possible to disprove the doctrine, but many thoughtful people are for various reasons doubtful about it, and it is not wise to make our religious beliefs depend upon the weakest link in the chain. Nor again is it really possible to accept the creeds as documents which are inerrant or final. The language of them and of other formulas is that of the time when they were drawn up and in some cases either scientifically or philosophically obsolete. We may attach a quite intelligent meaning to the phrase “ he ascended into heaven,” and “ he descended into Hades,” but we do not take either of them and cannot take them literally and if once we admit in such a way the possibility of symbolism we cannot ascribe any infallibility to these documents.



Nor again do we feel that in such a matter as this formularization of truth, or its explanation, anything that the Church does should be unalterable. The promise to lead us into all truth was not limited to any period. It applies to the present and future as to the past. The Spirit is working through the modern mind and we must listen to his voice.

But there is a further and more fundamental difficulty and that is the fact that it is not possible to know accurately what on this theory is the Catholic Faith. If it were confined to those formulae which have the assent of a general Council, and we could be quite sure what were general Councils it might be easier, but the system called Catholicism is not confined to such teaching, many beliefs are part of an unwritten tradition which has never been authoritatively defined and there is no means of distinguishing what should or should not be accepted. There is no definite standard defining the complete system. What is put forward vaguely as Catholic at the present day is eclectic in its origin, derived partly from Eastern Christianity, partly from Western with no authority behind it but private judgment. It may well be, as will be suggested later, that there may be gathered from the general history of Christian theology a reasonable system of belief, which may be justly described as Catholic, and may be held to be a sufficient representation of what has been always held in the Church, but for a defined Catholic Creed, embracing all that is commonly included in that term, there is no authority which could enable us to say what according to hypothesis is infallible.

It is for this reason amongst others that some of those who are so anxious to find some infallible authority have sought it in the infallibility of the Pope. That step in the development of Roman Catholic Christianity was reached in 1870. The following is the relevant part of the decree passed at the Vatican Council :

“ The Roman Pontiff when he speaks *ex Cathedra*, that is, when in the exercise of his office as pastor and teacher of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines the doctrine in faith or

morals to be held by the Universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in the blessed Peter, possesses that power of infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that his Church should be furnished in defining doctrine or faith or morals, and that accordingly such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are of themselves not from the consent of the Church irreformable. But if as may God forbid any one should presume to gainsay these our definitions, let him be anathema."

Now it may be noticed that this definition states that the Roman Pontiff is infallible when he speaks *ex Cathedra*. But when does he do so ? On this point there is no definition given at all. There is, therefore, no means of knowing what decrees of the Roman Pontiff are infallible. There have been solemn pontifical utterances condemning discoveries of the geologist, taking an extremely conservative view on the criticism of the scriptures, condemning modernism. There have been two conflicting pronouncements on the principles which determine the validity of Orders, and a definite condemnation of Anglican Orders. Are any of these *ex Cathedra* pronouncements ? If they are, they show that an infallible authority can arrive at incorrect conclusions, if they are not they suggest that this infallible guide is somewhat illusory. The fact that we have no means of knowing when a pontifical utterance is infallible will to a thoughtful person deprive the definition of its value. It does not really mean anything from the intellectual standpoint. The claim of the Roman Pontiff to supremacy and infallibility is found useful in the Roman obedience for it gives an apparently strong basis to a great Ecclesiastical system, but from the intellectual point of view it adds no weight whatever to the authority of the Roman Church as embodied in the decrees of the Council of Trent and other authorized formulas.

One of the ablest attempts to support on rational grounds the authority of the Church of Rome is that made by Cardinal Newman in his book on the *Development of Christian*

*Doctrine*, and a short examination of his arguments will be of value in our investigation, as one of the keys to his life was his desire to find a basis of authority for religious belief. Like others of his writings it is partly a philosophical investigation of the grounds of Christian belief, partly a defence of the position he had just attained and a vigorous criticism of the Anglican position that he had recently held. It is an *Apologia* for the Roman position as against the Anglican. There has been, he argues, and it is in accordance with the nature of things, that there should be a development in Christianity ; it is reasonable, therefore, to hold that if there has been such a development there should be also an infallible authority to aid men in knowing what developments are true.

“ Reasons shall be given,” he writes, “ for concluding that, in proportion to the probability of true developments of doctrine and practice in the Divine Scheme, so is the probability also of the appointment in that scheme of an external authority to decide upon them, thereby separating them from the mass of mere human speculation, extravagance, corruption, and error, in and out of which they grow. This is the doctrine of the infallibility of the Church ; for by infallibility I suppose is meant the power of deciding whether this, that or a third, and any number of theological or ethical statements are true.”<sup>1</sup>

“ The essence of all religion,” he says, “ is authority and obedience, so the distinction between natural religion and revealed lies in this, that the one has a subjective authority, and the other an objective. Revelation consists in the manifestation of the Invisible Divine Power, or in the substitution of the voice of a Lawgiver for the voice of conscience. The supremacy of conscience is the essence of natural religion : the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, or Church, or Bishop, is the essence of revealed.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine. By John Henry Cardinal Newman. Chap. II. § 4.

<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.* Chap. II. § 11.



And he adds later,

“ The absolute need of a spiritual supremacy is at present the strongest of arguments in favour of the fact of its supply. Surely either an objective revelation has not been given, or it has been provided with means for impressing its objectiveness on the world.”<sup>1</sup>

It being postulated then that we should expect a development in the Christian Faith, and that we should also expect an infallible authority to direct that development, it is argued that it is reasonable to hold that that development which has taken place is the right development and that authority that exists is the true authority. This, of course, is the authority of the Church of Rome. Newman proceeds further to argue that these developments that have taken place and are found in the Church of Rome are healthy and natural developments of the original deposit of faith and are not corruptions.

The whole argument is far more ingenious than convincing. It appears a somewhat artificial attempt to justify what it is desired to justify, and the later influence of this work seems rather to corroborate this. Its publication started a principle which harmonized with current philosophical and scientific ideas, and the introduction of the idea of development into Christian theology has had far-reaching consequences which were not contemplated by the author. If Christian doctrine has developed clearly it will develop further during future times. We recognize that the formulated systems of past days are imperfect, may it not be true also of the systems of the present day, and of much of the ordinary teaching of the Church of Rome. What reason is there for saying that that particular system is infallible except that it makes the claim that it is. There are other developments which may be true, there may be more in the future. A basis is therefore found for what is described as Modernism, and it may be suggested that the very system which Newman wrote to defend may give way in time to a more advanced theology, fitted to the evolution of human

<sup>1</sup> *op. cit.* Chap. II. § 13.

thought. Christian theology is no longer looked upon as something static. Newman's defence of the infallibility of the Roman Church has created ideas which are really undermining it.

### III.

We have studied certain presentations of the authority of the Bible, the authority of the Church, and the authority of the Pope, and we shall notice that all of them alike have this in common. They start with the assumption that what is necessary is an infallible authority. That they all postulate. It is argued that if there is a God, we might expect that he would reveal himself to mankind, and that if he did thus reveal himself there would be some clear and authoritative guide to enable us to know what his revelation was. Therefore, when we find such a clear and certain guide we feel that it is in accordance with what we ought to expect. And this harmonizes with the natural desire of the vast majority of the human race. We want, they say, to have some certainty in these matters. We must know what is true. We cannot sacrifice ourselves for a cause which is uncertain. Men's conduct will not be influenced if there are serious doubts about their religious belief. Religion appeals to men only when they know that it is true.

Now there are, I think, two strong arguments against this desire for infallibility. The first is that this appearance of certainty is entirely delusive. It is quite true that the authority claims to be infallible, and brings forward arguments to justify that claim, but the proof that it is infallible is at best only probable. A series of arguments are brought forward to prove the infallibility of the Bible, the Church, and the Pope. To some they may make an appeal, but however good they may be they are not and they cannot be demonstrative. They only at the best make it probable that there is an infallible authority. There is really no certainty. It is quite true that when the authority is accepted, the doubtful nature of the evidence on which that

acceptance is made ceases to be apparent. Conviction is attained and there is a feeling of certainty. Moreover, the system, based as it seems on an infallible authority, is satisfying. There is the assurance and support which is desired. There seems to be no need to trouble longer. We can live our life henceforth in a satisfying atmosphere. Once accepted doubt seems to be gone. All this is true. It is quite true that many people attain this feeling of satisfaction. It is, however, purely subjective. There is really no more certainty about the religious system which makes these claims than there is for any other system of thought.

A second argument against any of these systems which claim to be infallible is that the study of God's methods of dealing with mankind as revealed in human history does not suggest that this is the way he would work with men. The Creator has endowed man with such powers of mind as have enabled him by his own powers to build up his knowledge of the world. What man has attained has been attained by his own effort. This is true alike of his knowledge of the external world which we generally call science, and of his knowledge of the human mind and life, and of the reality of things which we call philosophy. It has been true also in the history of natural religion. In our first chapter we sketched the process by which man has gradually attained some knowledge of the things of the spirit. Now analogy would suggest that there is no reason to suspect that God would employ any other method in the case of revealed religion. We believe for what seem to us adequate reasons that God has revealed himself to us first in the Old Testament and then in Jesus Christ. We believe that he has endowed man with rational powers to enable him to interpret this revelation, and has given the gift of the Holy Spirit to guide the Church in the interpretation of it to mankind, but if we study the history we shall find very little to justify any claim to infallibility at any time.

Turn to the Old Testament. Here is clearly no infallibility. There is a record of development guided by the



inspiration of the Prophets. That revelation appears to us adequate for the time when it was determined and occupies a high place in the record of human achievement under divine guidance, but it is in no way infallible. In fact a large part of the teaching of the Old Testament appears from a later standpoint erroneous. At a later time the religious teaching of the nation became stereotyped and Rabbis ascribed both to the Law and to the Interpretation of it an authority which claimed infallibility, and it was just this that Our Lord denounced. The characteristics of the New Testament revelation we shall discuss more fully later, but neither here nor in the life of the Church do we find anything static. The development of Christian thought seems in many ways to correspond to the development in progressive nations in Natural Religion, and suggests that God has dealt with mankind in relation to religious teaching as he has in all the other activities of life.

The claim then to an infallible authority can in no case be made good. Such a claim does not harmonize with anything that we might expect in God's method of dealing with mankind so far as we can learn it from a study of human history or the records of revelation itself, and it really destroys the value and impressiveness of the very authorities that it means to support. The Bible, if treated as an infallible authority loses its inspiration and becomes wooden and lifeless, the history of the Church is used to teach us formal doctrines and ecclesiastical rules, and ceases to be a record of the glories of the spiritual attainment of mankind, the Pope who as the head of a large part of Western Christendom is an inspiring figure becomes, when unreal claims are made on his behalf, simply ridiculous.

#### IV.

The great evil of this passion for an infallible authority has been that it has obliterated and obscured the real value and influence of legitimate authority, and has led to a harsh and crude distinction being made between authority and

the work of the Spirit. A typical instance would be the work on *Les Religions d'Autorité et la Religion de l'Esprit*, by the well known French Protestant Professor Auguste Sabatier. A conflict of methods is, he tells us, a greater difference than a conflict of doctrine. That is the cause of the antagonism between the traditional theology and the homogeneous group formed by all other modern disciplines. In the first reigns the principle of authority, the second is based upon experience. The result is that between the two there is no common link or measure. Authority bases doctrine on external marks of its origin and the practice of those who have originated it, such as miracles ; the experimental method puts us in immediate contact with reality and bids us judge a doctrine from its intrinsic value. Authority therefore is without reality.

It is true that he defines authority to mean infallible authority, but he suggests that the very essence of authority is that it claims to be infallible, and he does not recognize any source of knowledge to which he can give the name. The only source of religious knowledge is in ourselves. Now the position that he has taken up seems to me to have blinded him to the realities of religious history, for it remains true that even those who claim most conspicuously to have revolted from traditional authority are really indebted to authority for most of their religious beliefs. It is no more possible in religion than in any other walk in life for a man to think out all problems for himself, and if he does so he will make a great many blunders and even the experience to which M. Sabatier appeals is itself not something natural and original to human nature but is the result of the education which comes through authority. Christian experience is itself conditioned by the teaching of the very authority to which it is placed in antagonism.

Authority, in fact, plays the same part in Christian theology that it does in all other human attainment. It represents the sum of Christian religious experience. It represents what the Church has attained in its interpretation of the Christian record and its adaptation to general and

particular human needs. It is derived from general human experience and from the attainment of those whose spiritual insight and theological knowledge has been greatest. It has therefore the same value and the same limitations as authority in common things. It is not infallible or inerrant or irreformable or anything of that sort. It has exhibited development and will, as we may reasonably hold, exhibit further development in the future. But it is of the greatest value as the guide of each generation. Its teaching has been formularized by the corporate voice of the Church, and is enshrined in our traditional services. It presents a body of truth which each generation inherits, and provides it thus with a wise standard of truth and a wise rule of life, and these it should pass on to the next generation, enriched, adapted to new circumstances and perhaps corrected.

This tradition which we receive on the authority of the Church is both general and particular. There is the Catholic, that is general Christian tradition, which it may be somewhat difficult to define but represents all that body of faith and practice which in the popular mind we associate with the name Christian, and is a very real part in the tradition of civilized humanity. Then there is the particular tradition of the separate religious societies, the result of a more limited experience and adapted to more special and limited circumstances. The Christian man receives his religion on the authority of that particular body to which he belongs, but he has to make it his own and adapt it to the special needs of his own generation, and perhaps to correct it by the more universal Christian tradition. It is the business of the society to which he belongs to help him in that task. The authority of the society is shown not only in the original gift but in the corporate guidance, and a society or church which cannot exercise that corporate guidance will lose the adhesion of its members.

The influence of the wider society should always be ready to guide the smaller society. This wide influence of Christian tradition is as much a factor in religious progress as the freer thought of the individual. We might illustrate



this from the more recent history of the English Church. The representation of Christian life in the eighteenth century in this country has been generally and rightly looked upon as in a special degree inadequate, and that from more than one point of view. The Oxford movement of the nineteenth century was an appeal to Christian tradition and the authority of the Church against the narrow aberrations of the previous century. No doubt it made mistakes. Its knowledge of history was not always good. It exaggerated its own discoveries. But by being able to correct a meagre representation of Christianity through the richness of inherited traditions it broadened the whole religious life of the country.

In a time like the present when new ideas are constantly being pressed upon us, and what is more appear often to be supposed to be almost necessarily true, a recognition of the value of tradition is of the greatest importance. Modernism has no doubt something to teach this generation, but Modernism is a mere phase of thought, the product of the limited experience of a small body of people at the present day, whereas in the tradition of Christian authority there is the accumulated experience of nineteen centuries of Christian thought, in a society taught as we believe by God's Holy Spirit.

The antithesis then between religions of Authority and religions of the Spirit is really entirely false. In Christian theology, as in all other regions of thought, there have always been two elements. There is the sum of human experience which we call Authority, and this represents the continuous work in the world of the Divine Spirit. If we separate ourselves from that we are in danger of becoming in a very real sense of the word, heretics, a word which may be translated into common language as cranks. Then there is the Spirit working in each generation and helping the Church to mould that inherited authoritative creed to the particular needs of the day. If we separate ourselves from that we become dogmatists out of touch with our own times. The authority of the Church thus exercised is of

the greatest value as a means of regulating truth, provided that it has not ascribed to it an infallibility which cannot be proved and has nothing to support it.

## V.

Let us examine more closely the two sources of Christian theology.

There is first of all the Bible which is the Authority of Christ. There is the Old Testament which is the preparation for his coming, and has its consummation in him. There is the New Testament which is the record of his life and teaching, and of his influence on his disciples. Now what we have to emphasize about this is that it is the authority of a Person. The Christian revelation is given us in and through the Person of Christ. It is not either a creed, or a moral system, or a code of laws. Neither the extant words of Jesus nor his teaching in any detail can be ascertained with accuracy. He teaches us principles conveyed to us in and through his personality. Now the characteristic of a Person is that it is always wider and deeper than any definition. A form of words whether a creed or a code is limited and defined. It is unchangeable and unadaptable. But a personality is different, it is neither limited nor exhaustible. And if this be true even of a human personality, how much more of a divine personality? Our knowledge of God is presented to us in the divine person of Jesus, in a manner adapted in the first instance to the times when he lived, speaking its language and making use of its ideas, but in that way presenting to us a theology and principles of life which are the interpretation of reality. That revelation, therefore, being through a person and the life, words and actions of a person and not through a code is capable of being interpreted and adapted to suit other ages and forms of thought, and is found to respond to the needs of each successive generation.

Then, secondly, there is the Church which is the Authority of the Spirit, that is the interpretation of the Revelation in

Christ by the human mind acting in a corporate fashion and inspired by God's Spirit. This implies a fundamental revelation of that which is unchanging, interpreted to suit the changing conditions of human life. Fundamentally the Christian Church teaches as it always has taught, a faith which is unchanging, a belief in Jesus Christ as Son of God, the only begotten God in the bosom of the Father, and for that faith we have the authority of the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, as interpreted by the continuous experience and reason of the Christian Church, formulated in Creeds, and exhibited in the Christian life. But the meaning of the life and work of Christ is far deeper than any separate interpretation. It has responded to the very varying needs of the different Christian centuries and it will have even more profound lessons to teach us. There is always, therefore, in Christianity both a static and a progressive element, and while we rightly speak of the unchanging faith in Christ, because Christ represents reality, the Church should never be burdened with outworn forms of thought and rules of life.

## VI.

One further question remains. What is our individual relation to the Authority of the Church as expressed in Creeds and Articles? What should be the attitude of a clergyman at the present day in regard to subscription?

There are two things required of him. The first is sincerity. He must be a sincere Christian, that is to say, he must be firmly convinced in his own mind that he sincerely believes that conception of Christianity which has been taught by the Christian Church from the beginning and is presented in the creed that he has to recite. I use these words advisedly. He must believe that conception of Christianity and of the Person of Christ which is taught in the creeds. It is not the creeds that he accepts, but the Faith presented in the Creed. That means that he is not required to accept each word or statement as if he were



dealing with an infallible document, but that he has no doubt in his mind that he accepts the faith thus defined by the Christian Church, in the best terminology that was available for it.

And then, secondly, there is loyalty—that is the attitude of the clergyman towards the particular church in which he has been ordained and of which he is the servant. You do not ascribe infallibility to it. You may think that some of its ways might be better changed. But so long as you are its servant you will loyally carry out its directions, and devote all your powers to its well being. The rules do not touch anything which concerns your conscience, that is concerned with your fundamental position as a Christian. It is a matter of loyalty, loyalty to the society in which you serve.

These are two things required of you. The one is perfect sincerity in the acceptance of the Christian Faith. The other is loyalty to the Church of England. You are not asked to say that you believe the Prayer Book to be a perfect document. You promise to use it, and no other form of service unless it is allowed by lawful authority. Some people have, I think, confused these two things together. They have thought that if for any reason they have come to the conclusion that some other form of service or some other manner of conducting service than that ordered would be better, therefore their conscience would bid them make the change. This is a mistaken idea of the function and meaning of conscience. What your conscience does teach you is that you are to be loyal and obedient to the society in which you serve, so long as you are a member of it. If you think its teaching fundamentally erroneous you must leave it. If you think it imperfect, you are at liberty to take all lawful measures to improve it, but you are bound to obey its rules. A desire for reform is quite compatible with loyalty, disobedience is not.

But as regards your belief in Christ and your acceptance of the Christian Faith no compromise is possible.

A. C. GLOUCESTR:

## ART. II. THE STAR OF THE MAGI.

## THE EPIPHANY STAR.

THE gospel story of the star of the Magi is classed as legendary by the commentator in *The New Commentary*,<sup>1</sup>

“because” (he explains in a letter in the *Church Times* of February 8th, 1929), “what it says is plain. One of the stars descended so close to the earth, that it could point out the road to Bethlehem, and the right house to which to go.”

The need for this absurd rendering has escaped the translators of the English versions, of the Vulgate, and of the Roman vernacular translations, none of whom use words unsuited to describe what might be seen by a terrestrial spectator as occurring in the ordinary course of nature. What he sees is what the honest witness tries to tell. He tells what he thinks he sees; and in so doing he can only take the earth as his fixed framework, and the heavenly bodies as movable. Many astronomical computations and explanations are even now simplified by this means of approach; and as regards the Star, no other basis could have been used or understood for many centuries to come. And if we reject this kind of testimony, we must reject the testimony of any witness who says that “a cloud covered the sky,” or that “the sun was just over the hill.” The phrases are indefensible but clear.

In what follows I try to show that the appearances of the Epiphany Star were such as may happen with no departure from natural law, but that the occurrences were wonderful beyond measure because they were timed and placed and used by the Divine wisdom and power to convey a special meaning to special individuals.

<sup>1</sup> *A New Commentary on Holy Scripture*, S.P.C.K., 1928.

The Gospel accounts of Our Lord's infancy are succinct. They have been added to by tradition, legend and art. The additions are lovely and have become parts of ourselves, but we must not let them hide, or disguise, the truth. Scripture never states that the Magi were kings, that there were three, and that one of them was black : nor that the Saviour was born on December 25th, and that the Magi arrived on the 6th of the following month to find Jesus yet in the manger : nor that the Star ever served as pilot or as guide : nor indeed that the Star was first seen on the night of the Nativity, as Herod seems to have concluded.

Without these accretions the Gospel accounts may be shown to accord the one with the other, to call for no astronomical portent contrary to the physical laws which we know, and to allege no acts of individuals that are not simple and natural in the circumstances. The present writing deals with the astronomical aspects of the story, and shows that the words in Matthew fit phenomena which though wonderful are consistent with what we know from natural science.

#### THE STAR'S MESSAGE.

Scripture does not tell how it was that the phenomenon called by the Magi "*His Star*" denoted to them the birth of the great King of the Jews. The sign was assuredly ordered by God, but we do not know how it conveyed its message. Did the Magi see in the sky an astronomical phenomenon, which by their astrological<sup>1</sup> learning they interpreted in this sense? Or, was the announcement made to them in some other way, the remarkable appearances in the sky being foretold to them at the same time as confirmatory signs to follow immediately and at the end of their search?

The Gospel words leave the question untouched. But against the first hypothesis there are strong though negative

<sup>1</sup> The words "Astrology" and "Astronomy" are here used in their modern senses for brevity's sake, not because the Magi can have distinguished the two sciences.



considerations. These do not apply to the second hypothesis, which moreover is in evident harmony with other instances reported in Holy Scripture, especially about this time.

An astrological interpretation is the obvious first thought in this inquiry. That is, that the Magi saw something wonderful in the sky, which by the rules of their art they interpreted to signify the birth of a great Jewish King whom they must go to worship. The Magi, by diligent observation and study, knew much about the stars. Much of their science was true, but it included much that was false. Many centuries had to pass before it could be realised that stars neither govern, nor are governed by, the affairs of men.

We moderns are so convinced of the futility and falsity of astrological ideas that we shrink from the notion that God might employ them to announce the Birth of his Son. In our ignorance we may be wrong, for good faith may be helped by erroneous science. But we may doubt how an astrological interpretation would be regarded by religiously-minded Jews, and especially by the Lord's Parents. Stargazers, astrologers, and monthly prognosticators are mocked by Isaiah. Daniel, versed in all the wisdom of the Chaldeans, never mentions astrology; indeed the few passages in Scripture which bear such an interpretation are rhetorical or poetical.

On general grounds, too, it seems incredible that any celestial phenomenon, however striking, could give an interpretation so clear and definite as to convince men well acquainted with astrology (and its tricks) and to make them ready to undertake and carry through a long, tedious, and painful journey to worship the son of a carpenter. The hypothesis has no supporting evidence and is out of harmony with the rest of Holy Scripture.

Consider now the other hypothesis. Scripture gives many cases, specially numerous in the times of which we speak, where a communication was made by God, and attested by a sign following. The promise to Zacharias

was followed and attested by his dumbness and subsequent restoration of speech. St. Gabriel's annunciation to the Blessed Virgin was confirmed by the sign of Elizabeth's expectation. The angelic declaration to the Shepherds was followed by the appearance of the Heavenly Soldiers and was attested by the sign of the manger.

The case of the Magi accords with these instances if it be supposed that the Magi were informed of the Nativity by a word from God delivered in some one of the ways he uses, and that at the same time they were told that as a sign they were to see a miraculous star shine forth, presently to fade, and to re-appear when they were about to find the Child.

New wisdom never comes to unprepared minds. The new ideas which came to the Magi were partly spiritual, partly physical. We cannot tell what they already knew and believed, nor what exactly was made known to them, but we see that God spoke in the way that served to convince them.

God speaks to every man by the way of his experiences and his knowledge, and in the way which that man and sometimes he alone, understands. Twice the sign of a miraculous draft of fishes spoke to Apostles who were fishermen, and well knew that no fish were there until summoned by the will of Jesus. The Woman of Samaria was convinced by the Saviour's knowledge of her private past. The cock-crowing said nothing to the bystanders, but it convicted St Peter. The sign of the star convinced men occupied with the stars, and it says nothing to men who would never notice a dozen more or fewer bright stars in the sky.

Under this hypothesis the confirmation to the Magi came through no astrological fancy but through a true astronomical fact, which could have been foretold only by the Divine Wisdom. The sign came through the true part of their science and not by their proficiency in the vain theories of their day. Not their scientific attainments but their readiness to hear and obey made them meet to receive this great intimation. God uses and needs human wisdom

and learning, but the acceptable foundation is the humble and obedient heart. The Shepherds, not the scribes, were called to the manger.

If my hypothesis is true, the stories of the Magi and of the Shepherds are closely parallel.<sup>1</sup> First, the heavenly message to both, attested to the Shepherds by the Heavenly Host, to the Magi by the Star. Both then go to see what the Lord had made known to them, and the Holy Child is attested to the Shepherds by the Manger, to the Magi by the re-appearance of the Star. Both Shepherds and Magi worship and praise God and depart. The acceptance of the Gentiles, pronounced by St. Simeon, is enacted in the Magi.

### THE STAR

"Now when Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judaea in the days of Herod the king, behold, wise men from the east came to Jerusalem, saying, Where is he that is born King of the Jews? for we saw his star in the east and are come to worship him." St. Matt II. 1, 2 [R.V.]

The Magi were practised observers of the stars. At their home in the East, they had noted a wonderful celestial phenomenon, which for reasons not stated they understood to attest the birth of a King of the Jews, a King of such dignity and quality that he must be found and worshipped.

St. Matthew nowhere describes the Star, and his words are insufficient to shew what it was. I hope to prove that of five obvious possibilities the conception of a nova<sup>2</sup> fits his account much better than does that of a planet, or of a conjunction of planets, of a comet, or of an extraordinary meteor. The gospel account suggests something unexpected, striking, which was first seen in the eastern sky and not otherwise, at the home of the Magi but not at Jerusalem,

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps this is why neither Gospel tells both.

<sup>2</sup> A nova, otherwise called an evanescent or temporary star, is a star which has suddenly blazed up according to no known law, and after a long or short period fades again. The word "nova," being the shortest, is used in this paper.



a sudden splendour, which soon faded, and later, after many months, burst out with renewed brightness, to be seen by the Magi in front of them on their way from Jerusalem to Joseph's house, and at last over Joseph's house. A nova may fulfil all these conditions, not so any of the other four. Let me deal with each in turn.

A bright meteor comes without warning, and may be most impressive. But it disappears immediately, never to return.

A great comet is a splendid and impressive object. It could not have been foreseen by the science of the day, and it might be lost to sight when near the sun and reappear later. But the presence of a comet would probably have been known to Herod, for comets were thought by Mediterranean ancients to be malefic and of evil omen. They were thought to be of atmospheric and not of astral nature. What the Magi may have thought of comets we do not know. A nova will be seen to fit the case much better.

The planet Mercury is at times to be seen on a few consecutive days shining brightly for a short time, low in the eastern or western sky. But it was well known, its coming could have been foreseen, and it could not possibly have appeared as described in v. 9.

A conjunction of planets may be a magnificent sight. But it could have been predicted, and the planets recognized as they came together and separated.

There was a triple conjunction of Mars, Jupiter and Saturn in the year 1604, accompanied by a sudden and brilliant nova, at one time as bright as Jupiter. This splendid combination deeply impressed Kepler, the great astronomer, mathematician and astrologer. He set to work to ascertain what planetary conjunctions there may have been about the time of our Lord's birth, hoping to find some planetary display which might have been "His Star," and thence to fix the date of the Nativity. He found that in the years B.C. 7 and 6 there had been four remarkable conjunctions of Jupiter and Saturn. His work was re-computed and confirmed about 70 years ago by the German

Astronomer, Encke, by Professor Pritchard,<sup>1</sup> and by the staff of the Astronomer Royal. These agree that Kepler's results were very near the truth, but that the planets had never approached each other nearer than twice the Moon's diameter. Though therefore the Magi might have included these planetary movements in their consideration they could hardly have called the combination "His Star." Kepler himself thought that the actual star must have been a co-incident nova.

No such nova is to be found in any extant list. The records are too fragmentary and incomplete to give proof either way. But whether recorded or not, a nova can satisfy the conditions of the problem. Consider what happens when a nova appears. Without warning some inconspicuous speck amongst the thousand million stars of our sky, a tiny unit almost invisible in the luminous haze of remote space, or perhaps some star already bright enough to be identified by the naked eye, blazes up, and is seen to shine brightly for days, or weeks, or sometimes for years. It may for a time be the brightest star in the heavens: indeed the brightest stars<sup>2</sup> recorded have been novae. It keeps its post unmoved in relation to its apparent neighbours; with them it makes its daily round, rising and setting with the earth's diurnal motion. Sooner or later it fades to its first degree of luminosity, sometimes with marked fluctuations in brightness. In a few cases it has been seen to blaze up afresh after a prolonged interval.

No one can speak certainly about novae, for no one has experience of the physical conditions in a sphere so immense that its radius may be as great as the distance of the earth from the sun, and so hot that its temperature must be computed in millions of degrees. But it is clear that the outburst of a nova transcends in magnitude all other known catastrophes. Such outbursts are thought to occur (in stars greater than the ninth magnitude) ten or twenty times a year, but, because of the immense distance very few are detected.

<sup>1</sup> Memoirs of Royal Astronomical Society, Vol. XXV, p. 119.

<sup>2</sup> Not planets.

It is known that novae after fading may flame up again after a considerable interval. But no one can foretell either the first outbreak or the renewal, so that the appearances of "His Star," if promised and foretold, were irrefragable proof that the message was from God.

The notion of a nova need not have been strange to the Magi, for it was the observation of a nova in B.C. 134 that led Hipparchus, whose own astronomical knowledge came largely from Chaldea, to form the first known Star Catalogue. Between then and A.D. 1927 about 50 novae have been authenticated. The list should now lengthen faster because powerful telescopes, with attached photographic cameras, watch the skies far more efficiently than ever was possible before.<sup>1</sup>

A bright nova, I suggest, blazed forth without visible cause, was seen by the Magi at their home, and was accepted or interpreted by them in the sense they declared. We do not know on how many nights they saw the star, nor why it was not noted at Jerusalem; but of this a recent case suggests a simple explanation. On June 5th, 1918, the tiny eleventh magnitude star, Nova Aquilae, invisible without a very good telescope, began to blaze up; on June 7th it was of the sixth magnitude (just to be seen with good eyes); on June 8th it attained the first magnitude, and surpassed it; on June 9th it was four or five times brighter, and one of the three brightest stars in the sky. It was the brightest nova recorded since Kepler's Nova, 300 years before. It then faded, and by June 23rd it was only of the third magnitude.<sup>2</sup>

It then slowly returned to dimness. The star was well placed for observation in Europe, for it was high above the horizon for many hours every night; but though many knew of it, and looked out for it, they did not see it, for clouds hid it from sight. Its glory lasted for no more than a week.

<sup>1</sup> Almost all the physical facts used here are taken from Russell-Duggan-Stewart's *Astronomy*, Chaps. XIII and XXIII.

<sup>2</sup> In this context "magnitude" means "apparent brightness." Aldebaran is a first magnitude star: Sirius seven or eight times brighter.

So may the Star of the Magi have been a sudden, short-lived brightness, visible where the Magi were, but in Palestine hidden by cloud. The hour or two just before sunrise I shall now try to show was probably the time of night when, and when only, the Star of the Magi was to be seen "in the east," so that a few cloudy dawns at Jerusalem might prevent its ever being seen there.

The Star is twice described in the English texts as "seen in the east." (vv. 2 and 9). This may be read as meaning (a) that the Magi were in the East when they saw it, or (b) that they saw the Star to their eastward. Translators are not agreed as to what the writer wished to signify by ἐν τῇ ἀνατολῇ, and some would render the phrase as (c) at its rising.

The meaning (a), if intended, only repeats what has already been told in v. 1. The meanings (b) and (c) are verbally different, but really the same, for a star seen in the eastern part of the sky cannot but be ascending in altitude, and a star which is ascending in altitude can only be seen in the eastern sky.

If we may accept (b) or (c), the hypothesis of the nova is supported in two respects. It is shewn in the following paragraphs (1) that if "His Star" was not a planet, comet or meteor, and if it was seen only in the eastern sky on the first occasions, it must have been evanescent: (2) that whereas on the first occasions it was seen only in the early mornings, it was not seen again until the Magi were journeying to Bethlehem and saw it at night in their S. and S.W. sky. It must therefore have been an evanescent star. Many months had elapsed, and in the nights intervening it had been dim, until the time came when its bright shining was resumed. For on the intermediate nights it had risen each night four minutes earlier, according to its nature as a star.

(1) That "His Star" should be specially described by astronomers as seen "at its rising," or "in the eastern sky" suggests that they had never seen it except as thus described, in itself a remarkable circumstance. Let me explain by an



instance. On August 22 in each year the bright star Regulus lies almost exactly in the same direction as the sun. It therefore rises and sets with the sun, invisible because of the brightness of the sun. Each succeeding day, as the earth proceeds on its orbital track, the sun lags behind the star, so that after 15 days the time of the rising of Regulus is one hour earlier by the clock, and at this time, in the latitudes of which we speak, Regulus will be visible in the early dawn, and fade out as day sets in. After three weeks, say on September 12th, it will rise in complete darkness, and shine at its full brightness until put out by the oncoming of dawn. During these days Regulus will have been visible "in the east" or "at its rising" only. And if it had shone on no other nights, it might easily have been so distinguished. But Regulus never ceases to shine, except when drowned by sunlight. It continues through the year, shining equably, rising each day four minutes earlier, and can be visible at any time of the night, and in any direction, from N.E. through South to N.W., according to circumstances, until it approaches the sun again. Clearly then a star such as Regulus would not be specified as "His Star" is specified.

Quite different would be the case of a nova which began to develop when close to the sun. Invisible at first, it would gradually come into sight, rising each morning four minutes earlier as the sun drew away. Each morning it would rise in fainter daylight, whilst each hour its own brilliance would increase. In this way a nova might attain very great brilliance in a very few days, being observable each early dawn, and just before it, low in the eastern sky. Each day it would shine until quenched by the approaching daylight. If it were a short lived nova it would on no day be visible for more than an hour or so, and in no direction other than to the eastward. It would be, in fact, a morning star and no more, for it would be dimmed before it was in a position to be seen at any other time.

The same conditions would apply at Jerusalem, but cloudy weather could prevent the star from ever having

been noticed. And if the conditions were as I have suggested, the description "seen in the east" is reasonable and appropriate.<sup>1</sup>

The nova might fade after a few days and revert to its first dimness. The Magi, who by my hypothesis knew that this star was their token, would have taken such careful note of its identity, or of its stellar position if unknown before, that when it shone out the second time they could be sure that it was the same.

(2) The second confirmatory deduction is this. The supposed nova, whether bright or dim, would rise an hour earlier every 15 days, two hours earlier every month. In this way it would be rising in the evening after a few months (or after a year, or years, and the same number of months) and thus could be seen by the Magi on their last march, as described.

In claiming that the great phenomenon may have been produced in the natural order, I do not lessen its miraculous character. I enhance it. For consider, the distance of Nova Aquilae is thought to be of the order of some 1200 light-years:<sup>2</sup> that is to say that the outburst probably occurred before the days of King Alfred, and that the light had traversed space ever since at the rate of eleven million miles a minute. Its greatest luminosity is put at 300,000 times that of the sun. These quantities are immense, far beyond any man's imagination or power of wonder. But, if the Star of the Magi was of this kind, it was planned and its outbreak produced in the depths of space and time by the Divine wisdom and power, which also knew how to adjust and time the doings of the Magi so that they might receive the light from the Star at the right moments.

The Star was to attest to them, and perhaps to countless others, human and super-human, of whom we know nothing,

<sup>1</sup> "And the Gentiles shall come to thy light, and kings to the brightness of thy rising. Isaiah LX. 3.

<sup>2</sup> A light-year is the distance travelled by light in one year. Its length in miles is 6 followed by 12 noughts. If the sun's distance from the earth is represented by one inch, a light-year must be represented by one hundred miles.

the news of the Birth at Bethlehem. Words cannot add to this great wonder, nor can they diminish it. Nor may we limit the meaning which God's wisdom may have made it carry.

#### THE STAR ON THE WAY TO BETHLEHEM

If I had room, I should submit reasons for thinking that the visit of the Magi took place at the time of the first or of the second Passover of the Saviour's infancy, when the Holy Family were likely to have been staying at Bethlehem: that Joseph would have heard of their quest, and made contact with them during the time of their detention at Jerusalem, and that he saw to their being led to his home, perhaps guiding them himself: that the Magi severally received the dream warning after their final interview with Herod, and then, in order to avoid the spies which Herod surely had meant should accompany them, had gone off by night to Bethlehem.

"And lo, the star, which they saw in the east, went before them, till it came and stood over where the young child was." v. 9. [R. V.]

The Magi, then, set out by night. As soon as they came out clear of the streets and buildings of Jerusalem they were able to scan the sky, and there, in its familiar place amongst its apparent neighbours, they saw once more and identified the star which had been their sign and token before they left their home, which had faded, and now had shone out anew.

This re-appearance of "His Star" at the end of the quest was, I have suggested, part of the original announcement to the Magi. However this may be, the renewal of the Star at this moment aroused in their minds the most ardent emotions of wonder, expectation and joy. They would hardly take their eyes off it, and when presently they were led to the Babe, they took the Star as complete and final attestation that this was indeed he whom they had been sent to find.

Four questions now call for attention.

1. Could the same nova shine out again after several months' dimness ?

2. In this case was it the same ?

3. How could it properly be said that the Star "went before them" ?

4. And that it "came and stood over where the young child was" ?

(1). That faded novae are occasionally re-illuminated is an established fact.  $\tau$  Pyxidis, ordinarily of the fourteenth magnitude, rose suddenly to above the eighth magnitude in 1890, 1902, and 1920, that is to say to about 250 times the brightness of its normal.  $\eta$  Carinae is another star of the nova type with several bright maxima. Neither of these stars is ever to be seen by the naked eye, but their very marked fluctuations establish the point that novae may repeat their outbreak, and that therefore the suggestion of a renewed outbreak in "His Star" is not to be set aside as a monstrous notion, unknown to natural science.

(2). The identity of such a star, then as now, could only be known by its observed identity of position. The Magi seem to have had no doubts, but we must allow that they also had no inkling of the enormous number of stars, too dim for the naked eye, which cover the celestial field. So numerous are they that at any moment the moon occults ten thousand stars bigger than the twenty-second magnitude. Of these many must be possible novae, so that the possibility that the second appearance could have been of a star other than the first cannot be excluded. As far as science is concerned the point could only have been decided by observers present on both occasions and armed with instruments of great precision.

The subject calls for modesty and restraint. By the improved methods and instruments of today astronomers keep a far more efficient and fruitful watch than ever before. But they reach only the tiniest part of eternity, and who can tell how small a part of space ? So that



fuller knowledge may lead to much modification. Meantime we can only use the data which we have, and from them it would seem that the occurrence of a second nova, in what seems exactly the spot occupied by the first, is an incalculably rarer event than the re-illumination of the first nova. There is no record of one bright nova following another so soon and so apparently close to the first as to be indistinguishable by persons reasonably practised in astronomy, as we believe that the Magi were.

The fact that no very bright repeat can be cited is no argument either way. It is only a very small proportion of the novae observed which have been seen to shine out anew after fading. Only a very small proportion of the novae observed have been very bright. A very small proportion of a very small proportion of a small total number argues great rarity. It may be therefore that centuries will pass before the re-illumination of a bright nova can be recorded. On the other hand an instance may occur this very night.

Suppose however that the Magi were in very fact mistaken, and the second nova was not the first, the miracle would be no less, for its essence is not the identity of the Star, but the timing and placing on two occasions of the marvellous sign, addressed to the Magi, and by them accepted as conclusive. Besides, we do not know the terms in which the sign may have been promised.

The Magi seem to have seen the Star, not exactly unexpectedly but suddenly. This need not mean that the brilliance came on with the suddenness of an electric light. It would usually take days to develop. Whether on account of cloudy weather, or of the limitations of life in a strange city, this was their first sight of the renewed splendour. How long it shone we are not told, but we may be sure that it would add to Herod's agitation and discomfiture.

(3). How could it be said that the star "went before them"? The Magi were going by night from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, a village nearly five miles away, on the Hebron road, and bearing S  $14^{\circ}$  W. If the Magi used the direct way

their general direction would be a little to the right of South, and they would be 1-2 hours on the way. During such a journey any star first seen in a south-easterly direction would move towards the front of the traveller, and so might be said to go before him.

This process would be specially apparent if, for fear of Herod's men—the same reason which made them travel at dead of night—the Magi had been led by a roundabout way, leaving Jerusalem in a south-easterly direction passing down the course of the Kidron, bearing off to their right as feasible, and at last approaching Bethlehem from its East. The journey would take four hours or so, and during that time any star first observed to the SE would move gradually to the South, and then to SW and West, moving round to the right of the travellers, as the direction of their march also trended towards their right. We must not picture any exact correspondence in either case, for no doubt the way was sinuous, nor yet that the Magi would see any thing strange in behaviour so natural to a star. What held their eyes and moved their deep wonder and reverence was that, in the star now shining before them, they recognised that same star which they had seen before they left their home, and had been told they would see again at the end of their quest. As to the Shepherds the Manger, so to the Magi the sign of the Star.

Let me add that no star could have been seen as described if the Magi had made detour to the westward.

(4). How could the Star have come and stood over where the young Child was? We do not know how high in the sky the Star was when the Magi were shown where the young Child was, but the story requires no more than that whilst they waited for admission they should have seen the star shining to them over the roof of the house. The idea that the Star could have denoted the house by being vertically over it cannot hold, for such a spot on the earth's surface never stands still. It speeds westward about 400 yards a second, and never stops for a moment.

The Star had not guided the Magi, nor had it chosen out the house for them. But when they saw it at this moment it brought them full conviction. It had been promised, and it was to them the final confirmation that they had found him whom they had sought. Without it the Magi could have reported little more than that they had found a very remarkable workman's family with wonderful family beliefs. The Star avouched to them that they had found the King, and that he was indeed the Child before them. It would have been seen also at the home of the Magi, and would have confirmed the truth of their account to many, others, and perhaps to intelligences of orders, unknown to us.

The historical probability of the visit of the Magi is strongly upheld in the *International Critical Commentary*. Here I postulate the visit, and try to show that the appearances of the Star, as required by the account, may be paralleled in modern experience, so that it cannot be claimed that the events in Matthew are contrary to what we know of natural law. There was however a very great miracle, because two unrelated events, far separate in time and in space, the actual outbreaks in the Star and the confirmations to the Magi, were made so to correspond and agree that they became one demonstration of God's wisdom and power.

No man knows the ways of novae, nor why they break out at one time rather than at another. It should not be hard to believe that these particular outbreaks may have had the pre-eminent purpose of attesting the Incarnation of God's Only Son, in the first place (as far as we know) to the Magi, and through them to others. And seeing that the rays and waves of light have never ceased to traverse the depths of space in every direction, it may be that they have not yet ceased to carry their message to beings widely different from ourselves in other parts of the Universe.

CHARLES STEWART SMITH.

## ART. III.—SUFFRAGAN BISHOPS.

## THE RULE AT NICAËA.

THE best way to study the subject of Suffragan Bishops is probably to begin with that which seems most opposed to their existence. The Eighth Canon of the Ecumenical Council of Nicaea lays down the principle that there may not be two bishops in one city. This principle was formulated in A.D. 325, but it was in the mind and practice of Christendom long before. It was well known in the age of St. Cyprian, A.D. 250. He attributed the rise of schism to forgetfulness of the principle that one person at a time is bishop in the Church.<sup>1</sup> His contemporary, Cornelius, Bishop of Rome, consecrated in 251, criticized the consecration of his rival, Novatus, on that very ground.

“This Avenger of the Gospel,” exclaimed the Pope, “did not know that there should be one Bishop in a Catholic Church.”<sup>2</sup>

St. Chrysostom, in discussion with the rival bishop, Sisinnius, at Constantinople, informed his opponent that “the city cannot have two bishops.”

Cyprian’s conception of a local Church is

“a people united to the priest, and a flock which adheres to its pastor. Whence you ought to know that the Bishop is in the Church, and the Church in the Bishop.”<sup>3</sup>

The Emperor Constantine banished Pope Liberius from Rome and had him replaced by Felix. The laity implored him to restore Liberius. Whereupon (A.D. 360) Constantine decreed that Liberius should be recalled from exile and that

<sup>1</sup> *Ep.* liv. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Eusebius, *H.E.* vi, 43, II.

<sup>3</sup> *Ep.* lxviii, 8.



the two bishops conjointly should rule the Church. This imperial edict was published in the circus, and provoked popular ridicule. They all exclaimed with one voice, "One God, one Christ, one Bishop."<sup>1</sup>

But, in fact, the principle was already a Catholic maxim in the time of St. Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, early in the second century. Already the one bishop is the centre of unity in the local church. The Catholic conception of the Episcopate, as Leclerc, the Editor of Hefele, says, excludes the idea of plurality of bishops in the same diocese.<sup>2</sup>

It is essential, however, to appreciate what this Nicene regulation meant. When St. Cyprian, for example, said in a letter that

"when a Bishop is once made and approved by the testimony and judgment of his colleagues and of the people, another can by no means be appointed,"<sup>3</sup>

he was contemplating the case of a person being consecrated as a rival when a diocesan already existed. The question whether a diocesan could have a suffragan under his jurisdiction was not before him.

While this principle of one bishop in a church is of great antiquity and universal acceptance, it is well to see how it was interpreted in practice.

The existence of bishops assisting a diocesan occurs quite early in the primitive Church. The historian Eusebius records an example in the Mother Church of Christendom about the year A.D. 212.<sup>4</sup> Narcissus, Bishop of Jerusalem, was unable, on account of his great age, to perform his official duties; accordingly the Cappadocian Bishop Alexander was appointed as assistant bishop to Narcissus. This is the earliest recorded case. But it has been often noted that numerous examples can be found in the following centuries. Eusebius records another case in the Church of Cæsarea.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Theodoret, *Eccles. Hist.* ii, 14.

<sup>2</sup> *Histoire des Conciles*, i, 586.

<sup>4</sup> *H.E.* vi, 11.

<sup>3</sup> *Ep.* xl.

<sup>5</sup> vii, 32, 21.

“Theotecnus, Bishop of Cæsarea in Palestine, first ordained (Anatolius) as Bishop, designing to make him his successor in his own Diocese after his death. And for a short time both of them presided over the same Church.”

Another instance is given by the historian Sozomen.<sup>1</sup> It is significant that this is another example from the Church of Jerusalem.

“Maximus succeeded Macarius in the Bishopric of Jerusalem. It is said that Macarius had ordained him Bishop of the Church of Diospolis, but that the members of the Church of Jerusalem insisted upon his remaining among them . . . And Maximus remained in Jerusalem, and exercised the priestly functions conjointly with Macarius : and after the death of this latter, he governed the Church . . . Macarius concurred with the people in their desire to retain Maximus.”

This was about the time of the Council of Nicaea, which Macarius attended.

There is also the celebrated North African case of Bishop Valerius of Hippo, who desired to have Augustine consecrated as his episcopal assistant : to be, as Augustine’s biographer Possidius describes it, “Consacerdos.” Augustine had misgivings at the time whether this was not *contra morem ecclesiæ*.<sup>2</sup> But he allowed himself to be overruled. After his consecration he got to know of the Canons of the Council of Nicaea, by which he understood such a case was strictly forbidden. And in his old age, when a similar desire was expressed by his diocese, at a general meeting, to give him a suffragan, a curious scene took place. The people clamoured :

“Thou our Father, Eraclius our Bishop.”

Augustine replied :

“I do not wish that to be done in regard to him which was done in my own case . . . When my father and Bishop, the aged Valerius, of blessed memory, was still living, I was ordained Bishop and occupied the episcopal

<sup>1</sup> *Eccles. Hist.* ii, 20.

<sup>2</sup> *Vita*, viii.

see along with him, which I did not know to have been forbidden by the Council of Nicaea : and he was equally ignorant of the prohibition. I do not wish to have my son here exposed to the same censure as was incurred in my own case.”<sup>1</sup>

Augustine therefore contented himself with designating Eraclius the priest as his successor in the office of bishop, and the consecration was postponed until after Augustine's death.

On this incident Prof. McGiffert, who is one of the most recent editors of *Eusebius' History*, observes that the numerous occurrences of such suffragans

“ show that not all the Church interpreted the principles as rigidly as Augustine did, and hence under certain circumstances exceptions were made to the rule, and were looked upon throughout the Church as quite lawful.”<sup>2</sup>

Bright held that Augustine's scruple about the appointment of an episcopal coadjutor was needless, since by “ two Bishops ” in one city the Council of Nicaea “ clearly meant two Diocesans.”<sup>3</sup>

Bingham had said something similar long before. After giving numerous instances of a diocesan and a coadjutor bishop he said that

“ these instances are evident proof that it was not thought contrary to the true sense of the Canon (of Nicaea) in case of infirmity or old age, to have coadjutors in the Church.”

The canon did not absolutely forbid two bishops to be in a church at the same time in all cases whatsoever, but only when there was no just reason and the necessities of the Church did not require it.<sup>4</sup>

Historians and canonists seem very largely agreed that the Nicene restriction to one bishop in a city was not designed to exclude the consecration of suffragans. They

<sup>1</sup> *Ep.* ccxiii, 4.

<sup>2</sup> p. 256.

<sup>3</sup> *Notes on the Canons*, 1882, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> Bingham, *Origines Eccles.* I, 180.

agree that if a diocesan bishop had several episcopal assistants the principle of diocesan unity would not by any means thereby be injured.<sup>1</sup> The Diocesan is and remains the one possessor of jurisdiction, the true centre of unity for the diocese.

The canonist Bouix says that in a regularly constituted diocese there cannot be two bishops. That is a rule which was maintained in the earliest centuries. But nevertheless, according to Bouix, there are exceptions. It is certain that a bishop may be appointed coadjutor to a diocesan. But generally he is given the name of another place, such as *in partibus infidelium*. Benedict XIV<sup>2</sup> says that in certain cases two bishops had been allowed in one city—a Latin bishop for the Latins, and a Greek for the Greeks. But he wishes that this had never been permitted.

Hammond, in his *Definitions of Faith*,<sup>3</sup> remarks with reference to Canon 8 of Nicaea :

“ The rule of one Bishop only in a city was of universal observance in the Church from the very beginning. . . . This rule, however, did not apply to the case of coadjutors, when the Bishop, from old age or infirmity, was unable to perform the duties of his office.”

Our own theologian, Richard Field, Dean of Gloucester, quotes the case of Boniface, Bishop of Mainz, consecrated A.D. 750, who requested Pope Zacharius to allow him, on the ground of age and infirmity, to consecrate a suffragan. The Pope considered the request perfectly reasonable and granted it.<sup>4</sup>

#### THE CHOREPISCOPUS.

One of the early types of assistant bishops found in the fourth century is known as chorepiscopus. He is mentioned for the first time in the Synod of Ancyra, held A.D. 314. The thirteenth Canon rules that

<sup>1</sup> (e.g. Phillip's *Kirchenrecht* (1846), ii, 100; and Bouix *de Episcopo*.

<sup>2</sup> (*De Synodo Diocesana* II, xii, 7, p. 50).

<sup>3</sup> p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> *Of the Church*. V., ch. xxix, p. 233, where the Pope's reply is quoted.



“ it is not permitted to the Chorepiscopi to ordain priests and deacons : neither is this permitted to the priests of the towns in other parishes (dioceses) without the written authority of the Bishop of the place.”

The intention of this canon is not very clear, and has been differently understood.

But if it is to be understood correctly it must be compared with Canon 10 of the Synod of Antioch held in 341, where it was ruled that

“ the Bishops of the villages and country places called Chorepiscopi ; even if they have received consecration as Bishops, must yet, so it was decided by the holy Synod, keep themselves within their appointed limits, and content themselves with the care and government of the Churches under them, and with appointing readers, sub-deacons, and exorcists, not presuming to ordain a priest or deacon without the Bishop of the city to which the Chorepiscopus himself and the whole district is subject. If anyone dare to infringe these rules, he shall be deprived of his dignity. A Chorepiscopus is to be appointed by the bishop of the city to which he belongs.”

Canon 57 of the Synod of Laodicea, held according to Hefele between A.D. 343-381, says that

“ in villages and in the country no Bishops may be appointed, but visitors and those who are already appointed shall do nothing without the consent of the Bishop of the town, as also the priests may do nothing without consent of the Bishop.”

As to the purpose of this Canon opinion is divided. Hefele says that according to some interpreters it directs that in future priests shall act as visitors in country places instead of rural bishops. Others understand that the rural bishops were in episcopal orders. Hefele's own opinion is that

“ the rules of Laodicea were not fully carried out, for as late as the 5th century we met with very many real chorepiscopi in the country towns and villages of Africa.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *History of the Councils*, II, 321.

Several great writers of past centuries have written on these regulations of the Canons about chorepiscopi. Rabanus Maurus, the learned Abbot of Fulda, Archbishop of Mainz, who died A.D. 856, wrote a treatise on the subject.<sup>1</sup> He calls attention to the fact that the Canon of Ancyra does not simply say that it is not lawful for chorepiscopi to ordain, but that it is not lawful apart from the direction of his bishop, or without a letter in each diocese.

Peter de Marca, Archbishop of Paris (1594-1662), wrote an exhaustive study of the chorepiscopi in his *De Concordia Sacerdotii et Imperii*, Bk. II., ch. xiii.<sup>2</sup> It was disputed as early as the time of Charlemagne whether the chorepiscopi were bishops, and some denied it on the ground that they held no episcopal see. De Marca quoted against this opinion the tenth Canon of the Synod of Antioch, held in 341, which definitely referred to cases in which the chorepiscopi had received consecration as bishops and directed that they must not presume to ordain a priest without the diocesan's consent. De Marca understood the comparison of chorepiscopi to the seventy disciples only to mean that they were subordinate to the Diocesan and held no episcopal jurisdiction. De Marca's own opinion was that the chorepiscopate was a function sometimes conferred upon a priest, and sometimes on a bishop. There were cases in the early centuries where a person already consecrated to the episcopate was nevertheless without a diocese. And to such persons the functions of chorepiscopus were sometimes entrusted. He was a true bishop independently of and previous to his appointment as chorepiscopus. As an illustration of this state of things De Marca referred to the 8th Canon of the Council of Nicaea, which is concerned with the reconciliation of separatist bishops or priests to the Catholic Church—which he understood to mean that those who were consecrated already and returned from schism should be allowed to retain their episcopal dignity, or at least to be placed among the chorepiscopi. Further,

<sup>1</sup> Printed in De Marca's *de Concordia*, III, 586-596.

<sup>2</sup> see pp. 277-282.

De Marca pointed to the 18th Canon of Antioch, which declares that

“ if a Bishop does not go to the Church to which he has been consecrated, not from any fault of his own, but either because the people will not receive him, or from some other cause over which he has no control, he shall retain his office and dignity, only he must not interfere in the affairs of the Church in the place where he dwells, and must accept whatever the full Synod of this eparchy decrees about the matter.”

That is to say, here were bishops unemployed, and it was open to another diocese to avail itself of their episcopal ministrations : always of course on condition that the diocesan bishop accepted the bishop without a see. The Bishop so accepted must keep within the restrictions required of one who has no jurisdiction.

From these same Canons Bellarmine drew the conclusion that the term *chorepiscopus* was used comprehensively to include two classes of assistants to a diocesan. Some of them were simply priests not bishops, others had received episcopal consecration, but were called *chorepiscopi* because they had no diocese of their own. Bellarmine compared these to titular bishops of his own time, who are also known as suffragans.<sup>1</sup>

Bingham, who died in 1722, inquiring into the subject of *chorepiscopi*, explains their origin as follows :

“ As the Bishops, when they were disabled by old age or infirmity, ordained themselves coadjutors in the city ; so when their Dioceses were enlarged by the conversion of Pagans in the country and villages at a great distance from the City Church, they created for themselves another sort of assistants in the country, whom they called *Chorepiscopi*.”

Bingham was of opinion that the *chorepiscopi* were truly consecrated to the episcopate.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *De Clericis*, 17. (Ed. Fevre, 1870. II, p. 452.).

<sup>2</sup> *Origines Eccles.* II, ch. xiv, pp. 181 ff.

## BISHOPS WITHOUT A SEE.

A further development of the Episcopate is that commonly known as titular bishops. As early as A.D. 341, the case of bishops without a see is mentioned (Canon 16). Difficulties of this kind frequently arose in the early persecutions. There were cases where the bishop was driven out of his diocese, or exiled by imperial power. Bishops expelled from lands occupied by the Saracens were often adopted as suffragans to a diocesan elsewhere.<sup>1</sup>

Similar cases arose in Spain during the occupation of many provinces of that Kingdom by the Moors. More difficult problems were created when the Latin Church consecrated titular Patriarchs for the East and the Latin aspirations failed. Bishops *in partibus infidelium* were frequent. When the Latin possessions in the Holy Land were lost to the Church a great number of bishops were deprived of their sees and of their occupations. Some of these, says Robertson, were found useful by the prelates of the West in the fulfilment of episcopal functions.<sup>2</sup> It was thought well to retain the title of bishop *in partibus infidelium* in the hope that the East might yet be recovered. Employment was accordingly found for many of these bishops as suffragans in the diocese of another.

With regard to bishops who have no diocese of their own, the Council of Trent directed that

“ none of the bishops who are called titular, even though they may reside, or tarry in a place within no diocese, . . . shall by virtue of any privilege granted them to promote during a certain time such as come unto them, be able to ordain, or to promote to any sacred or minor orders, or even to the first tonsure, the subject of another bishop, . . . without the express consent of, or without letters demissory from that individual's own bishop.”<sup>3</sup>

The Canonist Van Espen, who died in 1728, says that

<sup>1</sup> Pellicia Polity, (1883), p. 83. Binterim, *Suffraganei* (1843), p. 42.

<sup>2</sup> *History of the Christian Church* (1874), VI, 418.

<sup>3</sup> Session XIV, cap. ii. Waterworth, p. 113.



in contemporary France titular bishops were admitted to hold ordinations with the consent of the Diocesan.<sup>1</sup>

Yet another class of bishops subordinate to a diocesan arose in the later stages of the Church's history. These were coadjutor bishops, sometimes temporary, sometimes permanent and with the right of succession on the death or removal of their diocesan. This method was regulated in the Council of Trent which, so far as the Latin Church is concerned, restricted the granting of a coadjutor with the right of succession to the Pope.<sup>2</sup> Benedict XIV says of coadjutor bishops that they have no jurisdiction so long as their diocesan lives, except what he may assign to them.<sup>3</sup> But if the coadjutor has the right of succession he assumes jurisdiction immediately on his diocesan's decease.<sup>4</sup>

#### CREATION OF DIOCESES.

It has of course to be remembered that simultaneously with this consecration of assistant bishops of these various kinds there was the creation of dioceses, the determination of the extent of a diocese, and in many cases the process of sub-division.

It is not easy to discover any universally accepted idea in the early centuries as to what the extent of a diocese ought to be. Sometimes it may have been confined to a town: sometimes its limits were undefined. What did St. Ignatius of Antioch mean when he called himself the Bishop of Syria? In some cases a diocese was extensive, in others apparently small. The multiplication of diocesan bishops in North Africa is well known. There seem to have been some 400 dioceses: but even then, there were, in certain instances, Suffragans. The number of small dioceses in mediaeval Italy is also remarkable.

The sub-division of dioceses has at some periods been

<sup>1</sup> *Jus Ecclesiasticum*, 1769. T. 93 (Pass. i. Tit. xv. cap. iv).

<sup>2</sup> Session XXV, cap. vii. Waterworth, p. 262.

<sup>3</sup> *De Synodo Diocesano* xiii, c. 10. par. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Vering *Kirchenrecht*, 1876, p. 561.

carried out to a quite surprising degree. In the early part of the 14th century (A.D. 1317) Pope John XXII turned the diocese of Toulouse into an Archbishopric, and created five dioceses out of what had formerly been one. He did it on principle, and published his reasons in a Bull, which affirmed that the increase of population renders the increase of chief pastors essential to the cultivation of the Lord's vineyard. He acted on this same method in other parts of France. The Historian Guettée says that John XXII has been blamed for taking this course.<sup>1</sup> But the historian points out that in the early centuries of the Church the multiplication of dioceses was usual and was one of the chief reasons why the dioceses were well administered. A bishop cannot fulfil episcopal duties adequately so long as he has too great a number of priests and parishes under his care. It is better for the Church, urged Guettée, that dioceses should be small and numerous, rather than of vast extent.

#### SUFFRAGANS IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH.

We now pass from the place of Suffragan Bishops in the Church at large to their place in the Church of England.

Bishop Stubbs gives an instructive list of English bishops who were not diocesans in the three centuries immediately preceding the Reformation. In this list he includes all bishops bearing foreign titles, who were employed in occasional duties in English dioceses, and several who were consecrated for the special relief of aged bishops or overgrown dioceses—during the period 1266–1545. Among them is a surprising number of foreign refugees, bishops who had resigned their sees, and bishops *in partibus infidelium*. The variety of their titles is interesting. They include an Archbishop of Edessa, an Archbishop of Damascus, and an Archbishop of Nazareth. Also a Bishop of Sardis, a Bishop of Laodicea, a Bishop of Chrysopolis, a Bishop of Christopolis, a Bishop of Hebron, a Bishop of Philippopolis,

<sup>1</sup> *Histoire de l'Église de France*, 1856, V, 403–406.

a Bishop of Chalcedon, and Bishops of Gallipoli, of Ascalon, of Cyrene, of Negropont, of Lystra, of Philadelphia, of Neapolis, and of Hippo.

In the centuries immediately before the Reformation it is said that there were more than 300 assistant bishops in England between 1300–1535.

Henry VIII, in 1534, passed an Act (26. H. VIII, cap. 14) which followed this precedent by giving a list of thirty-six places for which Suffragan Bishops might be appointed. Under this Act suffragans were made. It ceased in 1600. Yet the Canons of 1603 take their existence for granted and regulate their position. However suffragans ceased until 1870 when, at the request of Bishop Wordsworth of Lincoln, the practice was revived.

In the Act of Henry VIII in 1534 (26. H. VIII. cap. 14), it was declared that

“ no provision hitherto hath been made for Suffragans, which have been accustomed to be had within this realm, for the more speedy administration of the Sacraments and other good wholesome and devout things and laudable ceremonies, to the increase of God’s honour, and for the commodity of good and devout people: be it therefore enacted by the Authority of this present Parliament that the Towns of Thetford, Ipswich, Colchester, Dover, Guildford, Southampton, Taunton, Shaftesbury, Melton, Marlborough, Bedford, Leicester, Gloucester, Shrewsbury, Bristol, Penrith, Bridgwater, Nottingham, Grantham, Hull, Huntingdon, Cambridge, and the towns of Perth and Berwick, St. Germans in Cornwall, and the Isle of Wight, shall be taken and accepted for Sees of Bishops Suffragans to be made in this Realm, and the Bishops of such Sees shall be called Suffragans of this Realm. And that every Archbishop and Bishop of this Realm and of Wales and elsewhere within the King’s dominions, being disposed to have any Suffragan, shall and may at their liberties name and elect, that is to say, every one of them for their peculiar Dioceses, two honest and discreet Spiritual persons, being learned, and of good conversation,

and those two persons so by them to be named, shall present to the King's Highness, by their writing under their seals, making humble request to His Majesty to give to one such of the said two persons as shall please His Majesty, such title name stile and dignity of Bishop of such of the Sees above specified, as the King's Highness shall think most convenient for the same.<sup>1</sup>"

In the Canons of 1603 the existence of suffragan bishops is contemplated and taken for granted. It is directed in Canon 60 that Confirmations shall be taken by the bishop, or by his suffragan.

### THEIR REVIVAL IN THE XIXTH CENTURY.

One of the advocates for the revival of Suffragan Bishops in the English Church was J. H. Newman. His Essay may still be read in the second volume of the *Via Media*, originally published in 1835.

Newman urged the restoration in the English Church of what he called

"the primitive Institution of Suffragans, that is District Bishops, as assistants to the Diocesans of each."

He thought that the problem of incomes might be solved by appointing a suffragan to a Cathedral dignity. He argued that if the Cathedral and Collegiate dignities may be made subservient to diocesan purposes to improve the diocesan system as the Ecclesiastical Commission proposed, why may they not be utilised for the same purpose in another way?

"Why not employ them in the endowment of a certain number of suffragan or Assistant Bishops, to take the charge of districts in relief of certain Sees?"

He understood that Cranmer's scheme was to add new sees and also suffragans:

"finding the whole number of Bishops 21 he designed to raise it at least to 60, that is, to treble it, with a view to meet the wants of the Church in that day."

<sup>1</sup> Gibson, *Codex*, I, 134.



Newman seriously questioned whether a population of a million and more was ever intended to be the charge of one man. Newman enlarged upon the evil effects on the diocesan.

“Such vast charges must be distressing even to the most vigorous minds ; oppressing them with a sense of responsibility, if not, rather, engrossing, dissipating, and exhausting their minds with the mere formal routine of business. If they are able to sustain such duties, they are greater than the inspired Lawgiver of Israel, who said, ‘I am not able to bear all this people alone, because it is too heavy for me.’ Nothing is more necessary to the Rulers of the Church than that they should have seasons of leisure. A whirl of business is always unfavourable to depth and accuracy of religious views. It is one chief end of the institution of the ministerial order itself, that there should be men in the world who have time to think apart from it, and live above it, in order to influence those whose duties call them more directly into the bustle of it.”

Discussing the alternative solutions of overworked diocesans, which are of course either to divide the see, or else to provide suffragans, Newman left the former to be advocated by others. Personally he considered it inadvisable.

“It is an organic change and so irretrievable. It is a measure taken without trial, the abrupt passing into law of what is an experiment. Moreover, as multiplying centres of government, it tends to dissipate the energies of the Church, and admits the risk of dissension and discordance of operation.”

Accordingly, the expedient of creating suffragans, which is an increase of bishops without an increase of sees, seemed to Newman in all respects the safest as well as the simplest mode of relieving such diocesans as at present are oppressed by an excess of pastoral duties. It was in his opinion a restoration in principle of the primitive chorepiscopi—that is, bishops who had no independent jurisdiction and territory of their own.

In the Diocese of London the restoration of Suffragan Bishops was advocated officially by Archdeacon Hale in his Charge to the Clergy in 1856. It was the time when the Bishop of London (Blomfield) was attacked with serious illness and incapacitated. Archdeacon Hale reminded the clergy of London that

“ for about 200 years before the Reformation there was a perfect succession of such Bishops in almost all the Dioceses of England.<sup>1</sup>”

He quoted from Bishop Gibson's *Codex*<sup>2</sup> words all the more remarkable since Gibson was Bishop for 33 years from 1715-1748,

“ the Institution being of such evident use in large dioceses, and under infirm and aged Bishops, especially for the work of Confirmation, it is humbly to be referred to the wisdom of our Governors to inquire for what causes they have been so long disused, and to consider how far the revival of them would be serviceable to the Church of Christ.”

#### CONVOCATION ON SUFFRAGANS.

The official deliberations of the English Church on the subject of Suffragan Bishops should be grouped together and taken by themselves.

The increase of the Episcopate was discussed in the Lower House of the Canterbury Convocation in 1866. It was recommended that there should be a sub-division of dioceses and an appointment of suffragan or coadjutor bishops. The general tone was in favour of both. The Diocese of London was for a second time suffering from the illness of its Bishop, which was attributed in great measure to the overwhelming burden of his episcopal duties. It was observed by Archdeacon Wordsworth that

“ the Diocese was left without a head, and its episcopal duties were delegated to other prelates who are almost

<sup>1</sup> *Charge*, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> i, 136.

strangers to it, and some of whom are already overburdened by the work of their own Dioceses, which claim their first care."

It was urged by Chancellor Massingford that for 400 years at least before the Reformation, suffragan bishops had existed. They were equivalent to the chorepiscopi of an earlier period. It was said that in the Diocese of Exeter the system of suffragan bishops had been in operation for some time past. They had had a number of Colonial bishops acting to all intents and purposes as suffragans.<sup>1</sup>

When the petition of the Lower House was discussed by the Upper, the Bishop of Lincoln said that the work of his diocese precluded him from paying attention as he ought to other matters connected with the general welfare of the Church, and that he had no time for private study which was a matter of great importance. Division of dioceses was widely approved. The appointment of suffragan bishops involved a good many and somewhat nice questions. The appointment of a suffragan as coadjutor would be very desirable. But there might be very great difficulties. Resignation was in certain cases undesirable. Difficulties were at that time raised by the legal authorities. The method of calling on one diocesan to withdraw his energies from his own diocese to administer the affairs of another was a disadvantage to both.

The case was contemplated of a great number of suffragan bishops left without episcopal functions on the death of the diocesans who appointed them.

The resignation of bishops just at a time when wisdom is most mature, experience longest, knowledge of the diocese most complete, was deeply to be regretted.<sup>2</sup>

At a later date (June 29) the Upper House held that the appointment of a coadjutor *cum successione* would be unadvisable, and ought not to be recommended as suited to the Church of England. Suffragan bishops might hold important posts, such as Deaneries and Canonries.

<sup>1</sup> *Chronicle of Convocation of Canterbury* (1866), pp. 324-29.

<sup>2</sup> *Op cit.* pp. 350-59.

When the Convocation of Canterbury reassembled in 1869 the House of Bishops held a somewhat inconclusive discussion on assistant bishops. Much was said in favour of making use of returned Colonial bishops, to help where help was needed in English sees. The existence of such bishops was considered a providential solution of their difficulty. But the subject was withdrawn and no decision reached.<sup>1</sup>

In 1869 the Upper House of the Canterbury Convocation was greatly influenced by the view expressed in the Cathedral Report of 1854, that the best solution of the difficulty of increase of the episcopate would be a statement empowering the appointment of a coadjutor with the right of succession to the see, subject of course to the diocesan's consent. A change of mind was very evident. They had previously inclined to suffragan bishops, then to Colonial bishops assisting, and now to coadjutor bishops. It was now said that the proposal of coadjutor bishops had the sanction of primitive Christianity and antiquity. What appeared to be influential was the reflection that a suffragan bishop is one who may be appointed to assist bishops who are not infirm, whereas a coadjutor should be assigned to infirm bishops. The method of coadjutors was also adopted in the American Church.

It was further observed that the fact that a Colonial bishop resigned his see appeared, with some splendid exceptions, a presumably good reason for not employing him in a much larger and more laborious diocese at home. Moreover, to appoint Colonials was to overlook the claims of clergy at home. Accordingly, the coadjutor scheme was at that time most in favour.

In 1921 a request was made by a number of suffragan bishops to the Southern Convocation that, in virtue of their episcopal office, they should be granted seats in the Upper House of Bishops. Their request was introduced into the Upper House by Bishop Gibson of Gloucester. He was, however, compelled to own that there was no historic pre-

<sup>1</sup> *Chronicle of Canterbury*, 1869, pp. 174-77.



cedent for any right of bishops who were not diocesans to a place and a vote in Convocation. It was also felt impossible to give them a place in the Church Assembly, since the House of Bishops and the House of Clergy in that Assembly were identical with the Upper and Lower Houses of Convocation. It was, however, recommended that at the beginning of each fresh Convocation the suffragan bishops might be invited to be present at all the sessions of the Upper House and take full part in the discussion, but without the power of voting. The difficulty in the way of this *via media* obviously was that nearly half of the existing suffragans were either Archdeacons or elected Proctors for the clergy, and therefore in that capacity had already a place in the Lower House of Convocation. It was not possible for the Upper House to draw away from the Lower House such Archdeacons as were also in episcopal orders. Nor was it possible for the same individual to occupy a seat in both Houses. All therefore that could be done, as things stood at present, would be to invite that section of the suffragans who had no place in the Lower House to come and join in the deliberations of the Upper.

Against this proposal the Bishop of Worcester (Dr Pearce) contended. The Upper House of Convocation had always been restricted to diocesans. A suffragan held his commission from his diocesan and could not sit and vote in the Upper House as an equal, since at any time his commission might be withdrawn. But some thought there was no reason why they should not come as advisers without voting.

It was represented by the President that Convocation had an immemorial constitution, which it would be an extremely difficult process to alter. They were precluded from declaring that all suffragan bishops should be *ipso facto* members of the Upper House. They could not alter Convocation. Nor should they alter its constitution in the Assembly. Nor should they take Archdeacons out of the Lower House. There were 20 suffragans at the time in the Province of Canterbury. Probably no one would after

reflection propose that all retired Bishops in England should be also members of the Upper House. There were at the moment 77 retired bishops.

The conclusion ultimately reached was that at the beginning of every new Convocation all the suffragan bishops of the Province who actually held commissions, and who are not, in virtue of some other qualification, members of the Lower House, should be invited to be present at all sessions of the Upper House, and to give their opinion on any matter under discussion.<sup>1</sup>

This was carried, under protest from the Bishop of Worcester.<sup>2</sup>

In June, 1931, the subject of suffragan bishops was once more debated in both Houses of the Southern Convocation.

There are no fewer than 30 suffragan bishops in England at the present time. It was recognised, although none too effusively, that they have done and are doing a very valuable work. But they have no jurisdiction and no ultimate authority. Their position is precarious. They have no security of tenure. A suffragan holds his office during the life of his diocesan. A new diocesan is under no obligation to continue to employ his predecessor's suffragans. It was said, of course, that the system worked, and that the diocesans put up with their predecessor's creations, although there have been exceptions to this rule. Yet the fact is undeniable that a suffragan is liable to find himself among the unemployed, unless he is also an incumbent or a Canon in the Cathedral Body.

The anomalies attendant on his present position were enlarged on in Convocation. But the remedy was not so clear. The financial problem dominated the debate; and this was embarrassed by the existing economic distress which rendered it peculiarly inopportune and unwise to suggest large incomes for suffragan bishops at a time when everyone is suffering from restricted means.

<sup>1</sup> *Chronicle of Convocation*, 1922, p. 213.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.* 1923, p. 8.

It is a significant feature of the debate that the system of suffragan bishops was adversely criticised in 1931 by diocesans in the Upper House. The contrast between the utterances of diocesans in 1931 and those of their predecessors in 1921 was conspicuous. The reasons for this change of opinion were not made clear. It was even urged in 1931 that suffragans should be the exception and not the normal condition ; that nothing should be done to consolidate the system ; and that it would be far the best if it came to an end.

Quite in accordance, however, with the characteristic spirit of the age, the debate displayed far more critical than constructive power. For it was by no means agreed whether the alternative method was or was not a very considerable sub-division of dioceses. The President himself deprecated sub-division if carried out on an extensive scale. There were dangers in making a diocese too small. But it was not made clear how the vast populations of some modern dioceses were to be brought within the administrative capacities of a single diocesan chief. What the Bishops would propose to do in the case of the Diocese of London was not explained.

#### THEIR INCREASE.

To these deliberations of the Church in conference must be added an outline of the revival of suffragan bishops which had been actually in process all this while.

Christopher Wordsworth of Lincoln was the first to revive the office of suffragan bishop in the English Church. He did this in the very first year of his episcopate. Thus Dr Mackenzie became Suffragan Bishop of Nottingham. This was in 1870, and it was followed by a similar action on the part of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Winchester.<sup>1</sup>

In 1880, the Bishop of London (Bishop Jackson) made Dr Walsham How his suffragan, and appointed him to what

<sup>1</sup> *Chronicle of Convocation*, 1922, p. 194.

was practically independent charge of the northern and eastern portions of the diocese. For all practical purposes Bishop Walsham How as suffragan had sole responsibility for a considerable part of the Diocese of London. When Frederick Temple became Bishop of London he refused to allow this division of his diocese. No suffragan could possess an independent responsibility.

"I may delegate work," said the future Archbishop of Canterbury, "but responsibility I cannot delegate."

"A man must either be responsible and rule, or be irresponsible and obey. He must either take the lead or follow." "I am Bishop of the Diocese and cannot divest myself of what belongs to my office."

Dr Temple's judgment was unquestionably right, and it speaks volumes for the character of both bishops that they continued on that basis to work together, their mutual esteem increasing. But the case illustrates the importance that the Church should be directed by generally understood and accepted principles, and not by the diverse opinions of individual bishops.

#### COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS.

We have attempted so far to collect some of the facts of history, and to summarise the evidence. It remains to make some comments and to draw conclusions.

The evidence gathered from the early centuries, as well as from the mediaeval and later period, proves that it is not in accordance with historic precedent to regard bishops suffragan as temporary makeshifts. It is not correct to say that bishops subordinate to a diocesan are a late mediaeval development. The evidence is quite conclusive that they are nothing of the kind. There is apparently no period of the Church's history, since at any rate the fourth century, when they have not existed. And there is no time in which they have been regarded by the Church at large as inconsistent with the Church's principles.

It is not possible to condemn altogether the method of episcopal assistants to a diocesan without involving oneself



in a wholesale condemnation of a practice sanctioned very widely and during many centuries of the Church's life.

The general principle on which the rightfulness of suffragan bishops rests, is that an ordained man may be authorised to discharge any function which his ministerial order allows. It is manifestly not true that the only person who can ordain to priesthood is a diocesan bishop. Ordination is a prerogative of the episcopate. It is of course a prerogative which may never be exercised without diocesan authorisation. But it is certainly within the power of a diocesan to entrust episcopal functions within his diocese to any man who is episcopally consecrated.

As long ago as 1726, Joseph Bingham, criticising the size of an English diocese, observed :

“ One great objection against the present Diocesan Episcopacy, and that which to many may look the most plausible, is drawn from the vast extent and greatness of most of the Northern Dioceses of the World, which make it so extremely difficult for one man to discharge all the offices of the episcopal function.”

Accordingly, he reminded his contemporaries :

“ The Church of England has usually followed the larger model, and had very great and extensive dioceses ; for at first she had but seven bishoprics in the whole nation, and those commensurate in a manner to the seven Saxon kingdoms. Since that time she has thought it a point of wisdom to contract her dioceses, and multiply them into above twenty : and if she should think fit to add forty or a hundred more, she would not be without precedent in the practice of the primitive Church.”<sup>1</sup>

The Diocese of London is an outstanding case to which the method of suffragan bishops applies. It is widely felt that this is not a case for sub-division into a whole series of small dioceses. It is a diocese whose importance is unique, and that for many reasons. It is in many ways more like a province than an ordinary diocese. But so long as it remains more or less in its present extensiveness it is simply

<sup>1</sup> *Antiquities* III, p. 222-23.

impossible that it can ever be administered by one episcopal chief. (The alternative lies between sub-division and suffragans). The impossibility has been acknowledged, at least since 1880, when Walsham How was made suffragan in the London Diocese. And the necessity of suffragans for London has grown more imperative ever since.

More than 20 years ago, Bishop Creighton, suffering under the heavy burden of the London Diocese, said :

“ I shall soon cease to have any intellect at all. I never have time to read a serious book, or take in new ideas. I am always talking, writing business letters, deciding questions and being interviewed.”

At the beginning of the present century it was complained in *The Church Quarterly Review* that the Wilberforce idea had impressed itself on the public mind so that a bishop is expected to lead a life of incessant activity. When the Birmingham Bishopric was created it was observed that

“ it is a bad policy in any Church to lay so exaggerated a burden upon its chief officer as—unless he is a giant in physical, mental and spiritual capacity—to make it impossible that the work can be properly done.”

It is certainly to the interest of the Church that it should possess leaders who have time to think, and whose capacities of thought should not be dissipated by endless details of minor ministration.

The same necessity of episcopal assistants applies to primatial sees. It is not customary for the Pope to discharge the ordinary episcopal functions in Rome, but to delegate them to a suffragan. It is of interest to note that Archbishop Randall Davidson writing the *Life of Archbishop Tait*, said that

“ every year which has passed since then has made it increasingly certain that no Archbishop of Canterbury, however vigorous and robust, will hereafter be able to do without this assistance.”<sup>1</sup>

That prediction has certainly been verified and must secure the approval of all who appreciate the enormous,

<sup>1</sup> ii., 57.

overwhelming and incessant responsibilities, many of them world-wide, which press upon those to whom Primacy is committed.

But if the legitimacy, reasonableness, and indeed necessity, of suffragan bishops is acknowledged in such cases as the great Diocese of London and the Archepiscopal sees, it is not consistent to characterise a suffragan as a mere anomaly. It would be more accurate to say that he has become an indispensable adaption of the episcopate to the requirements of modern life.

The fact is that we are confronted with an alternative. Either there must be a sub-division of existing dioceses, or else there must be suffragan bishops. It is certainly significant that the multiplication of small dioceses is considered inadvisable and dangerous by the Primate himself. In the 1931 Convocation the Archbishop expressly cautioned the bishops against this solution of the difficulty. If then that side of the alternative is rejected, the solution by suffragan bishops alone remains.

W. J. SPARROW-SIMPSON

## ART. IV.—GÖETHE

## I. THE CENTENARY

THE name of Goethe looms large at the present day. We can hardly take up a Review, or even a daily paper, without being confronted with it ; while books about him are being published in almost every European country. In a few months there will probably be a change ; the name will disappear from the papers ; the flow of books will come to a full stop, and once more the majority of people will return complacently to the view that Goethe was a great writer, who may be discussed and talked about, but whom it is not necessary to read. This Centenary will follow then, the course of other Centenaries ; and before it passes, it may not be waste of time to ask—" Has Goethe anything to offer to the present age which it really needs, and how much of his work is of permanent value ? " We shall not, therefore, join in the chorus of rather indiscriminate praise which is being raised at the present time, but content ourselves with asking what has he to offer to those who come to his works for the first time knowing that he is a great figure in the world of literature, and with no special bias in his favour.

In England Goethe is far less widely known now, than he was sixty years ago. The influence of Carlyle and later of Arnold, the work of Lewes, and the translations by Miss Swanwick, gave him a great vogue in Victorian England. Carlyle regarded him as a moralist rather than as an artist, and unconsciously adapted Goethe's views to suit his purpose ; for Goethe was certainly not the Apostle of ascetic renunciation that Carlyle would wish him to be. Arnold found in Goethe's calm optimism an anodyne for



the fret and fever of modern life which he so abhorred. So he could write.

“ He took the suffering human race,  
He read each wound, each weakness clear.  
And struck his finger on the place,  
And said Thou ailest here and here.”

and again,

“ He said the end is everywhere,  
Art still has truth, take refuge there.”

Later in the century there came a reaction. This was largely due to the fact that Germany was producing little good literature at that time. One genius she had ; an incomparable artist, and courageous thinker, Nietzsche, but his work was by no means popular, either in his own country or in others. People looked to Germany for music, the great name of Wagner obscured all others ; and those in search of literary gods turned to Paris, and then to Russia, and Germany was forgotten.

Thus the taste of the older generation was formed not on Goethe, or Schiller or Heine, but on Balzac, Flaubert, Huysmans, Baudelaire, and others. Then came what we may call the Russian invasion, Tolstoy, Turgenev, Dostoieffsky were the giants of the day. And in England we had Meredith, Hardy and for the more precious, George Moore. None of these were influenced by German thought, and the whole trend of literary opinion in England was away from Germany to France and Russia.

As a consequence there is very little knowledge even among literary and cultivated people at the present day of the works of Goethe ; we have all, of course, read about him, but how many of us have read him ? Those who come to his works for the first time will certainly need guidance. Otherwise they will be like a man suddenly plunged in the ocean, or like one lost in a vast wood. They will waste endless time in finding what is of real and permanent value. For it is no use mincing matters ; Goethe probably produced more dull and poor work than any great author has been guilty of before or since. Like all the

writers of his time he wrote vastly too much ; in doing so, he is in good company, for the same charge must be brought against Scott, Wordsworth, Shelley, and even Keats ; and this intolerable diffuseness mars the work of the age immediately succeeding his ; for Dickens, Thackeray, Tennyson and Browning sinned in exactly the same way. It was an era of copious output ; one shudders to think of how much bad poetry Shelley would have written, if he had lived to the age of seventy. But Goethe wrote more than all. His works run to some 150 volumes. No man could write so much and write always well. The chaff must be separated from the wheat, and what remains will be sufficient to fill perhaps three or four volumes of fair size. The would-be student of Goethe would be well advised to confine his attentions to the first part of *Faust*, the *Helena*, and the closing scenes of the second part, the *Iphigena in Tauris*, the *Torquato Tasso*, and the lyrics, though these, of course, cannot be adequately judged in a translation. The rest may be left to the curious, or the out and out devotee who finds everything Goethe wrote of interest, just as those of us who are real Wordsworthians can face without flinching the Ecclesiastical Sonnets, or the duller portions of the *Excursion*.

## II. THE MAN

The life of Goethe was one of extraordinary interest, not only because he was a man of complex and subtle character, but also because he lived through one of the most important and stirring times of History. Born in 1749 in the age of Frederick the Great, he lived until 1832. Thus he saw the end and break up of the *Ancien Régime*, and the birth of the modern world.

“ The poet who in his young years, had been nurtured on Rousseau, lived to see in Byron the herald of the modern spirit.”

Thus Goethe was contemporary with the fall of the Bourbons, he saw France swept by the terrors of the Revolution, he was to know the experience of his country being invaded by

foreign forces ; he witnessed the rise and fall of Napoleon ; he met the man of destiny face to face, and received his homage. Now it is quite true that Goethe saw much of this as it were from a distance ; he lived most of his life attached to a small German Court ; Paris, Vienna, London he never saw, and in Berlin he never felt at home. At the same time the whole world was changing and being remade around him ; he could not help being influenced by these great events, and as a philosopher and poet he was bound to ask the reason for the tragic happenings of his day. Goethe saw plainly the faults of the old order, still he wished to preserve what was good ; he had no belief in wholesale destruction, nor was he under any illusions as to the dangers of popular control. He has been accused of being indifferent to what we now call " Social Reform," yet of late years we have been so surfeited with twaddling talk and high-faluting sentiment on this subject, that we shall not find it difficult to forgive him for this. We have also too often been reminded that when an artist becomes obsessed with this subject, as Charles Kingsley was, and Mr Galsworthy is, he generally ceases to be an artist, and we lose more than we gain. Many at the present day become impatient because Goethe seems to lack that faith in democracy which it is the fashion to profess. Certainly he refused to believe that the Voice of the People was the Voice of God, and was he so very wrong ? We have lived through a war which made the world safe for democracy, we are now living in a world where our saved democracy is robbing life with impunity of much that gives it real value and beauty. A little of Goethe's calm judgment and cool criticism would assuredly do us no harm at the present day.

Goethe has himself described for us the earlier years of his life, until he decided to accept the Duke of Weimar's invitation to become an official at his court. Professor Robertson says :

" By common consent *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, is one of the great autobiographies of the world's literature,"

but he rather qualifies his statement when he adds :

“ The most serious disadvantage of Goethe’s autobiography in modern eyes is its lack of spontaneity ; one misses the spirit of youth in this record of one of the most delightful youth-times in the annals of literature. The figures that appear in it seem too often to be moved like chess figures across the board ; its apothegmatic dogmatism, and its heavy periods are wearisome and often chilling.”

If we judge the work as an autobiography pure and simple, we must own that it compares badly with the Confessions of Rousseau, and that it lacks the intense vitality and simple sincerity of Scott’s journal. Goethe never wrote really well in prose ; his style is heavy and lumbering, except in parts of Werther and Wilhelm Meister ; it was in poetry alone that he found himself, and when, as in the prison scene in Faust, he changed prose into verse, the change was all to the good. Still if we regard the *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, not as an ordinary autobiography, but rather as the meditation of a man, now old, upon his past youth, seeking to interpret it in the light of his riper wisdom, then we shall find much in it to delight us. And though the passage of time, and also the writer’s deliberate intention to throw a veil of poetic glamour over past events, lead sometimes to inaccuracy and unconscious misrepresentation, still the book remains a store-house of information with regard to Goethe’s youth—that youth of genius, which when the book closes, had already produced the “ Sorrows of Werther,” and “ Goetz von Berlichingen.”

Goethe’s almost life-long sojourn at the Court of Weimar, has been regarded as a curse and as a blessing. There is truth, in both points of view. It was a blessing in that it gave him security and an established position. It saved him from the hardships of poverty, and the grinding struggle against adverse circumstances, which have broken the spirit of so many men of letters. But on the other hand, long connection with a petty court encouraged in him a certain stiffness of manner, a cold pomposity, which many



of those who came to worship genius found repellant and unpleasing. Moreover, much of his time had to be wasted over official duties, all of which he performed with scrupulous care. It is true that an artist may be none the worse, nay, even the better, for being forced to face the practical side of life ; but it was ludicrous that a man of European fame should be called upon to exhaust his energies in trying to reform a third-rate provincial theatre, or should be employed as a recruiting officer. In a Gilbert and Sullivan Opera, such things might pass: in real life they are a subject for tears rather than laughter. If Goethe had been a lesser man he would have become a mere court flunkey, content to exercise his talents in producing court entertainments, and writing occasional verses of compliment ; nothing shows his greatness more clearly than that in the stifling atmosphere of a petty court, he was able to write the works he did, and to develop his view of life, impeded but not conquered.

Goethe often broke away from Weimar, though generally only for short periods. But his long absence in Italy from 1786 to 1788 was one of the most decisive periods of his life ; freedom from the stuffy atmosphere in which he was condemned to live, acted on him as a spiritual tonic, and the Goethe who left Italy was a better man, if not a better artist than the Goethe who came to it for the first time. He has recorded his impressions for us in the *Italienische Reise* ; this, though delightful in parts, is a somewhat disappointing work, because it is badly arranged, full of irrelevant detail, and too often irritates by giving us information which we should prefer to find in the ordinary guide book. Nothing indeed brings out the limitations of Goethe's mind more clearly than the record of his Italian experiences. He was of course, enthusiastic over the classical remains ; he had a somewhat curious admiration for the architecture of Palladio, but to all the glories of Renaissance art he seems to have been almost blind, though as Professor Robertson says, he " speaks with warm admiration of Michel Angelo and Raphael, but the great quality in these masters which

he appreciated was their fulfilment of the promise of antiquity."

Nor did he shew any real appreciation of Italian literature. For Dante he had an instinctive dislike, Ariosto and Tasso meant little or nothing to him. He wrote a play about Tasso, he knew about Tasso, though for what Tasso wrote he seems to have had little care ; which accounts for the fact that the hero of the play is not so much Tasso himself as a type of the over-sensitive man of genius. But the spiritual gain was great ; in Italy he had the time, and the opportunity, to face life as a whole. He freed himself from the intense subjectivity which manifests itself in Werther. We may quote again from Professor Robertson, the greatest living authority on Goethe, both as man and writer.

" His spiritual and intellectual life was ordered and stabilized ; the confusing emotional factor was, if not eliminated, at least subdued, he attained at last a vision of that harmony in the greatest of all arts, the art of living, which had ever been his goal, and was to be his goal until the end." " From now on he no longer lived unreflectively in the moment, but consciously and with wise foresight ; subjective individualism has given place in him to an impersonal objectivity."

What did Goethe look upon as the ideal life ? It was to be a work of art ; man must appropriate from the world around him all that would make life more beautiful and more worthy, and eliminate all that was useless for his purpose. Activity is the salvation of man, he can go on from height to height until he reaches the summit, it is by this activity that Faust is saved. At the same time something more is needed ; the grace or help from the Higher Power who rules the world. Faust works out his own Salvation by his active quest for Truth, yet he must receive help in the end, help from God given through Gretchen, whom he had ruined and betrayed. Man is called to exercise this activity in a world which is good, which is overruled by a Divine Power, who uses what we call evil for the ultimate good of the Universe. Therefore, man can face life with

courage ; what will be, must be, and if met unflinchingly will bring peace in the end. Such a theory has, of course, obvious limitations ; if we eliminate the idea of evil, we find it hard to preserve our belief in the love of God. If Mephistopheles is the necessary agent of God for the saving of Faust, stinging him by his cold negative cynicism into active aspiration for the good, what of those like Gretchen, who are sacrificed in the process ? Goethe's belief, too, that all things are for the best, may easily encourage a cold, complacent optimism, and also would, if logically carried out, impede all efforts to improve the condition of the world in which we live. On the other hand it gave him courage. He had many sorrows, especially in old age, but he bore them bravely. He lived his creed consistently. He was not of those who regard the troubles of others as the Will of God, and yet kick against the goad of their own misfortunes.

It must be confessed, however, that his theory of life as a harmonious work of art did tend to increase his native egotism. He showed at many periods of his life a somewhat unpleasant facility in discarding those who seemed to threaten the calm of his existence, and to clog his progress towards the goal he desired. This is shown clearly in his treatment of his mother, whom in her old age he neglected to visit without even the flimsiest of excuses. This unpleasant talent for calmly discarding what seemed no longer necessary for his happiness, is shown again and again in his love affairs. These affairs are as numerous as they are famous. A full account of them would be greater than one number of the *Church Quarterly* could hold. They are famous, not only because of the great influence they exercised upon his life and writings, but also because, as was inevitable, more people are interested in them than in the works of the poet himself. It is easier to chatter about Harriet, than to read Prometheus Unbound, or to weep over Haworth Parsonage than to study the novels of the Sisters Brontë, so also it is much easier to become interested in Goethe's affairs of the heart, than to unlock the mystery of Faust.

Too often it is forgotten that a writer is better known through what he has written than through what he has done. Goethe preferred the society of women to men, as Disraeli also did after him. There was in him a strong strain of sensuality, against which he struggled but which he never perhaps wholly overcame. Most of his famous love affairs were platonic, as we say, and most of them followed the same course. The lover wooed and won, then when he feared that he might be entangled, he cut the knot, and rode away. All of which was highly prudent but not highly pleasing. His treatment of Charlotte Von Stein is typical.

“Once back in Weimar, Goethe felt that this friendship, like all else in Weimar, was a turned page in his life, in the new consciousness of his own spiritual strength, which he had acquired in the South, he had no further need for such companionship as Charlotte had to give him. There was something callous in the way in which Goethe avoided her on his return, in the trivial excuses he made for not visiting her; if he saw her, it was in the company of others.”

To put it bluntly, he had no more compunction in discarding a human being, than he would have had in selling one of his library books when it ceased to interest him.

There is one notable exception. When Goethe had successfully cut Charlotte Von Stein out of his life, he startled Weimar and much of the world also, by establishing in his house, a young ignorant girl, a maker of artificial flowers, Christiane Vulpius by name, as his mistress. Every effort was made by his friends, Schiller included, to persuade him to give up this liaison, Goethe was adamant, and after some years he legalized her position by making her his wife. This has astonished not only his contemporaries, but also his many biographers. Of all the women who played their part in his life none seemed so unsuited for this position. She could not be the intellectual companion needed by a man of genius. But she gave him a home life; a thing he had never had since early youth; she was the mother of his son, and when Weimar was invaded by the French



she showed remarkable courage and common sense. Moreover, surely it is a mistake to suppose that a man of genius always wants to be with clever people, rather he welcomes at times the ordinary and the commonplace. Mrs Johnson was neither young nor amusing, still the Doctor adored her ; Disraeli delighted in the irrelevant chatter of his rather foolish, though certainly wonderful, wife ; why should it be thought so strange that Goethe preferred to share his home with one who knew more about cooking than she did about literature ? At all events, though many have deplored it, this chapter must be pronounced as the kindest and most human in his life. When Goethe fell in love for the last time, he afforded the cynics a good deal of ribald amusement. He was well over seventy when he entertained the idea of marrying Ulrike Von Levetzow, who was a girl of nineteen years of age. Here, said the cynic, is only another instance of senile salacity. This, however, is rather a crude and incomplete view of the matter. Goethe was unhappy in his home ; his son was unsatisfactory, his daughter-in-law flighty and extravagant, though charming. The pair quarrelled and brawled and squandered money in extravagance. It was hard for him to preserve that stately facade of calm well-being which he loved to present to the world. We cannot blame him for seeking a change ; though we might have desired that he should choose a more suitable partner. And too, there is a pathos in this last flicker of passion. In Ulrike, Goethe saw all the beauty that he had worshipped in his life. Like Faust, he longed to put back the clock, and enter again the joyous domain of youth, but time conquered Faust and Goethe wisely felt it had conquered him. With true wisdom he abandoned an idea, which had caused the enemy to blaspheme, and the foul-minded to sneer. He turned from temptation and settled down to a lonely and unhappy old age. However this unfortunate episode, as it was regarded by the world, had fortunate results from the artistic point of view, for there can be no doubt that Goethe was cherishing the memory of Ulrike when he wrote the wonderful triumph of Galatea in the second part of Faust.

This great passage in which Raphael's frescoe is transmuted into verse and gains in beauty by the change, is full of light, colour and movement. Once a year the aged Nereus is allowed to see his daughter Galatea, who has taken Venus' place on earth.

“ And Galatea comes, the fairest far,  
In opal lights on Venus' pearly car,  
For since the Cyprian left the world alone,  
In Paphos dwells my child, is worshipped there,  
As Venus self, the true, the acknowledged heir,  
Queen of the temple and the pearled throne.”

Galatea is the spirit of beauty who kindles life and love in all things. Her car of pearl sweeps over the sea, led and guided by sirens and snake charmers; all nature breaks into life, but she cannot tarry, not even for a moment.

“ O Father dear  
Stay Dolphins—His eyes, they hold me here— ”

She passes and Nereus cries,

“ Over and gone already—already they draw us apart,  
Wider and wider the circles sweep,  
What do they care for the pain of my heart,  
Oh take me but with you, out over the deep,  
Yet one glance is so dear, so dear  
One moment pays for the barren year.”

It is one of the marvels of literature that this Triumph of Galatea was written when Goethe was over eighty; here, as in the close of Faust, he regains a passionate vitality and burning beauty, which had seemed quenched for ever. It would alone, for it is a thing of sheer loveliness, give him a secure niche in the Temple of Fame. And if, as seems certain, there would have been no Galatea, if there had been no Ulrike, Goethe's elderly passion was not so unfortunate after all, and certainly deserves something better than the scoff of the satirist or the snigger of the unclean.

In the lines,

“ Yet one glance is so dear, so dear  
One moment pays for the barren year.”

he sums up all it had meant for him. In it there had been vouchsafed a revelation of beauty. He would have held it, but that could not be. Just as Nereus must be content with the moment's vision, so was it to be with Goethe ; still the memory of it made it worth while, and kept alive a flame of beauty to console and cheer him in his old age. That old age so impressive to the outer world, and so sad within. Sorrows borne bravely, but with also an increasing coldness and pomposity of manner. He became as it were more of a monument than a man. People came to worship, and went away chilled and awed. He had no longer the power or desire to attract affection. Dignity, calm, self-control, these there were, but the old life was dead within him. We need not insult this impressive close by niggling questions as to whether when the dying Goethe said " Light more light," he was still thirsting for Truth, or whether he merely desired the blinds should be drawn up.

### III. THE WRITER

Goethe, the writer, challenges criticism as a novelist, dramatist and poet. He was also by way of being a scientist. This part of his work we must leave to the specialist. It is not to our purpose to discuss his " Theory of Colour," or his supposed anticipations of Darwin. These things have nothing to do with art, and it is to be regretted that he so often laid aside other work in order to pursue these investigations. He had neither the patience nor the training which are necessary for serious scientific work ; he would always have remained an amateur, though an occasionally inspired amateur in the domain of science.

His fame as a novelist rests upon three of his works. The *Sorrows of the Young Werther*, *The Wilhelm Meister*, and the book which is known to English readers as *Elective Affinities*. It may seem irreverent at this time to ask : " Can Goethe be regarded seriously as a novelist at all ? Is there one of his novels which approaches the first rank ? Can he be compared with Scott, Flaubert, Tolstoy, to

mention no other ? ” Now we believe, if it were possible for a student of fiction to approach these works for the first time, without knowing by whom they were written, the answer to these questions would be an emphatic “ No.” These are the writings of one, he would say, who might have been a novelist, but for some reason, never mastered the art of fiction. It is flattering to our own vanity to see, when we read these novels, how infinitely far ahead England was of all other countries in the art of writing fiction. Richardson, Fielding, Sterne, and Smollett were assured craftsmen, beside them Goethe seems incompetent indeed. He might be the greatest novelist of his day in Germany ; but that is really to say nothing. Even the *Nouvelle Héloïse*, intolerable as it is, is superior to anything we can find in his works. The fact is that Goethe was here attempting an art form for which he was totally unsuited. *Werther*, indeed, nearly succeeds ; there are scenes in *Wilhelm Meister* which come to life, though the general effect is dull and heavy. The character, with a few exceptions, are mere shadows, and the dialogue is always tedious, stilted, and pedantic.

Of the three, *Werther*, though it lacks the variety to be found in the earlier chapters of *Wilhelm Meister*, is probably the best. It is true that young readers of to-day, find it provocative of mirth, and dismiss it as mawkish twaddle. But this attitude does not err on the side of justice. It is really quite a successful description of that spiritual malaise, through which many young men pass, between the ages of twenty and twenty-four. The feeling that one is out of gear with the world ; that the world is a baffling and cruel mystery, and that whichever way one turns there is an opposing barrier ; all this is true to life, and should find a sympathetic response at the present day. With a few alterations *Werther* might pass for one of the more sentimental pictures of post-war mentality. We may find the same spirit expressed in verse of genius in the “ Shropshire Lad.” Charlotte the heroine has been accepted for generations as an ideal presentation of innocent and unselfish womanhood, especially by those who have never



read the book. Cutting bread and butter for her little brothers and sisters, she has passed into tradition, charmed artists and ended successfully with others of Goethe's heroines, on the operatic stage. It would be useless as well as brutal to suggest that the way in which, after her marriage, she keeps Werther tied to her apron strings and is the cause of his suicide, argues her either a coquette or a simpleton—probably both. She is secure in her shrine and no one will ever be able to take her down and relegate her to obscurity.

*Werther* has one great advantage over most of Goethe's writings, it was conceived and executed in one mood, and so has unity and harmony of design. Goethe had an incurable habit of laying his work aside, and of taking it up again, sometimes after many years when the original inspiration had died away. It is this fatal habit which ruins *Wilhelm Meister*. If the first part had concluded with Wilhelm's performance of Hamlet it would have been nearly a first rate novel. It is a subtle study of the actor's art, and of the ideals of the theatre. The scenes with the strolling players are alive and vivacious, and come near to Fielding in actuality; the characters of Mignon and Filina are delightfully drawn. But when he took up the work later, the hero's apprenticeship changes from the theatre to the art of life. And from that moment life dies from the book. The characters become more and more shadowy and dehumanized, and instead of the theatre we are given the boring secret society of the Tower. The moralists have found all this highly edifying and illuminating. Schiller said,

“ Wilhelm Meister emerges from an empty and undefined ideal into a definite active life without thereby losing his idealizing powers.”

So he may, but he loses his humanity in the process, just as the novel loses its vitality. Wilhelm's gain is art's destruction and the novel reader's loss. *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* need not detain us. Here there is no pretence at being a novel at all. It has been described as a receptacle into which Goethe threw the most varied collection of odds and ends

of his work and thought. It has about as much relation to art as a patchwork quilt. It may be full of deep thought and rich in apothegms. This is not sufficient to give lasting life. If it were, an open copy of *Theophrastus Such* would be upon every study table in England.

Goethe's third famous novel, *Die Wahlverwandtschaften* (*Elective Affinities*), has for its motive an interesting problem. It deals with the marriage of Eduard and Charlotte, whose happiness is broken, and who incur disaster, because the wife is hopelessly attracted by her husband's friend, a captain, while he falls desperately in love with his wife's niece, Ottilie. Both fight against the temptation, but when their child is born, it resembles, not its real parents, but the captain and Ottilie, thus showing the love that had displaced in the hearts of the parents, their love for each other. Whether this is possible we cannot assert, but Goethe has brought into his book any amount of hard thinking and subtle reasoning. It is certainly an idea that any novelist might seize upon with avidity. Mr Hichens must feel aggrieved that it was filched from him so many years ago. He would certainly, being an extremely competent novelist, have made much of it. The latest medical theories from Vienna, a background of sunset over the desert, some snapshots of Riviera society, and a tennis tournament at Wimbledon would no doubt have all been used to decorate and dramatize the main motive. Goethe though a greater writer than Mr Hichens, fails conspicuously to make his book interesting. The love story lacks passion, the characters are merely puppets, not living beings, and the dialogue is unusually lifeless and dull. So when the critics praise *Elective Affinities* it is not as a novel, but as a study in pathology. As such it may pass.

Goethe's novels have received and are receiving, this being a centenary, lavish praise from many critics because they were written by Goethe. And it will be noticed that they are nearly always praised for qualities which are not essential to good fiction at all. Yet if we do not judge them as novels, how are we to judge them? As novels they are

offered to us, and as novels they must stand or fall. Signed by any other name they would, we think, be pronounced as failures—the failures of a great mind working at an art form for which it was unsuited. *Werther* shows promise but not fulfilment; *Wilhelm Meister* is a long rambling, badly constructed book, containing some good scenes, and many which are intolerably dull. *Elective Affinities* is a philosophical tract, disguised, and very badly disguised, as a work of fiction. To praise a great writer for everything that he may choose to give us is to render the poorest of all services we can offer. We merely damage his reputation. Many people would be still reading *Scenes of Clerical Life* if they had not been gravely assured by George Eliot's devotees that *Daniel Deronda* was a work of inspiration to be received with prayer and thanksgiving.

Goethe did not, as Meredith and Hardy have done, succeed both as novelist and poet; his novels at the best are splendid failures—as a poet he at times reaches heights which can only be mastered by the few. It is unfortunate that some of his best work cannot be fully appreciated by the foreigner. He was one of the greatest lyric poets in the world, but it is difficult for those who are not highly skilled in the German language, really to appreciate the subtle beauty of phrase, the exquisite choice of words in his lyrics, and in a translation they are bound to lose something of their magic. *Hermann and Dorothea*, too, appeals chiefly to his own people; the interest of the tale is local rather than general; and many find the combination of realistic matter with classical manner somewhat unpleasing. Nor has any good translation been made of it into English. With his plays it is different. It is true that only a few of these live still; *Goetz Von Berlichingen* seems to-day only a crude essay in the pseudo-gothic manner; though it has a certain life and movement; *Egmont* is good bustling drama, and should be effective on the stage; the lesser characters are well drawn, and if *Egmont* himself seems an inadequate picture of a national hero, because he brings about his fall by sheer stupidity, yet he has the requisite

glamour and panache of conventional romance. Something of the brilliance of *Cyrano* without his intolerable verbosity. It is really on "*Torquato Tasso*" and "*Iphigenia auf Tauris*", that Goethe's fame as a dramatist rests. How they would play upon the stage we cannot say ; perhaps they are, too, lacking in incident to hold an ordinary audience, though as plays for the study they can inspire that rare delight which only great poetry can give. It is easy, of course, to point out the faults in "*Tasso*" ; for one thing it lacks background. Though the action takes place in Italy, there is no special suggestion of Ferrara in it ; it might just as well take place in Baden Baden. Shakespeare, by a few words, could paint for us the scene he desired us to see ; night over Rome ; moonlight in the gardens of Belmont ; the arcadian countryside in the *Winter's Tale*. Goethe has no such gift ; his characters seem to live in a vacuum. But we have characters who speak beautiful verse ; and in the character of *Tasso* himself we have a skilful portrait of the over-sensitive, irritable, morbid man of genius ; always looking out for slights, and never allowing himself to be happy and content. This may not be *Tasso* himself, whom perhaps Goethe never understood, as he cared little for the poet's works ; he may seem more a type than an actual individual, though in him there is presented to us, with great skill, a state of mind only too common with the artist who lives upon his nerves.

In "*Iphigenia auf Tauris*," he had for his aim the reproduction of the calm beauty and cold severity of ancient Greece. This is the best constructed of all his works ; it has the uniform design which they so often lack. It is, judged as a work of art, his supreme achievement. It has been likened to a Greek temple by moonlight. Twilight would perhaps be a better description. Goethe deliberately tunes down everything to a minor key, and eliminates anything that might ruffle its calm surface. The ravings even of *Orestes* are beautiful rather than terrifying, and the barbarian king would have been quite at home at Sans Souci or Versailles. *Iphigenia*, it may be said, does not thrill or excite. It is not meant to. Its aim is to soothe by its noble calm, and



to fill our minds with a vision of undefiled beauty. Though modelled on the Greek Drama, except that there is no chorus, Goethe was not content to give us merely a skilful reproduction of an ancient art ; in the character of Iphigenia herself, he introduces a new element which brings her into touch with the modern world. In the ancient legend she saved her brother by a trick ; Goethe's Iphigenia will stoop to nothing so mean. She risks the life of Orestes in order that the truth may be told ; she refuses to treat the king unworthily, and to return his kindness by deception even to ensure her brother's safety. And in doing so she challenges the gods themselves, if they desert her now, when she is risking all for the sake of right, then they will remove their image from her heart, and destroy her faith in their goodness.

“ Let not abhorrence spring within my heart,  
Nor the old Titan's hate, toward you, ye gods,  
Infix its vulture talons in my breast,  
Save me, and save your image in my Soul.”

“ Rettet mich

Und rettet euer Bild in Meiner Seele.”

The ancient gods would at once have smitten with lightning one who had challenged them with such daring arrogance ; and indeed we may ask, magnificent as her gesture was, is it consistent with any real religion at all ? Can we say to God : “ I am going to do what is right, regardless of consequences, but if you don't help me, you will forfeit my allegiance ” ? Certainly this strikes a very different note to that which we find in the greatest of all tragedies. However, it is a mistake to vex ourselves with too many questionings when we read Iphigenia. Goethe's aim was to charm us with beauty, and to inspire us with the thought that just as Orestes could be freed from the power of the furies, and Iphigenia break through the meshes of deceit ; so we can rise above our past mistakes, and be born again. It is doubtful whether, when he wrote his play, he was troubled at all by all the subtle problems and theories commentators have sought to find in his work.

At all events, the conclusion is consistent with his whole trend of thought. He hated tragedy and had an incurable desire for the happy ending. Egmont must be executed, though the horror of his death is softened by a rather tawdry and operatic vision of Freedom, which calls aloud for Puccini, and is no doubt effective as a spectacle. The gods must act, as he would wish them to act, and Iphigenia's presumption is ignored. She and her brother are allowed to set forth to a new life of peace and hope. Such is not the way of Zeus—here he must bow to the will of the poet.

It is not, however, on Iphigenia, or Tasso, beautiful as they are, that Goethe's world-wide fame rests, but on his treatment of the Faust Saga. The story of Faust is one that has made an irresistible appeal to many generations; the legend of a man who sells his soul to the devil, seems to have appeared about the sixth century, and to have been reproduced in various forms throughout the following ages. It was used by Calderon in *El Magico Prodigioso*; it captured the imaginative genius of Marlowe; Byron produced it again, thinly disguised as Manfred; it inspired the once famous poem of Festus, and suggested "A Modern Faust" to the late Roden Noel. To Goethe it was familiar in the Volksbuch, and in the puppet plays of which he was so fond.

As Goethe was writing Faust for the greater part of his life; constantly laying it aside, and taking it up again in another mood; altering here, eliminating there; the work is not a harmonious whole; it is like a rambling building, to which each age adds a portion, sometimes without troubling to make it consistent with the rest—this method of production brings both gain and loss; gain, because it forms as it were a running commentary on his own life; loss, because as a work of art it lacks unity of design, and also because certain scenes which he regarded as essential were never written at all. The many changes made in the work were not always for the better; one of the most unfortunate is the alteration of Faust's age in the first part. In the original version he was about thirty; still young,

and feeling stifled in the dusty atmosphere of the university ; missing in life, the three essential qualities of beauty, action, love. He longs for beauty and love, not merely sexual love, but that love and knowledge of the natural world, which will bring him into unity with nature, and make him master of her secrets. When Goethe took up the work again he changes Faust's age, in accordance with his own. He is now middle-aged and prematurely old. So the macabre scene of the Witch's Kitchen is introduced. He is rejuvenated by the rather coarse expedient of a strong aphrodisiac given by the witch, which savours too much of monkey glands and Vienna to be pleasant ; Mephistopheles cries in triumph :

“ As works the draught, you presently shall greet  
A Helen in each female form you meet.”

This vulgarizes the first meeting of Faust and Gretchen. We feel that any other woman would have had the same effect upon him ; because he is merely the victim of an overpowering lust. On the other hand, the change from prose to verse in the Prison scene was all to the good ; for Goethe rarely wrote good prose, and nearly always wrote good poetry ; and when the Angel voices cry “ Is Saved,” we feel that these words were not added because of his timid dislike of tragedy but because they were right and fitting. Gretchen was more sinned against than sinning ; she, weak and innocent, was an almost inevitable victim of the powers of evil brought against her ; she was also a penitent, and therefore would be saved from eternal punishment. Still she must suffer the earthly punishment of her sin ; Goethe does not save her from her death upon the scaffold.

It is in the Gretchen scenes that Goethe reaches the highest point of his achievement. Though not specially written for the stage, they are the most dramatic of his works. It is astonishing how much passion, pathos and beauty are concentrated in these passages, some of them quite short, but palpitating with life. And Gretchen herself is his finest character ; less fantastic than Mignon, she lives before

us in all her simple charm and innocence. It is the price Goethe pays for his fame, that when we read these scenes, our ears are haunted by the cloying melodies of Gounod, and our vision of Gretchen is obscured by an endless procession of Prima Donnas, mostly mature, all ample, resolutely attacking the coloratura difficulties of the Jewel Song. If we can for a time rid ourselves of Gounod, Boito, and the rest ; and brush aside the tawdry glamour that opera has thrown over his work ; how wonderful we shall find it. Simple, lyrical, artless, and yet how tragic and profound. Besides Gretchen, Faust at his best seems somewhat the lover of conventional romance, though he is more alive than any of Goethe's other heroes. He never succeeded with men as with women ; he could only write his best about what stimulated and inspired, and as we have seen, men played a very small part in his life. With Mephistopheles, however, he succeeds triumphantly. To quote Professor Lowes Dickinson :

“ He is the most interesting and profound of Goethe's dramatic creations. Like Shakespeare's Caliban, he is at once a symbol and an individual like him, something less than human, but, unlike him, also something more. For he has a double aspect. On the one hand, he is the spirit that denies, and denies especially love, that love whereby the whole creation moves upward. Lust he can understand and feel, he is defeated by it at the very end of the drama. But he cannot give himself to another, for he is the assertion of the self when it means only to be selfish. Hence the repulsive coldness that always marks him.” And again : “ Mephistopheles despises men because he remembers perfection. And for that very reason his criticism can prompt men to creative action. . . . On men, always ready to sink into apathy, Mephistopheles acts as a provocative force ; he will not let them admire themselves, and he dangles an exciting life before them, a life that provokes in the end, not as he now desires to evil, but to good. That is the meaning of God's words when he says he ‘ can sting and stir and devil-like create ’ ”



This is a far cry from the half-comic Devil of the puppet shows, and Goethe might have spared us the conjuring tricks to which Mephistopheles sometimes condescends. Nor could this ice-cold spirit have uttered the impassioned cry of agony Marlowe places on the lips of his spirit of evil.

“ Why this is hell, nor can I out of it ;  
Think'st thou that I who saw the face of God  
And tasted the eternal joys of Heaven  
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells  
In being deprived of everlasting bliss ?  
Oh Faustus, leave these frivolous demands  
Which strike a terror to my fainting Soul.”

The second part of Faust has never gained so great a hold upon the imagination of men as the first ; the simple, pathetic, tragic episode of Gretchen's temptation and fall, has overshadowed the infinitely more complex and elaborate work which follows it. In the first part we have one main theme, the trial of strength between the tempter and the tempted ; Mephistopheles and Faust—the triumph of evil bringing in its train the fall of Gretchen, the death of her mother and the murder of her brother Valentine. In the second part Faust is brought into touch with the wider issues of life ; the quest for classical beauty, and its union with knowledge ; the affairs of empire and state ; of war and finance ; and finally of work for the benefit of his fellow men. Faust comes near to salvation when he labours for the benefit of humanity, and abjures the aid of magic. Still even here his work is imperfect as through impatience and pride he causes the ruin of two innocent people. Then blinded by care, he is prepared to go on with his work, but death comes to him, and his imperfect service is made complete by the Grace of God, bestowed through the Virgin Mother and aided by the prayers of the penitent Gretchen. The design is vast and impressive ; it contains much lovely poetry, at the close of the Classical Sabbath, in the Helena, and the death scene of Faust, in the final episode of his Salvation, which in spiritual beauty comes near to the Vision of the Mystic Rose in the “Paradiso.”

But it has also many defects, the characters are symbolized and devitalized. Faust becomes a mere shadow, even Mephistopheles seems less vivid, and it is only in the death scene that the old dramatic fire burns up anew. Some of it is, to speak frankly, tedious and boring, and much of it is spoiled by masses of irrelevant learning. Professor Dickinson says the Classical Sabbath is :

“ Not so much poetical as whimsical, shrewd, learned, often tiresomely so, reminiscent of Goethe’s wide interest in art and science, and sometimes even of controversies which have now lost their interest.”

These words would also be true of many other parts of the work. It is well to master the whole of it if possible ; having done so we can afford to leave much of it on one side. If it be not heresy to say so, we can read the different parts as separate poems, for the work was written at long intervals, and in many moods. We can treat it then in a way we could not treat *Paradise Lost*, or the *Divine Comedy*. The poem is not a perfect whole, far from it, though it does contain many passages of almost incomparable beauty ; and the closing scene, written at an age when poetic inspiration is as a rule dead and gone, shows us Goethe as a master poet indeed.

#### IV.

Even the most ardent devotees of Goethe deplore the fact that though he was a man of genius, who wrote much, yet his work which is of enduring quality is comparatively small. His interests were too wide and varied to allow him to concentrate on his art ; he lacked too, the perseverance to carry out a work to its end. To begin, to lay aside, to take up again when the first inspiration has died down, all this is fatal to the artist. We do him poor service when we say he would have been less great as a man, if he had been greater as an artist. What Goethe was matters little now ; what he wrote matters everything. It is uncritical to close one’s eyes to his defects ; or to refuse to acknowledge that

much of his work, especially his prose work, is dull, heavy and second rate. However, time works its will, what is of no permanent worth is cast aside, and only the good remains. Goethe might have given us more, much more, great and enduring work, but it was not to be. We shall revere his memory best by treasuring what is pure gold and leaving the rest in well-merited oblivion.

S. ADDLESHAW.

## NICOLAI HARTMANN.

1. *Plato's Logik des Seins*. By N. HARTMANN. (Philosophische Arbeiten herausgegeben von H. COHEN und P. NATORP, Bd. III). (Giessen. 1909).
2. *Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie* (Wege zur Philosophie, No. 6). By N. HARTMANN. (Göttingen. 1912).
3. *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. By N. HARTMANN. (Berlin and Leipzig. 1921). (Zweite, ergänzte Auflage, 1925).
4. *Die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus*. By N. HARTMANN. (Berlin and Leipzig). I Teil: Fichte, Schelling, und die Romantik. 1923. II Teil: Hegel. 1929.
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IN a recent issue of this *Review*,<sup>1</sup> we had occasion to deal with the Phenomenological School of philosophy which has exercised an ever-increasing influence on German speculative thought since the beginning of the present century. In that issue, we were concerned chiefly with Edmund Husserl, its founder, and with his immediate disciples. The present article will deal with a thinker who, though he has been profoundly influenced by Husserl, is no longer sufficiently close to the Husserl group to be regarded as a member of his school. Nicolai Hartmann<sup>2</sup> is primarily a metaphysician, and only secondarily a phenomenologist. Originally a disciple of the Marburg School of Neo-

<sup>1</sup> January, 1932, Vol. CXIII, pp. 240-262.

<sup>2</sup> If we were called upon to attempt the hazardous task of arranging living German philosophers in their order of influence and significance, we should begin our list: (1) Edmund Husserl; (2) Martin Hiedegger; (3) Nicolai Hartmann. Hartmann was born in 1882, and is now Professor of Philosophy at Berlin.



Kantians, he published a treatise on Plato with the title, *Plato's Logik des Seins* in 1909; and this study interpreted Plato wholly in the spirit of Cohen and Natorp, who were the leading exponents of Marburg Neo-Kantianism at the time. It was between the publication of this monograph and that of his treatise on epistemology in 1921 that he came under the influence of Husserl. Husserl led him to abandon the "Critical Idealism" of the Marburg School, and, accordingly, as the title of his epistemological treatise indicates—*Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (1921)—the epistemological problem has now become a metaphysical or ontological problem. This was followed by a long article on Kant in the *Jubiläums-Heft* of the *Kant Studien* for 1924 entitled "Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus," which, though in form an attempt to distinguish between the permanent and the transitory in Kant, contains the essence of Hartmann's present philosophical position, and is perhaps the best introduction to his writings. In 1926 there followed his *Ethik*, a work of 750 pages, which is an exhaustive treatise on its subject. It is this work which is now appearing in an English dress. Dr Coit's translation of it will be completed in three volumes; two of these are already obtainable at the booksellers.

# I

It is necessary that we should begin by saying something of the two streams of thought which have exercised a formative influence on Hartmann.

(1) The so-called "Neo-Kantian" movement in Germany was a widespread movement in philosophy in the latter part of the last century. The work which heralded it was Otto Liebmann's *Kant und die Epigonen* (1865), every chapter of which culminated in the refrain *Also muss auf Kant zurückgegangen werden!* This was the clarion call to return behind all the dilettante materialism which had succeeded the death of Hegel, behind even the Hegelian colossus and the systems of Schelling and Fichte which had rendered the building of that colossus possible, back to the Königsberg philosopher.

But the return to Kant was not to be a piece of mere anti-quarianism. Kant was to be re-thought, to be re-interpreted. And a large number of those who had heard Liebmann's clarion call proceeded to "re-interpret" Kant in their own way. They one and all proclaimed their intention of reiterating the Kantian

philosophy, but they realized that this reiteration demanded at the same time an advance beyond Kant. "Kant verstehen Heisst über ihn hinausgehen," said Windelband; and the conviction that it was possible to deduce from the historic Kant a philosophy which progressed beyond him was shared by the whole Neo-Kantian school.

Our present purpose does not demand that we should recall all the ramifications of the Neo-Kantian movement. The current edition of Überweg's *Geschichte der Philosophie* divides them into seven groups; and of these seven groups the only one which concerns us here is the Marburg group, though this is perhaps the most important of them.<sup>1</sup> Though it looked back to Königsberg rather than to Berlin, the Marburg school was in many ways a closely parallel movement to the Neo-Hegelian school in England. The frontiers between logic and psychology were fairly sharply defined, and the "true" Kant was divested of his somewhat naive psychology and understood from the exposition of the logical deduction of the categories. Further, the doctrine of the "thing-in-itself" was rejected; and accordingly speculative philosophy became nearly identified with epistemology. Above all, Kant was converted into a tidy system. The system which resulted from this editing of Kant was not dissimilar to that of the historical Hegel without his jargon; the chief objection raised against Hegel was his use of the Dialectic Method. The whole *ethos* of the Marburg Neo-Kantian movement was, in fact, similar to that of English Neo-Hegelianism; it was evolutionistic, optimistic, logical, idealistic, "tidy." The Nicolai Hartmann who wrote *Plato's Logik des Seins* would probably have been quite happy as a disciple of Francis Bradley or of Bernard Bosanquet.

(2) The second influence to which we have already referred as exercising a great effect upon Hartmann was the phenomenological school. Whereas in the Marburg School the principle of research was "rational construction"; at Freiburg—the home of phenomenology—it was "essential intuition." Readers of Husserl's writings will know the scorn which he pours upon those who believe that the essences (*e.g.*, the numbers) are "constructions" or, as we (in Britain) should more naturally say, "abstrac-

<sup>1</sup> Some account of this school in English is to be found in A. Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*, pp. 277-305, though these pages are concerned primarily with the mathematical philosophy of the school.

tions." The numbers—those entities which form the subject matter of arithmetic—exist prior to all rational "construction" of them. They are there—eternally there—and the investigator (in this case, the arithmetician) needs only to open his (mental) eyes, and he sees them, he intuits them.

And what is true of the numbers is true of the whole realm of essences. Phenomenology is simply the essential analysis of the whole realm of the *a priori*. It is, that is, another name for *Wesensanalyse*. Before any science can be put on a firm footing, the essences which are its precondition must be subjected to phenomenological analysis.

Into the specific realm of ethics, Scheler, the phenomenologist, opened the door for Hartmann. Scheler had shown by his investigations of the ethical values—and above all, those connected with "love" and "sympathy" and "*ressentiment*"<sup>1</sup>—the fruitfulness of such analyses, and illustrated from them how it was possible to obtain ethical data which were free from all factual contingency. Take, for instance, the relationship implied in the proposition that justice is a higher value than pleasure. This relationship, Scheler maintained, can be seen, can be intuited, to be absolutely and finally correct. It would have been equally true a million years ago, even if there were no beings in the Universe who were capable of "realizing" either just acts or pleasurable sensations. We can, therefore, intuit ethical relationships which are eternally valid. And it is possible for the student by proceeding in this way to collect a series of eternally valid relationships and analyses, all of them dealing with the ethical values. It is true that before the phenomenologist gets very far into the ethical realm, he finds that his "certainties" disappear. But this is because the phenomenological telescope has at present, and perhaps will continue to have for many a long day, only a limited range, not because there are no objects there awaiting investigation.

### III

The preceding paragraph contains the principle from which Hartmann now sets out. He believes that it is possible in every sphere of philosophical study to collect in this way a series of phenomenological data. The collection of the phenomenological data, is like the assembling of the bricks for the construction of a house. And these data, derived from phenomenologically

<sup>1</sup> Cp. below, pp. 288f.

clear intuitions, are the facts which must be the starting-point for every philosopher, and from which all his theories must be built up.

The strictly orthodox phenomenologists confine their attention to the analysis of essences and purely methodological questions. That, at least, is their claim, though even Husserl, especially in his later writings, has gone far beyond this mere analysis. Hartmann openly proclaims, and rightly so, that phenomenology cannot be the ultimate goal of the philosopher. The philosopher is not primarily a collector of data. His main object is not to collect bricks, but to build the house. And consequently, Hartmann is led on to the problem as to how the building is to be constructed. On what principle are the phenomenological data to be used?

The reply which Hartmann gives to this question is of primary importance. The principle of construction is founded on a simple maxim, namely "A Maximum of Data, a Minimum of Metaphysic." Or, in the metaphor we have used, as many bricks as possible, and no more mortar than is necessary.

This is all clearly brought out in Hartmann's *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. This book, the first edition of which appeared in 1921, practically secured for Hartmann his reputation. The book begins with a phenomenological investigation of the act of knowledge; and as a good phenomenologist Hartmann sets out from our every-day attitude to reality. Knowing for the unsophisticated is a relationship between a knower and an independent object. It is, that is, a *Seinsverhältniss*. The knower believes that he is knowing a something which is there to be known, that he is knowing an *Ansichseiendes*.

Hartmann proceeds to point out that in passing from the phenomenological data to the interpretation of them, the philosopher is faced with a curious situation. The phenomenological data do not fit readily into a system. In fact, they seem actively to resist systematization. It is as if the builder should find the bricks of all shapes and sizes which he had collected were almost positively obtuse. Here it is that Hartmann brings to bear his principle of "A Maximum of Data, a Minimum of Metaphysic."

Most traditional theories, so Hartmann says, have aimed at a tidy metaphysic at all costs. The bricks have had their corners knocked off; the original *data* have been sacrificed to some metaphysical theory. It may happen that datum A and



datum B are both phenomenologically clear intuitions, and yet, when it is attempted to bring A and B into mutual relationship, they resist the attempt. Nearly all the great metaphysicians have sought to overcome this resistance. If A be sacrificed to B, then one metaphysical theory results; if B be sacrificed to A, then quite likely the opposite system will result. Thus, in the case of epistemology, such contradictory theories as idealism and realism may both result in the interpretation of professedly the same phenomena.

Now when the phenomena are sacrificed in this way, the philosopher is no longer acting on the maxim, "A Maximum of Data, a Minimum of Metaphysic." Often he seems to be almost working with a minimum of data and a maximum of metaphysic. But, if philosophy is to be kept in the course of a strict science—that end for which Husserl has so consistently striven—then the phenomenologically clear *data* must be preserved at all costs. And it is such preservation that Hartmann advocates. Where the phenomena do not agree, we must be fully prepared to let them stand apart. The philosopher must not aim at obtaining a compact system at all costs. On the contrary, he must be prepared to investigate the *data* and let his investigations carry him whither they will. He may find (if we may change the metaphor) that only a few pieces of the jig-saw puzzle will fit together. But he will have learnt something of the universe, however fragmentary, if a very few of the pieces can be placed. What the modern philosopher needs to do is to learn to take an interest in the problems for their own sake. He must seek out the Antimonies in the Universe—and by this Hartmann means the *true* Antimonies, these which are incapable of resolution (for in so far as antimonies are resolvable, they are not ultimately antimonies at all). He must relearn the lost art of *Aporetics*.

It is interesting to turn at this point to Hartmann's interpretation of Hegel<sup>1</sup>. The reader who has followed our account of Hartmann to this point might expect to find that he would have little sympathy with the greatest of the German idealists. Surely Hegel is the greatest of all systematizers. Did not Hegel on one occasion remark that if the facts failed to fit his system, so much the worse for the facts? Is not this the very antithesis of the maxim "A Maximum of Data, a Minimum of Metaphysic"?

As regards Hegel's metaphysic, Hartmann would recognize, of course, this divergence. But Hegel, he believes, was far

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Hartmann's treatise on *Hegel*.

better than his Metaphysics. In fact, Hartmann believes that Hegel is one of the greatest discoverers of antinomies of all time. His system is full of them. Where Hegel was misled, so Hartmann contends, was in supposing that it was possible to *overcome* (*aufzuheben*) these antinomies in new "syntheses." Again and again (he says) the antinomies of which Hegel has discovered such multitudes, prove irresolvable; in the discovery of them, Hegel has achieved a permanently valuable work.

#### IV

We have reached now the point at which it is possible for us to turn to the book with which we are here concerned. The subject-matter of the *Ethics* falls into three divisions, entitled respectively "The Structure of the Moral Phenomenon," "The Realm of Moral Values," and "The Problem of the Freedom of the Will," and these three divisions correspond with the three successive volumes of the English translation.

Volume I of the English translation deals with the basic principles of ethics. In general, the problems here discussed are the same sort of problems as are treated of in the standard English works on philosophical ethics, such as in Professor G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica* or in Rashdall's *Theory of Good and Evil*, or by the recent Oxford writers on ethics—Mr Caritt, Mr Ross, and Mr Joseph. But, though the scope of the problems is substantially the same in Hartmann as among these English writers, their formulation and their mode of treatment are quite different in the two cases. This is instanced by the different angles from which the problems connected with the Right and the Good are treated here and in Germany.

In Hartmann (as in the English moral philosophers) the formulation of these problems comes down directly from Kant; but in Hartmann it is pre-eminently through the medium of Max Scheler that they receive their final shape. Scheler himself recognized the Kantian ethics as the greatest of all the modern systems of ethics. He wrote:—

"However much the whole of post-Kantian ethics may have achieved in the discovery of individual concrete moral values and in the analysis of concrete moral relationships, in their essence, these later schools of ethics at best constitute a background against which the magnitude, the solidity, and the completeness of the work of Kant stand out only so much the more clearly and plastically."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (p. 2).

Once for all, Kant refuted all theories of ethics which seek for the moral good elsewhere than in the will.

But Scheler held that in spite of Kant's great achievement in the field of ethics, he was fundamentally wrong on one point. This was in his "Formalism." By this word, Scheler expresses the fact—a fact constantly pointed out, of course, by Kant's critics—that Kant's ethics was devoid of "content." The Categorical Imperative as such had failed to give content to the Moral Law. As against this "Formalism," Scheler pleaded for a "Material"—i.e., "contentual" (if the word be not thought too barbarous)—ethics. It is of the first importance to recognize that this is what the word material means in Scheler and Hartmann, namely the opposite of formal<sup>1</sup>; for it has obviously no connexion with what is commonly designated "Materialism."

The criticism which Hartmann directs against Kant in Part I, Section 4, comes direct from Scheler. Kant's teaching about the *a priori* had offended against the demand "A Minimum of Metaphysic." Among the untested metaphysical elements in Kant's system were the following: (a) that the *a priori* is *ipso facto* subjective; (b) that the *a priori* is *ipso facto* formal; (c) that the *a priori* is *ipso facto* intellectual. Each of these Kantian presuppositions is shown by Hartmann, following Scheler, to be unjustified. By the rejection of them the way is opened up for a "Material Value Ethics."

## V

A highly important section is Part I, Section 5, for here Hartmann elaborates his belief about the nature of the values. What are they? What is their *Seinsweise*? What sort of an entity is, for example, justice?

Descartes had held that there were only two possible *Seinsweisen* for an entity, mental and physical. What was not physical was mental, and what was not mental was physical. To have proved an entity to have been non-physical in character was equivalent to having proved it to have been mental. That the "values" are not physical in character would now be generally admitted. Therefore, on the Cartesian hypothesis, it would follow that they must be mental. "Justice," therefore, would be a mental entity.

But this whole proof turns on the assumption that the mental

<sup>1</sup> Of course, the word Formalism as used, e.g., in the writings of Dr K. E. Kirk, has quite a different meaning.

and the physical are the only two possible *Seinsweisen* ; and it is just this assumption which the majority of the phenomenological school strenuously deny. They contend that the values are neither mental nor physical, but that they have their own *Seinsweise*. Their existence is not dependent—at least, *prima facie*—on the existence of any other entities, physical or psychical. It is this independent mode of being which Hartmann means when he speaks of the “ideal *Ansichsein*<sup>1</sup> of the Values” in Chapter 16.

## VI

The second volume deals with the analysis of the values themselves. Here there is some highly interesting investigation in a largely uncharted sea. The vessel required by the investigator in this region is no longer intellectual acumen, but a sensitiveness to moral values. The investigator in this realm may be compared with the art critic. Just as the art critic occupies a place between that of the artist and that of the philosopher, so the researcher in this field stands midway between the moral man and the philosopher. For success in it different talents are required from those needed by the speculative thinker ; but it is quite clear that Hartmann, like Scheler, has been gifted with the talents which such research demands. This volume is full of illuminating ethical observations.

Characteristic of the analyses here presented is the almost total absence of discussion of “questions of origins.” Husserl’s phenomenology draws a sharp distinction between questions of being and questions of genesis. The phenomenologist is concerned with things as they are ; he does not concern himself with the processes by which things reached their present state. Morality may have been “developed” from non-moral beginnings. Do not the writings of such scholars as McDougall and Westermarck recount many data which countenance this hypothesis ? But what the moral philosopher is concerned with is not how morality came to be, but with what morality actually is. That this is the primary concern of the moralist would, perhaps, be very generally admitted. But with Hartmann this conviction is held as no mere academic proposition. It is a thesis which for him is so certain that genetic questions do not come into consideration.

<sup>1</sup> Dr Coit translates this by “Self-existence.” The expression—though of course used by Hegel—in Hartmann probably comes from Bernard Bolzano, who used the expressions *Wahrheit-an-sich*, *Satz-an-sich*, etc. Cp. *C.Q.R.*, Jan., 1932, p. 253.



When, in the analysis of concrete values, historical references—*e.g.*, to Aristotle and to Christ—are introduced, they are there only for the purpose of illustration, not for that of explanation. All through the questions asked are: “What *is* value *A*?” “What *is* value *B*?” Practically the whole discussion, therefore, is in the present tense. “Truth and Truthfulness are not the same” (ii, 281). “In valuational quality, reliability is closely allied to truthfulness” (ii, 286). “Fidelity is not confined to the keeping of promises and agreements” (ii, 288). “The ability to trust is spiritual strength” (ii, 292).

What, then, has Hartmann to say on the *de facto* changes of morality, which are a commonplace of history? Why is cannibalism praised to-day, condemned to-morrow? Why is marriage with a deceased wife’s sister disallowed yesterday, allowed to-day? Is moral philosophy blindly to disregard all these varying changes in moral standards, to shut its eyes to the alleged doctrine of moral progress?

Hartmann replies that it is not the values which change; it is our apprehension of them which changes. Any one epoch can see only a small area of the realm of values; but it may see that area very distinctly. There may be some epochs of history which in their very nature are so gifted that they can see an area of the map of values which no other age, either before it or after it, will be able to discover because it lacks these gifts. Consequently the changes in the “Ethos” of successive ages are caused by the different areas of the map of values which are discovered by successive generations; for the ethos of any age is determined by the effect of the sum-total of the ethical values which it keeps in view and takes as the principles of its life.

## VII

What bearing, if any, have the ethical doctrines of Hartmann upon the problems of religion?

(1) To begin with, it may be noticed that Hartmann’s treatise is quite free from “unction” of any sort. Near the beginning of his book, Hartmann raises the problem as to whether or not ethics is a normative science—whether, that is, it is the purpose of ethical inquiry to have consequences in the realm of practical morality; and to this problem, Hartmann maintains that there are three possible answers. There is first the answer of Antiquity, which found typical expression in the moral doctrine of Socrates, that we need only to know the Good in order to perform it;

secondly, there is a theory such as that of Schopenhauer, which maintained that ethics was a purely theoretical or "contemplative" science, such as is geometry; and thirdly, there is the theory which has been central in Christian thought, that the study of ethics reveals to us the nature of the Good, and therefore has practical implications, but that the good action does not *ipso facto* result from knowing what the Good is. Hartmann defends the last of these three possible theories, and maintains that the investigations of the ethical philosopher are the presupposition of moral action. But Hartmann's own interests are predominatingly theoretical. He treats his subject with the detachment of the philosopher rather than with the fire of the prophet.

(2) It is only in the last chapter (85, of the German) that Hartmann deals expressly with the problem of religion. In this chapter are drawn out, in a manner highly characteristic of Hartmann, a number of antimonies between the conclusions to which a study of ethics leads on the one hand, and those to which a study of religion (it might almost be said, the Christian religion) leads on the other. The most important of them are those centring in the problem of predestination.

Here, as constantly in Hartmann, these antimonies are left unresolved. But they are a good illustration of the hard and fast lines which run across the Map of Being throughout Hartmann's philosophy. The different realms of *entia* are very sharply delimited from each other, and the only relations existing between them are "external" relations. The cleft is absolute between ethics and religion; likewise between ethics and aesthetics; likewise between the ideal and the real; likewise between the Ought and the Is. All these hard and fast lines are of great methodological value in throwing up philosophical problems. But they lead in the end to a very atomistic universe.

And here we may begin to have our doubts. Is the universe really such a collection of completely isolated and heterogeneous entities as Hartmann's interpretation of it implies? To pretend that it is may be the most illuminating starting-point from which the philosopher can set out in his exploration of it. But can the philosopher proceed ultimately no further than a doctrine of complete Atomism?

Possibly not. But, if he can, then the only way out from such Atomism or Pluralism would seem to be by the acceptance of a "doctrine of degrees." On that doctrine, religion and ethics

would not stand in such utter isolation as Hartmann assumes they do. Religion and ethics might then be regarded as both of them roads leading to the same Goal, and we should have some means of divining the explanation of what is after all an empirical fact of history, that *de facto* religion and morality have always stood in close relationship. When the medieval thinkers applied to God the expression *Summum Bonum*, they probably used the word in both an ethical and a theological sense. It is only if we can assume that the barrier between religion and ethics is less absolute than Hartmann represents it that there is opened up the possibility of explaining the *de facto* relationship between them.

(3) Though Hartmann writes as if ethics stood altogether out of relationship with religion, the ultimate source of much of his teaching is to be found in the theological metaphysics of Medieval Scholasticism. It was the Phenomenological School which awakened the possibility of, and the need for, a "Material" ethics; and this school has its roots in the Middle Ages.<sup>1</sup> Brentano's *Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis* and Scheler's *Formalismus in der Ethik* both have a Scholastic background; and Hartmann's analyses of values have many affinities in method with the Scholastic ethical theories. Hartmann may have denuded this tradition of its theological colouring; there is no doubt about its origin.

That Lutheranism has never produced a body of ethical doctrine compatible with that of Medieval theology is not without its explanation. For Lutheranism has always distrusted "ethics" in the same way as it has distrusted other "cultural" phenomena; and, with the strong "other-worldly" *Weltanschauung* of the Lutheran divines, it has been the fashion to deride ethical systems in Lutheran Germany. That this anti-cultural prejudice is still very much alive is instanced by the attitude which was taken up by the Lutheran theologians to the Stockholm Conference in 1924. They showed very little sympathy with the attempt to build up a social ethics on a Christian basis (herein, incidentally, they stood in sharp contrast to the Calvinists present at the Conference). This anti-ethical philosophy has received its nemesis in the doctrines of Karl Barth,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cp. *C.Q.R.*, Jan., 1932, pp. 243 ff.

<sup>2</sup> In many of his teachings, Barth is nearer, of course, to Calvin than to Luther. But Calvinism is not Calvin nor is Lutheranism Luther; though Lutheranism has not departed nearly so far from Luther as Calvinism has from Calvin.

where the divorce between ethics and the Gospel is final. Of the few Lutheran theologians who have abandoned this recalcitrant hostility to ethics is Professor Georg Wünsch of Marburg, who fully realizes the need for a cultural synthesis between religion and modern ethics. He has drawn out some of the implications of the Gospels for modern industrial conditions in a long treatise, *Evangelische Wirtschafts-ethik*,—a fine piece of work. And it is noteworthy that in the exposition of his subject, he constantly draws upon the writings of Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. Movements such as the Anglo-Catholic Schools of Sociology occasionally complain that they do not receive in England the attention which they merit. But we are fortunate in having been spared a philosophy of life which is actively hostile to them.

### VIII

In conclusion, something must be said of the translation of the *Ethik*. The translator has followed very closely the German text, and readers familiar with the original will be able to recognize almost word by word Hartmann's characteristic style. There are some happy renderings, e.g., of *Ansichsein* by "Self-Existence" and *aktuales Sollen* by "the positive Ought." But the translation is marred by a large number of blemishes. Thus in Vol. I, p. 250, in the first complete paragraph, *erst* is no less than three times rendered "first"—blunders for "only then."<sup>1</sup> Again, I, 258, line 4 should be "If Being were nothing else than an object for a subject"—which means something quite different from "If for a subject Being were nothing else than an object." Again, at I, 262, in a single paragraph *Setzung* and its correlatives are translated by no less than three different English words, where the same word (we would rather not be asked to say what word!) is demanded by the context all through. On I, 268 (9 lines from bottom), *als Schauplatz* is very inadequately rendered by "at the point of." The structure of the original of the last sentence on page 270 has (we believe) escaped the translator through the omission of a comma after *definierbar* in the German. We instance these as some of the misrenderings which we have noticed by examining a sample of some twenty pages of the English text. In fact, there are few pages that we have examined on which we have not been able to detect some translational error or other. Among the most misleading of those which we

<sup>1</sup> At any rate, this is true of the translation of the first *erst*.



have come across is the rendering of *Ressentiment* (which, as used in German ethics since Nietzsche,<sup>1</sup> is still practically a French word) by "resentment." This English word no longer conveys the meaning of the French *ressentiment*, which may be best translated "sense of injury."<sup>2</sup> Unless the English reader realizes this, he will not be able to make much of § (d) of Vol. II, ch. xxiv. A curious error occurs in the title to II, xxi, § (b). What was evidently intended to be *Sittlicher Mut* in the German was misread by the German typist or printer as *Sittlicher Wert*—the translator, not observing this, has rendered it "Moral Value" instead of "Moral Courage"!

But, in spite of its inaccuracies, the translation has a merit which is not universal in all translations from the German, namely, that it is fairly readable. Hartmann's *Ethik* and Scheler's *Formalismus* are probably the two most important contributions which have been made to ethics in the present century; and Dr Coit's translation enables the English student to get a very fair idea of the former of them. Those unfamiliar with the German tongue have reason, therefore, for being grateful to Dr Coit for a work which has been carried out, as we learn from the Preface, as a pure labour of love.

F. L. CROSS

<sup>1</sup> Cp. Max Scheler's essay "Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen," in *Vom Umsturz der Werte*, Bd. I.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. *Oxford English Dict.*, s.v. Resentment, i.

## THE CHURCHES OF EUROPE :

## RELIGIOUS RENAISSANCE IN THE UKRAINE.

THE Ukraine, or Kiev State, or Little Russia, to give the country the other names by which it has been known, is a problem far more important than is generally realised in Western Europe, and this importance is due to the fact that by tradition as well as owing to the characteristics of the people, it is in every way opposed to the Bolshevik régime. As the Bolshevik régime stands for Atheism and the suppression of all individuality, it is worth while to give a little thought to a country that is engaged in a struggle for its traditional rights and which, not for the first time in History by any means, is playing its part in protecting civilisation and culture. The whole history of the Ukraine is an account of struggles against barbarism, paganism, Mohammedanism, in their attempts to invade Europe from the East and South-East and constant struggles for independence due to the fact of the country being placed midway between restless and warring neighbours. Thanks to these never-ending struggles for independence and religious rights, the Ukrainian's sense of private property and of religion have become far more vigorous than would have been the case had they been allowed to exist calmly and quietly.

For some time past now a strong religious renaissance has been making itself felt in the Ukraine and this, together with national renaissance, has been increasing steadily as the oppression on the part of the Soviets has been growing severer. Two of the outstanding characteristics of the Ukrainian people are a sense of nationality and a sense of religion, and the whole history of Europe is not lacking in examples showing that the more these two senses are oppressed in a people, the more vigorously they will fight for their right of expression. Under the Tsars, Ukrainian nationality was not acknowledged ; not even the existence of a national language was admitted, for which reason the publication of the Bible in a Ukrainian version was forbidden, a decree of which the natural result was only to make every Ukrainian more desirous than ever to read the Scriptures in his own tongue. Only in 1905 did Count Witte, when carrying

out his Liberal reforms, succeed in having the decree revoked, but even then many local newspapers were closed down and much literature suppressed, as the idea of the independent culture and learning of the Ukrainians was distasteful to Great Russia.

The country had to submit to an intensive system of Russification under the Tsars, which only served to strengthen the desire for national expression, just as today the chief results of the Bolshevik anti-God campaign are noticeable in the desire of the population to have religion at all costs. At the moment, some two thousand Ukrainian priests are holding regular religious services in hidden places much in the same way as the Early Christians did in the Catacombs of Ancient Rome. In this they are supported both morally and materially by the entire population, impoverished though the people are. For it must not be forgotten that the population is preponderantly agricultural, and in the primitive mind of the peasant God and all that belongs to the soil—sowing, harvesting—are indivisibly bound up together. Priests bless the ground in impressive religious ceremonies before the sowing begins, going the round of all fields, in full vestments and followed by the people, and then once more when the harvest has been brought in. That, at least, was the custom before the service of God became a criminal offence.

From the earliest times the Ukraine has been a bulwark of Orthodoxy, protecting Europe against the invasion of Mongols first, from the East, then Tartars later from the South (Crimea); but the Orthodoxy of the country came to be adapted gradually to the needs of the people and has always tended to differ from the form of Moscow Orthodoxy with its intolerant harshness. Perhaps it is owing to having as a neighbour a Roman Catholic country, Poland, that Ukrainian Orthodoxy has taken to itself certain traits of that religion. But the militant and aggressive national character of Polish Catholicism, as soon as it attempted to force itself on the Ukrainians, strengthened not alone the sense of Orthodoxy of these latter, but their sense of nationality as well. Yet the cultural influence of Catholicism still remained and made itself felt in the Ukraine. So, for instance, non-Polish Catholic missionaries were always warmly welcomed at the courts of the Kiev Princes, but when the idea of a religious union between the Ukraine and Poland was mooted in the 15th century it became so mixed up with national questions that a still greater split between the two nations occurred.

The keynote of Ukrainian culture has always been Western

learning, and therefore, once it was realised that thorough education was the best means of protection for Greek Orthodoxy, it became the custom to send Ukrainian boys into Western countries to study, more especially in the schools of the Jesuit Fathers, just as foreigners were welcomed in the Kiev schools. Everything possible was thus done for the protection of the Ukrainian church.

All through history this spirit of broadminded tolerance was an essential characteristic of Ukrainian religion, and in the 17th century the Syrian Archdeacon Paul was struck by this difference with Moscow. He noticed how all children were sent to school, how women followed the services with their prayer books, and how nuns and monks in convents and monasteries would study philosophy, while in Moscow everything was rigidly dogmatic and blindly uncultured. In Moscow he felt the lack of freedom and found a gloomy spirit of restriction that imbued all existence, while in the Ukraine he felt at home among a gay and hospitable people. And conversely, the Moscow priest Loukianov, on passing through Kiev on his way to Palestine in 1701, thoroughly disapproved of what he found there, even seeing a most regrettable approach to Rome in the fact that the Kiev Metropolitan liked to hear the organ played in church and regarding such music as blasphemy against Moscow Orthodoxy. Ukrainian priests as a whole were looked down upon by their brothers of Moscow as heretics, but this did not in the least prevent the latter having to apply to the Ukrainians for help in correcting certain errors that had crept into the texts of religious literature and church books, as the degree of culture and education of Kiev was far and away above the standard of Moscow. It must be noted here that in the seventeenth century there were more primary and advanced schools in the independent Ukraine than was the case in the twentieth century under the Tsarist régime.

So the intellectual struggle between Moscow and Kiev continued through the centuries, but it was always the Ukrainians who emerged victorious because of their higher state of education. The correcting of the Scriptures ordered by the Patriarch Nikon was carried through by Ukrainian theologians, but under Peter the Great and his anti-Ukrainian campaign the work of these theologians was declared to be false and even the author of the Orthodox Prayer Book was looked upon as a heretic and anti-Greek Orthodox. But even so Peter the Great made the Ukrainian Bishop Yavorsky head of the Moscow Church and placed the



whole administration in the hands of Ukrainians. One of these latter was the famous theologian of the Kiev Academy, Theophan Prokopovitch, a scholar of the Jesuits.

In 1686 the Kiev Metropolitan was forced by means of threats to acknowledge the supremacy of Moscow, and it was from this time onwards that the authority of the Ukrainian Church gradually dwindled. Political authority weakened at the same time, for Peter the Great suppressed the Hetmanship, fearing that if the Ukraine were ruled by its hereditary monarch, even though he might be a vassal to the Tsar, it would become too strong and independent. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the decree which has already been mentioned was passed forbidding the publication of the Bible and other religious books in the Ukrainian language, and was only revoked by Count Witte about a hundred years later. But one of the greatest blows dealt to the Ukrainian Church was the secularisation of the Monasteries by Catherine II in 1764, when the Ukrainian Bishop Arseni Mazievitch was put to an inhuman death in the dungeons of Reval prison for having dared to protest against the measure. After that, Ukrainians were no longer appointed bishops in their own country, but were replaced by Russians, in consequence of which step the Church became nothing more than a mere instrument of Russification in the hands of the Moscow Government. The monasteries and convents, once the centre of culture and learning, were now filled with Muscovites who transformed them into strongholds of the Black Hundreds, as they were called in Russia, and their reactionary intolerance.

The result of these steps was not long in coming. The land-owning classes took no further interest in the church while the whole nation, which was by nature devout and always accustomed to turn to the church in its search for truth, now saw in it nothing more than a dead body of ritualism. The people therefore began to seek Christian truth in other quarters and began founding new sects, including the Stunda, which was a kind of Protestant creed. This sectarianism obviously did not suit Moscow plans at all and the movement was fought by the method which Tsarism regarded as applicable to all eventualities, this method being police interference. But the only result of police interference in religious matters was to make the Ukrainian Church even less popular than before.

Strange to say it was the Revolution of 1917 which at last gave the Ukrainians the possibilities for which they had waited

and struggled, and they were once more able to see the way clear towards national and religious expression. For as the Revolution swept away Tsarism, the Ukraine was thereby freed from an oppression which had lasted for so many centuries and they were able to organise their forces and give vent to their national feelings in many ways. The Provisional Government entirely sympathised with the movement and eventually granted the country autonomous rights in August 1917. Recognising the high moral standard of the people General Kornilov, Chief Commander of all the Russian Armies in 1917, began introducing detachments of Ukrainians into the ranks of his army, as he thought that this would be the best way of checking the spread of Bolshevism, the idea of which is entirely foreign to the Ukrainian character. Then after the downfall of the Provisional Government and the coming to power of Bolshevism the Ukraine separated into an independent State. It was only under the Hetman Skoropadsky that the country was at length fully organised. He was a direct descendant of the last independent Hetman of the Ukraine, Ivan Skoropadsky (1709), and his form of government appealed to the large majority of the people because it conformed to their traditions of independence and was based on the three principles of their historical tradition: private property, nationalism, and religion.

Ukrainian nationalism and the manner in which its flame was kept alight through the centuries in spite of, or rather in consequence of, continued attempts at Russification, has already been discussed. But here it must be remembered when speaking of the people's sense of private property, that the Ukrainian peasant has always owned his bit of land and that, in the days when Russian peasants were serfs, Ukrainians were still free men. It was only under Catherine that serfdom was introduced. And now, when the Bolsheviks are working to introduce collectivisation, they find themselves forced to temper this campaign to the national character. For the Ukraine is a land far too rich and important for them to ignore, and the independent-minded peasant is not easy to subjugate. So the idea of collectivisation is camouflaged in continually varying ways, the one in vogue at the moment being to allow the peasant to own a small plot of land and all it produces at the same time as he is made to work on the "State Farms" as a robot. The advantage of this system is twofold to the Bolshevik mind: the bait in the shape of his own plot induces the man to work on the

collective farm, while the double task of tilling his own ground and that of the State keeps him too busy to permit of him having time for discussions and thus forming an opposition to the régime.

But to return to the Hetman Skoropadsky. In view of the fact that the third principle of the Ukrainian character is a sense of religion and a desire for free expression, his organisation would not have been complete or successful had he ignored the importance of the Church. During the first months of the Revolution it had become thoroughly imbued with the revolutionary spirit, Ukrainian priests attended revolutionary meetings, and even became political leaders in contradistinction to the Moscow clergy who were mainly reactionary. The Hetman therefore convoked a Church Congress which, thanks to his untiring efforts, was recognised as a legal body by the Moscow Patriarch. Under the Hetmans' rule the whole country began to recover from the years of war and oppression. Prosperity reigned, and a normal life of peace was once more established. Everything looked hopeful, when unfortunately for the whole country, and indeed for civilisation, the Hetman's power collapsed. For nine months he had succeeded in protecting civilisation against Bolshevism, but the occupying Austrian and German forces had not permitted him to form an army of his own. When therefore these occupiers left the country after their defeat on the Western front and revolution in Central Europe, the Hetman had no army at his disposal for checking the Bolshevik advance.

The Bolsheviks advanced and overran the entire country, doing all in their power to subjugate it. In the thirteen years which have elapsed since the Hetman Skoropadsky was obliged to withdraw, these invaders have done all in their power to conquer this, the richest land of the Union. But they have gone to work in their own way, trying to introduce their system of collectivisation and renunciation of God, and quite overlooking the fact that, however well this system may succeed in the benighted parts of Great Russia, it is entirely unsuitable in dealing with the Ukrainian peasant who is of an incomparably higher standard of culture. They overlook the chief characteristics of the people, and forget that anything which touches their sense of nationality, their sense of private property, and their desire for religion, is doomed to failure from the outset. Instead of trying to develop the country they are trying to destroy the basis of its prosperity, the peasant and his religion, and trying to turn him into a Godless robot. For they fully

realise the importance of this rich country, at one time called the Granary of Europe.

But in spite of all Bolshevik efforts, the sense of nationalism, anti-collectivism, and of religion, has continued to develop more than ever, just as it has done all through history as a consequence of national or religious oppression. The only obvious result of the present Red suppression of religion is seen in the firm resolution of the peasants to have their religion at all costs, which explains the fact described at the beginning of this article, *i.e.*, that the impoverished population still manages to find the material means necessary for keeping their priests so that they, now that all churches have been closed and all religious services forbidden, can carry out their duty in secret. These two thousand priests have now become the moral leaders of a country which, though subjugated for the moment, in no way intends to submit to the hated *régime*.

All links with the Moscow Church have been entirely broken off, except in the case of some few old priests who still recognise the authority of the Moscow Patriarchal See. Notwithstanding the fact that no formal agreement of any kind exists between the Ukrainian priesthood and the Patriarch of Constantinople, the Ukrainian clergy, remembering the remote times of their country's independence some centuries ago, look upon this Patriarch as their nominal head and religious leader. By means of various intricate political intrigues the Soviets have many a time tried to work against this tendency of the part of the Ukrainian clergy, but without any success whatever. For as no written and signed agreement exists there is nothing concrete that they can take hold of, the only agreement being a tacit understanding in the hearts of the Ukrainian clergy. It has thus become a recognised fact that neither the remainder of the Moscow Patriarchal clergy in the Ukraine, nor the Bolshevik so-called "Living Church," have had any influence in the country at all, and that all their efforts to gain such influence over the people have only resulted in failure.

VLADIMIR KOROSTOVETZ.

### THE PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM.

JERUSALEM is not indeed in Europe, but the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem is so closely bound up with the life of the national churches of Eastern Europe that its affairs may rightfully receive consideration here.



The Patriarch Damianos died on August 14th, 1931. He had been paralysed for some two years previously. It had long been clear that His Beatitude's death would revive in menacing form the disputes between the Fraternity of the Holy Sepulchre and the local Arabic-speaking community which had been intermittent ever since 1908. The history of that quarrel is familiar from the two Reports on the *Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, by Sir Anton Bertram and H. C. Luke, and Sir Anton Bertram and J. W. Young respectively, published by the Oxford University Press in 1921 and 1926 respectively. While no one was more skilled than the late Patriarch in avoiding difficulties, age and infirmity as well as temperament had prevented him from attempting any permanent solution of the problems of the Patriarchate.

On the day of the Patriarch's death, the Holy Synod elected the Metropolitan Keladion of Ptolemais (Akka), who on a literal interpretation of the law was the only person qualified for election to the See of Jerusalem, as *topoteretes*, and he was recognized as such by the High Commissioner for Palestine on August 19th.

Subsequent developments fall under two headings—a difference of opinion among the members of the Fraternity of the Holy Sepulchre as to what persons were eligible for election as Patriarch, and an attempt on the part of the Arabic-speaking community to use the election to extort concessions from the ruling Greek Fraternity.

The minor dispute is whether former members of the Fraternity now serving in other Orthodox churches are entitled to be elected under the constitution of the Jerusalem Patriarchate. Among the candidates nominated by the Holy Synod of December 16th, 1931, were the Patriarch of Alexandria, the Archbishop of Athens, and the Metropolitan of Leontopolis (Zagazig) in Egypt. But an accompanying memorandum explained that the majority of the Synod (sixteen as against seven) did not consider them eligible for election. On January 5th, however, it was announced that the High Commissioner for Palestine did not intend in the present instance to exercise the right inherited from the Imperial Ottoman régime of excising any of the names from the list of candidates submitted to him. There is reason to think that a majority of the Synod has changed its opinion on this point, and that either the Patriarch of Alexandria or the Archbishop of Jordan will be chosen.

Meanwhile, there had been so much agitation among the Arabic-speaking laity that the Palestine Administration was compelled to issue a formal statement on October 17th, that it did not propose to enforce the changes in the Fundamental Law of the Patriarchate, proposed in the 13th chapter of the Bertram-Young Report, *before* the election of a new Patriarch. Three times the Holy Synod summoned the married priests who represent the Arab community in the election—on September 23rd, on October 15th, and on December 16th. Three times they failed to appear, and on the third occasion the Synod drew up the list of a candidates without them, and proposed to conduct the final stages of the election on January 28th, 1932, to attend which the representative married priests were again summoned.

In November, however, there had assembled at Jaffa the second Arab-Orthodox Congress. The executive committee of this body brought a suit in the Palestine Supreme Court to have the whole procedure of the election declared invalid. The Patriarchate protested vigorously that its affairs were not within the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, and refused to plead. But it did, in fact, postpone once more the final date of the election.

On January 26th, the Chief Justice and Judge Baker gave their decision. They held that they were competent to hear the suit. They dismissed the contention of the petitioners that the initial election of the *Topoteretes* was illegal. But they invalidated the whole of the subsequent proceedings on the Gilbertian ground that the proper person to discharge the duties of Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire (and therefore to recognize the *Topoteretes'* election) was not the High Commissioner for Palestine but the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Since January there has been a deadlock. Orthodox ecclesiastical circles anticipate that the British Government will modify the Fundamental Law of the Patriarchate, substituting the High Commissioner for the Secretary of State as the competent supervising authority, and that the election will then proceed.

## REVIEWS.

*The Medieval Books of Merton College.* By F. M. POWICKE.  
(Clarendon Press). 21s.

It is possible to write a book of this particular class and to note that its importance is entirely confined to specialists in medieval byways. It is also possible to write it so that it may appeal to all who take an intelligent interest in the past, and this is the line that Professor Powicke has chosen. No one can, of course, read his learned labours without learning much about the ways of Merton College students in bygone days: no one can also read it without learning much about medieval conditions of study. This is to have achieved a substantial piece of work, and we heartily congratulate the author on his achievement. He takes pains to point out that he has not attempted to write the history of the library of Merton College, nor has he prepared a scientific catalogue thereof. He is simply concerned with lists of books most of which have disappeared for hundreds of years, and few of which ever reposed on the library shelves, chained to them. It is plain that few manuscripts were kept *in libraria*, and that many of them belonged to the larger collection, to be found in the rooms of the fellows who were perusing their contents. In the first part of this volume Professor Powicke gives us the entries in the catalogues, elections, and the document E, and he conveniently numbers these entries separately. In the second part he comprises in a chronological list, arranged so far as possible under the titles of the donors, the books which came into the possession of the college from its foundation until the magnificent bequest of William Rede, Bishop of Chichester (1385). It is thus possible to trace the growth of the working library in use by the fellows, and obviously such a purpose leads us on to consider the varied phases of medieval learning. With this book in hand one can do much towards seeing how thought was continuously changing, and it is apparent if all colleges followed the example set by Merton, we should know the medieval mind as we have never known it before. From this angle we learn on the authority of the President of Corpus that the majority of the existing manuscripts did not come into the possession of

the college until the fifteenth century. The survivors from the earliest collection are Bonaventure, Jerome, Gorran on the Psalter, Chrysostom, the major prophets, logical treatises, Gregory, Grosseteste, St. Thomas Aquinas, Vincent of Beauvais, Ambrose, Augustine, Kilwardby, SS. Luke and John with glosses, Henry of Ghent, Eusebius, Bede, Josephus, and the *historia animalium*.

The Provost of Eton has compiled list after list of this type, and we have taken the trouble to compare his lists on some authors with those given by Professor Powicke, and, as we expected, they reveal substantial identity. Twice the latter, for instance, mentions Seneca's *Naturales Questiones*, a book that particularly arouses our curiosity. Throughout this book Seneca is well aware of the necessity of procuring correct data. He records his careful observations when digging among his vines. Take some of his views.

"A great contribution to discovery was made by the man who first conceived the hope of its possibility. We must therefore listen indulgently to the ancients. No subject is perfect while it is but beginning. The truth holds not merely of the subject (*i.e.*, earthquakes) we are dealing with, the greatest and most complex of all, in which, however much may be accomplished, every succeeding age will still find something fresh to accomplish. It holds alike in every other concern; the first principles have always been a long way off from the complete science."

We are here far removed from the conception that the whole body of truth has been discovered, and that all we can do is to re-discover what has been lost.

This is more evident in the next quotation:

"It is not a thousand years since Greece 'counted the number of the stars and named them every one.' And there are many nations at the present hour who merely know the face of the sky and do not yet understand why the moon is obscured in an eclipse. It is but recently indeed that science brought home to ourselves certain knowledge on the subject. The day will yet come when the progress of research through long ages will reveal to sight the mysteries of nature that are now concealed. A single lifetime, though it were wholly devoted to the study of the sky, does not suffice for the investigations of problems of such complexity. And then we never make a fair division of the few brief years of life as between



study and vice. It must therefore require long successive ages to unfold all. The day will yet come when posterity will be amazed that we remain ignorant of things that will seem to them so plain."

This book of Seneca's was the last word on science spoken by the classical world, and it is the only work of importance bearing on science that has come down to us in Latin. Herein its author possessed a marked advantage over Aristotle, whose *Physics* was written in Greek, a tongue much less familiar to the medieval world. This book became a text-book of science to the man of the Middle Ages. It has been the infinite loss of mankind that the two following passages have not sunk deeply into the mind of Europe.

"Aristotle has finely said," remarks Seneca, "that we should never be more reverent than when we are treating of the gods. We enter a temple with all due gravity, we lower our eyes, draw up our toga, and assume every token of modesty when we approach the sacrifice. How much more is all this due when we discuss the heavenly bodies, the stars, the nature of the gods, lest in ignorance we make any assertion regarding them that is hasty or disrespectful; or lest unwittingly we lie. Let us not be surprised that what is buried so deep should be unearthed so slowly. . . . But all these questions (*i.e.*, on comets) are foreclosed by the statement that they are not accidental fires, but inwoven in the texture of the universe, directed by it in secret, but not often revealed. And how many bodies besides revolve in secret, never dawning upon human eyes? Nor is it for man that God has made all things. How small a portion of his mighty work is entrusted to us!"

He proceeds to draw attention to the new discoveries :

"How many animals we have come to know for the first time in our days. Many, too, that are unknown to us the people of a coming day will know. Many discoveries are reserved for the ages still to be, when our memory shall have perished. The world is a poor affair if it does not contain matter for investigation for the whole world in every age. Some of the sacred rites are not revealed to worshippers all at once. Eleusis contains some of his mysteries to show to votaries on their second visit. Nature does not reveal all her secrets all at once. We imagine we are initiated in her mysteries : we are as yet but hanging around her outer courts.

These secrets of hers are not open to all indiscriminately. They are withdrawn and shut up in the inner shrine. Of one of them this age will catch a glimpse, of another the age that will come after."

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

*Studien zur Geschichte des Neuen Testaments und der Alten Kirche.*

VON ADOLF VON HARNACK. I. Zur Neutestamentlichen Textkritik. (Berlin and Leipsig, 1931. Verlag von Walter de Gruyter). Unbound 11 m. Bound 12 m.

THE present volume constitutes No. 19 of the important series, *Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte*, edited by Hirsch and Lietzmann. In it are reprinted ten essays of Harnack, all of which had previously appeared in the *Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy. Through the text-books, the conclusions of a good many of these essays have become widely known; but it is probable that only a relatively small proportion of those who are acquainted with their results have studied them in their original form. The wider world which has little opportunity of access to the periodicals of foreign learned societies will be grateful to Dr Lietzmann for this collection.

In view of their importance, we proceed to give a list of the titles and theses of the ten essays. They are as follows:—

(1) "The Apostolic Decree (Ac. xv, 29) and the Hypothesis of Blass." As against Blass, Harnack contends here for the reading of the longer text which contains the words *καὶ πνικτῶν*. The shorter text—which converts the Food Law into a Moral Law, and is attested by D and the early Western fathers—is secondary. Harnack believes that this single instance is sufficient to disprove Blass' hypothesis of the priority of the Western text of the Lucan writings.

(2) "On the Original Text of Acts, xi, 27 f." Here Harnack argues against the D-Reading, which makes this a "We-Passage."

(3) "On the Two Recensions of the Story of Prisca and Aquila in Acts, xviii, 1-27." Again the D-text is rejected. Many indications in the N.T. shew that Prisca had gained a more important position in the Church than her husband. D's editorial alterations were made in order to reduce her position.

(4) "Elizabeth's Magnificat (Lk., i, 46-55), and Some Notes on Lk., i and ii." In Lk. i, 46, the original reading was simply *καὶ εἶπεν*, from which the two variants *καὶ εἶπεν Μαριάμ* and

*et Elisabet ait* were derived. If this is so, then the context shows clearly that the latter is the correct interpretation, and that Luke attributed the Magnificat to Elizabeth. This attribution is rendered almost certain by reason of the parallelism of the circumstances of Hannah (I Sam., ii) and Elizabeth and the great similarity of the Magnificat with the Song of Hannah.

(5) "Problems in the Text of the Passion Narrative." Three independent texts are investigated. In Lk. xxii, 43, Harnack contends for the originality of the assertion that an angel strengthened Our Lord in Gethsemane, and of the two sentences which follow. This is the reading of D, as against B Syr. sin. Westcott and Hort considered this passage as one of the "Western Non-Interpolations"; though non-Lucan, it was a very early addition to the text. In Lk., xxiii, 33, Harnack defends (again against W.-H.) the genuineness of the text containing the First Word from the Cross. In Mk. xv, 34 (in the Fourth Word from the Cross) *ὠνείδισας* (D), instead of the usual *ἐγκατέλιπες*, is maintained.

(6) "On the Textual Criticism and Christology of the Johanne Writings." A study of several isolated passages, most of them from the Epistles of St. John.

(7) "On the Saying 'Glory to God in the Highest,' and the Word *εὐδοκία*." Arguing that the original text of the saying was *Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς εἰρήνη ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας*, Harnack agrees with Hort (as against the great majority of other commentators) that the break occurs between *γῆς* and *εἰρήνη*, and that we have a two-membered couplet running:—

*Δόξα ἐν ὑψίστοις θεῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς,  
Εἰρήνη ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκίας.*

Not only does he read *εὐδοκίας* (*genitive*), but also (with Origen and Hort) he connects it with *εἰρήνη* and not with *ἀνθρώποις*. (We are somewhat surprised not to find this plausible suggestion noticed in Professor Creed's Commentary).

(8) "On I Cor. xiv, 32 ff. and Rom. xvi, 25 ff., according to the Oldest Tradition and the Marcionite Bible." In verse 33 of the former passage, Harnack excises *ὁ θεός* (its original absence is implied by Marcion [in Tertullian] and Ambrosiaster); in this way, v. 33 becomes a possible premiss of v. 32. The latter passage is a "Catholic [*i.e.*, orthodox] working over of a Marcionite text."

(9) "Studies in the Vulgate of the Epistle to the Hebrews." The Greek text which Harnack believes that the Vulgate implied is printed here *in extenso*.

(10) "Two Ancient Corrections of a Dogmatic Character in the Epistle to the Hebrews." These are (i) the alteration of an original χωρὶς θεοῦ (Orig.) to the usual χάριτι θεοῦ in ii, 9; and (ii) the insertion of an οὐκ before εἰσακουσθεῖς in v. 8. The latter change at once makes sense of a passage which has long puzzled commentators, though Harnack has to admit that there is no MS evidence for the conjecture. Both these alterations were made by scribes in the interests of Christology.

We have contented ourselves with a mere record of Harnack's conclusions. These papers deserve the closest attention from all New Testament critics. In form and method they are models of scholarship. Under the influence of *Formgeschichte*, the prestige of the method of literary criticism such as characterizes these essays has somewhat declined in the last decade. Perhaps these papers will do something to set the fashion the other way. We await with keen interest the succeeding volumes.

F. L. CROSS.

*The Riddle of the New Testament.* By SIR EDWYN HOSKYNs, Bart., and NOEL DAVEY. (Faber and Faber). 10s. 6d.

SELDOM can a book written primarily for the layman have been so interesting to the theologian. With almost unvarying lucidity of style it describes the trend of much recent criticism of the New Testament. Its interest for the more expert consists in its invitation and its aid to survey the situation, but still more in its tendency to heighten certain effects in the scene.

Its main thesis—that the Jesus of History is identical with the Christ of Faith—is developed on purely critical and historical grounds. The gulf which has sometimes been imagined between the Synoptic Gospels, or their oldest strata, and the rest of the New Testament is shown to be non-existent. A portrait of Jesus is given us adequate to account for the origin of the Christian Church. The works and words of Jesus are all dominated by the assumption of his Messianic status. In life and death he is the conscious instrument of the "Action of God." The theology clarified in the Fourth Gospel and the Epistles was all given by the Ministry of Jesus himself—a contention supported by investigation alike of Mark, Q., and the sources



peculiar to Matthew and Luke. At the end of every avenue, explore it as far back as you can, we are confronted by no mere humanitarian teacher, but "the Son of God with power."

It has long been evident that you cannot scientifically eliminate from the earliest evidence either the Messianic claims or the sense of the "supernatural," that the extent of the influence of mystery religions was almost negligible, and that St. Paul was no isolated innovator, and in all these directions this book will strengthen our conviction and enlarge our arguments. But the writers are reactionary almost to the degree of fanaticism. In the main they react against the humanitarianism of Liberal Protestantism. "Humanistic" and "humanitarian" are such frequent terms of contempt in their pages that it is regrettable that we have to wait until page 261 before we receive the assurance :

"This does not mean, however, that the Gospel is in any sense anti-humanitarian. The antithesis between it and modern idealism arises, not because Jesus and Primitive Christianity were less human than humanitarianism, but because they were infinitely more so."

A better proportion would have been attained by an elaboration of that statement. A book which concentrates so largely on the mystery and majesty of the kingdom to the exclusion of the ethical implications of the Gospel inevitably conveys an impression of excitement rather than of inspiration as characterizing the life of the primitive Christian community.

It is disappointing and a little baffling, when one is wondering about the nature of the unique Christian righteousness to read such a sentence as :

"The whole record concentrates, then, neither upon a righteousness of the heart nor yet upon a righteousness of the spirit of man, but upon a spiritual righteousness of the Lord passing outwards into concrete speech and action and finally into the bloody scene of the Crucifixion."

It is almost as if the writers feared that some degree of affinity between the Gospel and humanitarianism might emerge from a more lucid treatment of the ethical aspect of the former.

The book represents also the modern reaction against the classical school of New Testament exegesis. The partial justification of this is to be seen, for example, in the illuminating paragraphs on *Ekklesia* and *Aletheia* in Chapter I. But the reaction is carried as the argument develops to a degree which can only

be described as putting the New Testament into bondage to the Old. For example, the authors concede all that Jewish scholars have contended concerning Christ's lack of originality. They claim that there is a modern agreement of Christian scholars with Jewish in this matter. And yet, as someone has remarked,

"The characteristic features of Greek sculpture had one by one been discovered by the Egyptians, the Hittites, the Assyrians. Would you say that the Greeks had contributed little to the world in the art of sculpture?"

The supposed lack of originality is explained by these authors with a difference from others.

"The righteousness which Jesus demanded is lacking in originality not because it was similarly formulated by the Rabbis, but because it was the demand of God revealed to the Jewish people."

The interpretation of the language of the Gospels is made to turn so largely on Old Testament prophecies of the "Messianic Age" that one wishes the authors had set themselves a preliminary essay on "The Messianic Age in the Old Testament," and had discovered how vague and conflicting are its deliverances on this subject. The writers' attempts to display new instances in the Gospels of the "controlling" power of the Old Testament are, for the most part, entirely unconvincing; notably the catena of quotations on pp. 184 f. which precedes the remark:

"These passages show that the metaphor of sowing in the

Old Testament almost demanded a Messianic application," the suggestion that Our Lord's use of the hand in healing was due to the frequent references in the Psalms to the "hand of God," and that his reference to the rescue of an animal from a pit on the Sabbath-day has something to do with the frequent pits and snares of evil in the Psalms. In fact, the book is frequently marred by constant intrusions of the Old Testament, which are in reality irrelevant to the evidence, which points to our Lord's unique Messiahship approximating at certain points to some of the dim adumbrations of the prophets, but utterly transcending them all. The authors, though remarkably successful in clearing Matthew and Luke of the charge of heightening the Markan Christology, fail to clear the former of attempting to force the history into parallelism with the Old Testament; and a process

which we can detect at work within our view may surely be presumed to have set in earlier. For such a process the writers have an elusive euphemism—"clarifying." St. Luke, on the other hand, simply because he gives us humanitarian passages is suspected of smoothing down intractable Old Testament material for the benefit of Gentile readers. Such drastic treatment of this humanitarian material excites a doubt as to whether the writers of the book have really appreciated the full vastness of the riddle of the New Testament. It explains the prejudice against the theory of Proto-Luke expressed on pages 16 f.

The treatment of parables illustrates the tendency of the authors to mar a good part by exaggeration. A parable such as that of the Sower has, no doubt, Christological implications; but they do not necessarily constitute its only or even its main significance, which would seem to be that the success or failure of a harvest depends not only on the seed but on the soil. Though the Christology would be dim to hearers of such parables it would not render them utterly unintelligible. The theory of the deliberate unintelligibility of parables is not even consistently maintained in St. Mark's Gospel. Mark, iv, 33, for instance, represents another, incompatible, tradition of their purpose, while the saying about not hiding a light under a bushel—reads in its context in Mark, iv, 21, like a general exhortation to make an effort to discover the meaning of the parables. New and strange is the suggestion (p. 189) that the very meaning of Parable in the Gospels is "scandal" or "enigma," a significance suggested merely by the context in which it is used in Jer., xxiv, 9, and Deut., xxviii, 37. But the authors of this book not only search the Scriptures of the Old Testament, they also love a mystery.

The treatment of the Parable of the Virgins, on p. 65, will illustrate vividly and briefly the main defects of the book. A certain lack of a sense of proportion is evinced by the remark that if the reading of Codex Bezae, etc., in Matt., xxv, 9 is correct, then "the whole point of the parable lies in the roughness of the answer"; which also suggests that the reaction, against humanitarianism may assume inhuman proportions.

The chief merit of the book for the layman consists in the discussion of the language and text of the New Testament and in the way in which the problems of the history are stated. The theologian will be grateful also for the main trend of the argument, thus admirably summed up by its authors.

"The Theologians of the New Testament, then, are not moving in a world of their own ideas. They are moving upon the background of a very particular history, which is itself shot through and through with theological significance."

F. D. V. NARBOROUGH.

*The Natural and the Supernatural.* By JOHN OMAN. (Cambridge University Press. 1931). 18s. net.

THERE can be no doubt that this is one of the most important theological works which has appeared in recent times. It may be regarded as Dr Oman's summing up of his thought upon the main problems of religion, and is, in effect, both a philosophy of religion and prolegomena to Christian doctrine. He deals with the nature of religion, giving a penetrating criticism of the more important theories. He develops a general theory of knowledge with special references to the kind of knowing involved in religion. In the third part, we are given a discussion of Necessity and Freedom, and in the fourth part, which is entitled "The Evanescent and the Eternal," we reach the conclusion of the matter, a discussion of the chief types of religion leading up to the Prophetic type, of which Jesus is represented as the supreme example. It is clear that no review could deal adequately with such a comprehensive work, and it will be necessary here to confine ourselves to some of the outstanding positions taken up by the author. It must be said, however, at the outset, that this is a book which cannot safely be ignored by any student of Philosophy or Theology.

The fundamental conception is that of environment, and the main purpose of the whole argument is to show that man is in contact with an environment which is not merely natural. By environment, however, Dr Oman means something different from the significance which is given to the word by the ordinary biologist. For him environment is essentially meaning.

"We think of environment not as impact or physical influx, but as meaning: and this meaning depends on (1) the unique character of the feeling it creates; (2) the unique value it has for us; (3) the immediate conviction of a special kind of objective reality, which is inseparable from this valuation; and (4) the necessity of thinking it in relation to the rest of experience and the rest of experience in relation to it."



Religion is then for Dr Oman both a contact with an environment of a special character and a special way of dealing with the environment.

"What distinguishes religion from all else is the unique quality of the feeling, of the valuation, of the nature of the object, and of the way of thinking things together."

The important element in Dr Oman's theory is the distinction which he draws between the holy and the sacred. He is by no means in agreement with Professor Otto in his view of the holy, but he develops a view suggested by Windelband in his *Präludien*. He does not, of course, deny the existence of a feeling of the "numinous" upon which Otto bases his interpretation of religion. He denies, however, that the holy in this sense is the essence of the higher religion. The "sacred" is that which demands not a terrified abasement but absolute reverence. There are, in fact, two persistent types of religion. "One a surrender of awe and one a challenge and adventure of reverence." Nor does Dr Oman agree that the holy is non-ethical and non-rational. On the contrary, there are, in his view, ethical and rational elements within the feeling of the holy from the beginning. The conception of the sacred is of great importance for Dr Oman's theory. He means by it absoluteness of value, that which is of incomparable worth, and which is seen by us, when we are in contact with it, to have unlimited claim to our reverence. We might define God, though not in Dr Oman's own words, as the sum of the sacred.

"Unless God himself embody all we value as sacred, he is a mere metaphysical hypothesis."

The author approaches the problem of the distinction between natural and supernatural from the standpoint of value. The distinction is, in fact, that between comparative value and absolute, which is, he argues, another way of putting the difference between the seen and temporal, and the unseen and eternal. We are not permitted, however, to regard the distinction as a separation or opposition. Natural and supernatural are consistently interwoven, so that it is true to say that nothing is wholly natural or wholly supernatural, though there is a definite distinction between them in our experience. When we are dealing with comparative values we are in the sphere of the natural; when with absolute values, which over-ride our needs and desires, we are experiencing supernaturally.

This conception of the supernatural leads to a view of supernatural religion which is almost a contradictory of much which

has been represented as rightly claiming that title. Supernatural revelation does not lay fetters upon our mind or confine us within a system of dogma. There is no true religion which is fixed and settled.

“The supernatural is precisely the environment which is always calling us into new territory, so that there is no religion except religion in the making.”

It is impossible here to consider the theory of knowledge which Dr Oman elaborates as a support for his theory of religion. He describes four types of knowing: Awareness, Apprehension, Comprehension and Explanation, and lays great stress upon the fundamental importance of Awareness. A specially interesting chapter is devoted to the poetical form of Awareness and Apprehension contrasted with the scientific and philosophical.

Probably the most difficult section of the book is that which discusses the problem of Necessity and Freedom. Dr Oman is not an indeterminist in the ordinary sense of the word, nor on the other hand, does he adopt the Hegelian formula that, properly understood, necessity is the true freedom. The central thesis which he maintains is that man wins freedom through his apprehension of, and surrender to the supernatural, and that this freedom is not to be found in isolated acts but in the direction of the self towards the absolute value.

Probably most readers will find the concluding section of the book both the most interesting and the most controversial. In this the author attempts to make a classification of religions. He covers the familiar ground of Primitive religion making some penetrating remarks on the way. In dealing with the higher types of religion he draws a sharp distinction between Mysticism and Prophetic religion, but will have nothing to do with the idea that Mysticism is religion in its purest form. On the contrary, he would condemn Mysticism as the final working out of that type of piety in which the awesome, rather than the sacred, is the dominant thought. The aim of the mystic is essentially to be rapt away from the natural by a union with the eternal, which is, in this type of experience, not ethical. Prophetic religion, on the other hand, consists in the finding of the sacred within the natural, and the attempt to realize the values of the supernatural order within the temporal. Perhaps the final sentence of the book states the point of view with sufficient clearness.

“Denying the world does not mean that we do not possess it

in courageous use of all possibilities, but only that we do not allow it to possess us."

This review has touched on only some of the salient positions defended by the author. We must be content with drawing attention to the illuminating remarks upon authority in religion which are the best reasoned statement of the essentially Protestant view with which we are acquainted. The whole book, in fact, is a philosophical basis for a Protestant theology. There are points which could be made the subject of criticism. It seems, for instance, that Dr Oman scarcely gives sufficient weight to the social source of our beliefs and valuations. We might question too his treatment of the mystical experience, and particularly his suggestion that the mystical type of religion is not possible for those who are engaged in the normal tasks of the world. But these are matters of minor importance and do not diminish the gratitude which we feel to Dr Oman for his contribution to religious thought. It cannot be said that the book is easy to read. It must be studied and not skimmed, but the argument is constantly relieved by flashes of epigram, of which we will, in conclusion, quote one example.

"Much theology is like much science, a mere exercise in the pleasing assurance that the Almighty would have too much sense to depart from our view of how the world should be run."

W. R. MATTHEWS.

*Christus Victor.* An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement. By GUSTAV AULÉN. Authorized Translation by A. G. HEBERT. (S.P.C.K.). 6s.

THE title of this book indicates at once the purport of it, for it is usual to-day to distinguish only two main types of Atonement doctrine—the *objective*, whether expressed in terms of Representationism or Substitutionism, and the *subjective* or exemplarist. Whereas it is recognized that the writings of the Fathers are steeped in the thought of a ransom paid to the Devil, such an idea is almost universally regarded nowadays as grotesque and therefore discarded wholesale. Dr Aulén's book claims to be merely a historical study and not an *apologia*, but in fact it is a most lucid and thought-provoking vindication of the truth underlying the devil-ransom idea. He maintains that there are *three* main types of Atonement doctrine, and that what he calls

the "classic" idea has the greatest claim of all to be the characteristic Christian doctrine. This *idea* (he refuses to call it a *theory*) is summed up in the words "Christus Victor," and "God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself." It is certainly *objective*, yet it is clearly distinguishable from the Western doctrine of a propitiatory sacrifice offered by Christ as Man to the Father, which was first clearly set forth by Anselm. The "classic" idea conceives of the Atonement as a drama of salvation. Throughout it is the work of God himself, and no distinction is drawn between the divine justice and the divine mercy. The idea is based on dualism. God in Christ carries on a victorious battle with the powers which are hostile to his will. The victory brings about a new relation between God and the world. God himself is reconciled by the very act in which he reconciles the world to himself. The dualism is of course not absolute, as in Zoroastrian or Manichean teaching: it is the opposition between the divine Love and the rebellion of created wills. In this sense Holy Scripture is thoroughly dualistic. Dr Aulén shows how this idea of conflict and triumph, of mankind under the sway of the evil powers, of the victory over them won by God himself who entered into the world as Man, pervades the New Testament and the patristic writings. He holds that the inception of the Latin theory can be fixed precisely.

"Tertullian prepares the building materials; Cyprian begins to construct out of them a doctrine of the Atonement."

The root idea of it is that man must make some payment to satisfy God's justice, a thought which is wholly absent from the "classic" idea. Luther himself revived the devil-ransom teaching in its crudest form.

"From the side-line of the Latin theory he bends right back to the main line, making a direct connection with the New Testament and the Fathers."

But Luther stood alone. Melancthon, with his Aristotelian philosophy brought "Lutheran" thought at once into line with mediaeval scholasticism: and Luther's own works have in places been amended by his followers so that his teaching about the merits and satisfaction of Christ might agree with the Latin doctrine on the subject. So, for a complexity of reasons, the "classic" idea has been widely ignored both by Catholics and Protestants, and Dr Aulén has made an important contribution to scholarship by showing that the dominant thought of the Fathers has profound underlying truth. Particularly valuable



is the criticism of Dr Rashdall's Bampton Lectures, coming as it does from one of the leading theologians in Sweden.

"He allows the highest human to shade off into the Divine, and thus obscures the distinction between the Divine and the human."

The doctrine of the Atonement is the most elusive of all the dogmas of the Faith. We need not suppose that the Latin theory has been in any way disproved or emasculated by Dr Aulén's treatise. The book's importance rather lies in bringing prominently to our notice an aspect of truth which has received too little emphasis. Fr. Hebert's translation is masterly, and his introduction admirable: and we agree with him that this book is a contribution to the literature bearing on the reunion of Christendom.

FREDERIC HOOD.

*Mediaeval Faith and Fable.* By CANON J. A. MACCULLOCH. (Harrap). pp. 350. 15s.

THIS book (one of the "Myths" series published by the firm named) is an excellent collection of beliefs current in the popular mind in medieval Europe. Thus we have articles on such subjects as Relics, Lycanthropy, Miracles, Demons, et *hoc genus omne*. One may suggest perhaps that the writer gives us any amount of medieval fable, but hardly does justice to the faith of which it was after all the perversion, leaving a casual reader with the impression that the many superstitions were all that there was then in the mind of men. We are certain of course that this was very far from his intention.

We are given much queer knowledge, and a lot of "fine confused feeding," with an excellent Bibliography to guide students who seek for more, and notes which are charitably put apart at the end, where the student who needs them can find them.

Canon MacCulloch is careful to point out (and both points needed making) that the superstitions he studies were not so much encouraged by authority as forced upon it by popular opinion that wiser men (*e.g.*, Vigilantius in his controversy with Jerome) often opposed in vain. Authority had to give in and endorse popular opinion, and then the Church that relies most on authority finds itself thereby fatally entangled in its own rulings.

Also, while the superstitions he studies are mostly survivals of paganism, it is not the "classic" paganism that they reflect, but the popular cults of those days that did not get into books or state ceremonies, but yet held (and hold) the emotions of the people.

One limitation of outlook may be noted, removal of which would have much increased the value of a good book. The superstitions and the mentality that Canon MacCulloch studies are those of Western Europe almost exclusively. There are few references to the Greece where the older gods like Pan live to-day; none—even in an excellent chapter on "Emotional movements"—to the Russia where the minds of men are still where Europe was in the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries, and give us a contemporary picture of what we find it hard to understand.

We doubt whether the Goliards d Gyrovagi of whom the writer discourses in Chapter XVI are strictly either "Faith" or "Fable," but the author's delight in telling us of these young "clerici" who had kicked over the traces of their usually minor orders would excuse a worse digression!

Sir J. G. Fraser, in a very kindly foreword that he contributes to a book that we fear his eyes forbade him to read personally, expresses the hope that Canon MacCulloch will read chapters from it to his congregation on Sabbath evenings!

While congratulating the author both on the book and on the joy of being *laudatus a laudato*, we cannot consider it an adequate substitute for the Church Calendar of lessons, and fear that the congregation of St. Ninian's Cathedral, Perth, would be surprised at the change!

W. A. WIGRAM

*Modern Greece, 1800-1931.* By JOHN MAVROGORDATO. (Macmillan & Co.). 10s. 6d.

"The country which had been left by the Turks a desert was indeed converted during the reign of King George into the semblance of a thriving modern community. The population had increased from 651,233 in 1834 to 2,631,952 in 1907, and as the territory had increased in the same period from 48,976 to 64,292 square kilometres, the average density of population to the square kilometre had increased from 13.2 to 40.9. The Peiraeus, which in 1839 had been marked by 'a piece of deal boarding projecting a few feet into the

sea, to serve as a landing-stage for small boats,' had become the fourth port of the Mediterranean. Exports had increased from 32,323,426 drachmae in 1862 to 140,900,000 drachmae. The mercantile marine grew from 28 steamers of 8,240 tons in 1875 to 347 steamers of 384,446 tons. The total volume of foreign trade was more than five times as great in 1911 as it had been in 1862."

THIS is a significant record of achievement over a period of Greek history which, but for brief intervals of good and sensible government by Tricoupes, had been marked chiefly by political corruption and nationalist hysteria. Mr Mavrogordato's account of the modern Greek achievement is the more impressive because he makes no attempt to disguise the failings of his fellow-countrymen. Extreme factiousness and violent partisan hatreds appear to have been innate in the Greek character from classical days. The long Turkish rule left a tradition of intrigue and jobbery and an uncivilized standard of administrative efficiency. The unique splendour of their history carried in the case of the Greeks the general nationalist fever of the last century to the point of mania. To faults were added misfortunes. The Greece created by the Powers in 1832 was too small to serve as anything but a focus of discontent. Metternich, the most resolute opponent of the Greek cause in Europe, was wise enough to see this and argued that if once the principle of legitimacy was to be set aside in the case of Turkey, a Greece large enough to become prosperous and contented must be created. The obstinacy of the Duke of Wellington defeated this proposal. There still remained in this small devastated corner of the Balkan peninsula the relics of the old local administration by which the Greeks had managed their affairs in Turkish days. All was ruthlessly swept away by the "Westernizing" policy of Capodistrias, and King Otho's Bavarians erected a clumsy, wholly centralized administrative system which none of the repeated revolutions and political upheavals has ever seriously modified.

Mr Mavrogordato tells extremely well his story of astonishing concrete achievement in spite of failure in character and hindrance of circumstance. His phrases are often a delight.

"He (Otho) died four years later in complete obscurity, in so far as complete obscurity could be obtained by anyone who insisted on wearing Greek dress in the middle of Bavaria" (p. 53). "It was announced that England (after

vainly approaching Ferdinand of Saxe Coburg, widower of Queen Maria of Portugal, and all other available members of the house of Coburg and after warning the Greek people that they must be sure to elect a Prince of 'mature years and of some experience with the world') had at last found them a king in the person of a sixteen-year-old naval cadet, Christian William George, a prince of the Danish Royal House, who was duly elected king of the Hellenes by the National Assembly " (p. 57).

But no Greek should inform English readers that Archbishop Germanos raised the standard of revolt at the monastery of Megaspelaion. That most famous scene took place at the Lavra by Calabryta. Nor is it excusable that the map at the beginning of the book should exclude Samos from the boundaries of 1913.

Mr Mavrogordato is that rare phenomenon among Greeks, a vigorous anti-clerical. But he is certainly wrong in the extent of reactionary influence he ascribes to the Church. The more enlightened prelates struggle courageously for reforms much belaboured by the truculent conservatism of their flocks.

Many readers will conclude that in his final chapter "A Tract on Federation" Mr Mavrogordato is ahead of the times. In fact he is behind them. After the colonizing achievement of the Refugee Commission it is as belated to suggest an autonomous Macedonia to solve the Balkan problem, as to advocate a revival of the Holy Roman Empire to curb the rivalries of greater Powers.

PHILIP USHER.

*James M. Wilson: an Autobiography, 1836-1931.* With five portraits and five facsimiles. (Sidgwick and Jackson). 10s. 6d.

It is easy to sum up the outward career of James M. Wilson. Therecord is an assistant mastership at Rugby, the Headmastership of Clifton, the vicariate of Rochdale, and a Canonry of Worcester, and yet we freely recognise that he occupied a commanding position in the Church of England in particular and in the world of thought in general. His was essentially one of the hidden lives of England. He never regretted this self-obliteration, for he believed that it accomplished the true end of his work, the reconciliation of religion with the knowledge of his generation. He always realised that the wedding of science with religion was that of a mortal with an immortal, and he thoroughly recog-



nized—no one more thoroughly—that theology represents the changed aspects of the unchanged truth of religion. Therefore his autobiography assumes an importance which can be fully conceded.

His two sons inform us that their father wrote his autobiography, and that they have supplied the links necessary to maintain continuous interest. These links have been supplied with care and discrimination, and the outcome is a volume easy to take up but most difficult to set down. For our own part we confess to the eagerness with which we received it, and this eagerness was sustained till we had finished the last page of an engrossing autobiography. It is throughout the record of a mind at work, and a mind influenced by the great movements of the Victorian age, the growth of science, the advance of critical research not only on the Bible but in history, and the arousing of the social conscience. All these make their due impression on the man, and we gradually realise how their combined influence impinged on James M. Wilson, and made him the remarkable man he undoubtedly was.

The autobiography begins with schoolboy days at King William's College, Isle of Man, and it is plain that the account Dean Farrar gave of it in his tale "Eric" is by no means the satire that we had supposed it. In after years Wilson tried to forget his schoolboy days, asserting that "it is too horrible." He passed on to Sedbergh where he was much happier, though here too the education imparted was a travesty of all it ought to be. Classics were taught "from the point of view of accident and syntax," and yet folks wonder there has been a reaction against the classics. In 1855 he went to St. John's College, Cambridge, and there for a time similar ill fortune dogged his steps. Even after winning a scholarship the Dons refused to take the slightest notice of the promising undergraduate. Then an old Sedberghian called upon him, and offered to coach him for the Bell scholarship. He won the second scholarship, and was bracketed with Henry Sidgwick. He read classics and he read mathematics, and he read both subjects with a will. The result of his hard work told, and he graduated as Senior Wrangler, though an illness prevented his sitting for the Classical Tripos. If anyone wishes to read an impassioned condemnation of the old Tripos system, let him turn to this book, and he will find it. Wilson's coach was Stephen Parkinson, and he constantly urged his pupil to read nothing that did not pay. Parkinson once

called on him, and looked over his shelves where Mill's *Logic*, Reid's *Philosophy*, and Coleridge's *Friend* caught his eye. He turned them upside down, vowing that they would ruin his pupil's chances of a good degree. As a matter of fact they did not, yet they did prevent Wilson feeling the fascination of philosophy that might have meant so much to the Church of England. His sons candidly confess that "He neither understood the philosophic mind nor did he value it sufficiently highly."

Temple attracted Wilson to Rugby where he began by teaching mathematics, gradually transferring his attentions to science. In 1879 he came to Clifton as Headmaster where he enjoyed the good fortune of succeeding to the magnificent staff that Percival had gathered around him. The school had a Mission in Bristol, and this deepened and widened the views of the Headmaster. In the eighties there was a strong secularist element in Bristol with which the parochial clergy were unable to cope. Wilson was summoned to their assistance, and, employing his wide scientific outlook, he easily discomfited the opponents of Christianity. There was a sudden interruption at the first meeting. For a young man stood up, a prey to anxiety. He was trembling, and the tears ran down his cheeks. Then he burst out in a high-pitched voice :

"No one has ever spoken to me like this." I read in the Bible, 'He that believeth not shall be damned.' I cannot believe him"—his voice here rose to a scream—"I have spent hours in prayer on my bare knees, praying that I might believe—and I can't—I can't—I can't. Tell me sir, shall I be damned ? "

Wilson shortly explained that the word translated damned meant condemned, judged, blamed. He concluded his answer by saying that he had promised to answer in one word, and that, on the grounds he had given, that answer was No. Wilson testifies that he could never forget the sigh of relief, the sense of excitement. Nothing more happened. Bishop Ellicott, who had taken the chair, said that they would have no votes of thanks. The Bishop declared he had never been so interested and moved by any meeting in his life. "It was an interest that amounted during the whole time to excitement."

The truth is that the labours Wilson carried out at Bristol, he carried out at Rochdale and at Worcester. It was a noble work nobly executed. The last chapter but one examines the growth of his religious thought, and this chapter, like the whole

book, will repay the most careful examination. It is evident that Wilson was neither desirous to make reason dictator in religion nor to banish it entirely from religion, nor to set up a sphere for it beside religion, but rather to strive towards some better unity in the Christian consciousness of all the facts given by nature, revelation, and history. The faith that seizes, so he held, cannot be set in permanent opposition to the reason which verifies: all truth is one and we must endeavour to grasp it. Now, put plainly, this means an attempted restatement of Christianity in terms of modern thought and modern conceptions. Thanks to Wilson and men likeminded with him, we are no longer frightened at this idea. The Inquisition, believing the Church to be in danger, imprisoned Galileo for asserting that the earth turned in its journey around the Sun: but their dislike of the idea did not prevent the earth from turning and turning them along with it. The Archbishop's Doctrinal Commission suggests that our Church has taken this lesson to heart, and the growing agreement of the members of this Commission—for we learn that there is this growing agreement—attest that we shall be able to adjust the old knowledge to the new. There may be a want of harmony between the conceptions of the past and the knowledge of the present, and a perusal of this fine book suggests that it is only temporary.

ROBERT H. MURRAY.

## SHORT NOTICES.

*Arnold of Brescia.* By GEORGE WILLIAM GREENAWAY, M.A.  
(Cambridge University Press). 8s. 6d. net.

THIS book provokes the not new question, what and how much equipment is needed to tackle a man and his teaching, when not only literal historical truth, but no small measure of theology and philosophy also enter into the matter? Not all possess the masterly sweep of a Gebhardt, Stubbs' solidity, fewer the comprehensive knowledge, sagacity and brilliance of Creighton. Let us realise too how much ampler an outfit is needed to make than to criticise such a book. A narrow specialist can pick damaging holes, saying, "here and here, this author is uninformed:" e.g., when Mr Greenaway juxtaposes the "mystical and supernatural theology" of St. Bernard and his friends with the "rationalist principles" of Abélard and his disciples, and then proceeds to call them "fundamentally and mutually destructive principles," any philosopher can cry him halt, suggesting that he should spend a few months with von Hügel's writings, learning the possibility and uses of synthesis.

Development of the practice of writing theses, so much encouraged in the newer Universities, seems to tend to the production of not over matured studies of most difficult matters. The cult of individuality too may breed breadth rather than depth: thus few seem to realise, as Mr Greenaway does not, that respect for authority is at least as defensible as a passion for individual judgment: fewer observe that to a balanced life and a just view of men and affairs, both are essential.

His reason for writing the book is twofold: "the absence of any biography of Arnold of Brescia in English is the *raison d'être* of this study": and then, "the literature relating to Arnold of Brescia . . . has not always been the fruit of impartial investigation." Whether or no impartial history is humanly possible (or even desirable in a rigid form), Mr Greenaway has not supplied it here. The story of Bernard and Abélard is a tragic one: but a writer who accuses the former of describing Abélard "maliciously," of "slandering his character with a pen dipped in gall"; who calls him "the astute monk" and "the implacable saint" can scarcely be called impartial.

So oddly too, when he tries to hold the scales evenly, he makes admissions on this side or that, without any shadow of perception that thereby he vitiates all the arguments: thus after a long pleading mainly to St. Bernard's discredit, he suddenly writes: "Whether or no Abailard was conscious of the drift of his teaching, there can be little doubt that Bernard's view was substantially correct," a statement which he backs up in a footnote by a confirmatory quotation from Dr Coulton. If so, surely, all that prevents him from



understanding the motive of Bernard's attack is that he estimates theological and religious truth at precisely the values of purely human affairs. That he does just that, this paragraph on the issue of the Council of Sens seems to suggest :—

Bernard's triumph appeared complete and permanent. Goliath and his armour-bearer lay rolling in the dust, the one stricken to death, the other bound with the chain of ecclesiastical censure, and the new David, improving on the example of his prototype, retired in befitting modesty to the shelter of the monastic sheep-fold.

So, if they enjoy it, combatants may write of some political uproar ; but hardly, if they sincerely regard the Church as the Spirit-bearing Body of Christ, of the clash between Truth and Heresy.

Mr Greenaway too seems to have slender appreciation of the mystical element in religion, oddly referring to Hugh of St. Victor, as "an interesting personality," and this is only one, if a crucial, instance ; and as little of the worth and meaning of the religious life, when he describes "the monks of the local Cistercian houses" as men "who invariably adopted the rôle of secret service agents with skill and equanimity." No one denies that monks may fall from their ideal ; but "invariably" admits no exception. Indeed his bias, all through, against St. Bernard in particular and monasticism in general is obvious. According to ruling fashion, there is abundance of "documentation," plentiful evidence of wide reading ; but there is less appearance of power to assimilate and appraise, still less of that sagacity which Henry Sidgwick pressed on would-be critics—"Criticism a man at his best, criticise not what he says but what he appears to have meant." Once on purely historical ground, Mr Greenaway writes soundly ; *e.g.*, his little sketch of the "character of the sole Englishman who has attained the papal chair" is excellent. Wise too, after a tangle of argument and counter argument, is his insistence that Arnold's real "legacy . . . to Christendom was simply the vision of a 'poor Church,' bereft of temporal power and confining its energies to spiritual ministration." Even if he attributes a too entire purity of intention to him, while underrating his opponents' merits, he here draws attention to a point as pertinent to the twentieth as to any century.

G.H.

*Saint Patrick, The Travelling Man.* By WINIFRED M. LETTS. (Nicholson and Watson). 12s. 6d.

THE problems of the life of the Irish national saint do not concern Miss Letts, and she remains indifferent to the question whether he lived in the second century or in the fifth. She is content to take the traditional view that he lived in the fifth century, and from her point of view she is quite right. Her aim is to tell the story of the life and the wanderings of the man who was the missionary of Ireland, and she undoubtedly accomplishes her purpose with lucidity and with vividness. Though Celtic Ireland possesses annals in which the ancestry of mythical kings is traced back to Noah, the country

can hardly be said to emerge into clear historical light until the coming of St. Patrick as a missionary in 432. The soldiers of Rome never came to Ireland, but one of her sons came, and he proved to be the national saint. Eastern as was the setting of his faith, he proclaimed a very simple creed. It is plain in his "Confessio," which is filled with the spirit of earnestness and sincerity marking every line of it.

"We shall rise," he holds, "on that day in the brightness of the sun, that is, in the glory of Christ our Redeemer, as sons of the living God and joint-heirs with Christ, and conformed to his image that will be, since of him and through him and in him are all things. To him be glory for ever and ever. Amen. For in him we shall reign."

Such was the personal creed he came to teach. This was the message he came to bring to the Irish, and Miss Letts lays stress on the fact that it is this message which fitted him to leave a lasting impress on the Irish. She makes his life a record of ceaseless activity and of as ceaseless resistance to Druidism, yet the activity achieved a signal triumph over the resistance. Though he was a bishop, he never breathed the spirit of compromise. To the day of his death he was unconscious of the magnitude of his achievement. He was hampered by the incessant petty squabbles of the chieftains, their sons, and their descendants, who were sapping the strength of the races in the land. A Dunstan might have settled at least some of them, but St. Patrick could not. The truth is that he was better fitted to look after the things of God than the things of Caesar.

R.H.M.

*Sobieski King of Poland.* By J. B. MORTON. (Eyre & Spottiswoode). 10s. 6d.

ONCE upon a time the doom *Finis Poloniae* was pronounced, and with the reversal of this doom it is but natural there should be an awakening interest in a country that has rendered services of the first magnitude to Europe. John Sobieski stands among the small class of the immortals, and we are glad that at last he has found in Mr Morton a biographer able and willing to expound the greatness of his one exploit if he has not fully convinced us of the greatness of the man. Indeed the biographer seems far more bent upon asserting the Catholicism of the king at the expense of his other qualities. This is a curious line to take, for it always seems to us that the one land where individualism ran mad was Poland. Think of a country where even in the eighteenth century the Crown was put up for sale to the highest bidder, be he Bourbon or Hapsburg, and, above all, think of a country where when he was chosen the *liberum veto* rendered strong government impossible, for the *liberum veto* meant the power of any one member of the Diet to veto any decision even if all the other members agreed to it. We have heard of unworkable constitutions, but was there ever a more unworkable one than the Polish? The Poles have contributed not a little to music, art, and

learning, but have they offered a single contribution to the art of government? We entirely doubt it.

The debt of Europe to Poland remains of the very greatest. Nor is this debt confined to the seventeenth century when John Sobieski saved Europe from the Turk. Do we remember sufficiently in our day that by the resounding Polish victory of Poland at the decisive battle of Warsaw, the Poles once more delivered Europe from the twentieth century Turk, the Bolshevik? While Mr Morton bestows much attention on the religion of John Sobieski, we for our part realise that while this religion was the foundation of the character of the man, nevertheless posterity concentrates its attention on the relief of Vienna in 1683. The author graphically describes the feeling of terror that the advance of the Turks had inspired, and we breathlessly realise that Europe was forced to contemplate the capture of Vienna. Just as the defeat of the Turk before the walls of Vienna averted the destruction of civilised Europe in the seventeenth century, so the defeat of the Bolsheviks before the walls of Warsaw averted the destruction of civilised Europe in the twentieth.

There is nothing better in the whole volume than the account of the raising of the siege of Vienna, and the author contrives to invest the reader with the thrill he himself feels. The tactics John Sobieski had employed against the Tartars he now employed against the Turks with the signal difference that whereas the Tartar victory might not have resulted in the overthrow of civilisation, the Turkish one undoubtedly would have so resulted. The French, then as now, endeavoured to minimise the splendid services of the Polish King, and even the Austrians joined in this belittlement of their saviour. Mr Morton does justice to the one outstanding deed of the King, and he compels us to see that had it not been for the valour of the Poles the Crescent might have replaced the Cross on St. Peter's, Rome, and the Sultan might have realised the dream of his existence. On the following Sunday, September 13th, 1683, the King and his army attended in Vienna a service to thankfulness to Almighty God for the victory vouchsafed. The King modestly attended, but the moment the text was given out by the preacher, Father Marco Aviano, everybody stood up and bowed to the conqueror, for the text was, "There was a man sent from God whose name was John." Pope Pius V had greeted the wonderful victory of Don John of Austria at Lepanto in the same words, and on each occasion they were thoroughly deserved.

R.H.M.

*The Legacy of Islam.* Edited by the Late SIR THOMAS ARNOLD, C.I.E., F.B.A., Litt.D., and ALFRED GUILLAUME, M.A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931). With ninety-two illustrations.

A COMPANION volume to others in the Legacy series for which we have waited long. It differs from three of its predecessors in the series in being the account of the Legacy not of a particular nation or people, but the Legacy of a politico-religious system. It is this fact that forbade its being entitled the Legacy of Arabia. The

Arabian ancestry quickly gets lost sight of in the development of Islam save for the Arabic words (words that often stood for much) that found their way into one or another of the languages of Europe. But it will be obvious from reading this book that Bagdad, Cordoba, Cairo and even Jerusalem bulk far more largely in the legacy of Islam to the world than the Holy Places of Arabia. And this quite apart from the Islamic legacy from Persia in architecture, literature, the arts and sciences, such as Burlington House has shewn us, to say nothing of what great names, such as Hallaj, stand for in other realms.

There are not many dull pages in the book ; and to the general reader there will be probably some unexpected pieces of information. It will be a surprise to learn something of the philological debt of western nations to Islamic peoples ; as to realise how much else of Islamic thought and cultures has filtered into western life, and even western buildings. Perhaps too it may be news that after the Golden age in Spain it was the Jews, who passed on the torch of learning from the Muslims to the Christians in the prerenaissance days. Perhaps living in Jerusalem, a reawakening centre for cultural Judaism, we may express the hope that modern Judaism will yet consider following in the footsteps of its mediaeval forbears and once again make its own the "conciseness" and the "flexibility" of the Arabic tongue. Would not Maimonides nod approval here ?

There are chapters in the *Legacy* for nearly every thoughtful student. We are told what the Iberian peninsula meant for Europe in the middle ages, and what the Crusades were the means of bringing westwards. The Essay on *Science and Medicine* covers a wide field but here the Muslims were rather legatees of the Greeks, while their faith in itself practically prohibited them from surgery. What however they added to the Greek foundation was based on sound observation and personal experience. We get the impression however that it is rather in the fields of the mineral and vegetable kingdoms that the Muslim scientists shone. But the *Legacy* includes too astronomy, mathematics and music. And Islam has produced its lawyers and its system of its society, but it is difficult to say in so many words what its *Legacy* is in this case, though it seems to share the best and worst of a Semitic system. Perhaps a reminder should be added on page 304 that great though the Islamic conception of equality really is, yet it works out as an equality that is exclusive rather than inclusive.

There are many who will feel Professor Nicholson's essay on Mysticism to be the crown of the whole collection. The Mystics are made attractive for those not so inclined. And the same is true of the Editor's own contribution on Theology and Philosophy. Averroes, Raymund Lull and Al Ghazali are names still heard in these days as centuries ago. Professor Gibb's instructive article on Literature shows that the *Arabian Nights* and *Omar Khayyam* are not the only specimens of Arabic Literature known in or by the West. We are glad on reading Professor Gibb to realise that he has succeeded Sir Thomas Arnold. He makes us think on every page.



Islam too has its buildings that bring their own message, while in many instances they represent an architecture worthy of the wealth of history that is connected with some of the greatest of them. The chapter on the sister subject of Islamic minor arts is full of interest, while we must not forget the commercial range of the Muslim World and the way that Muslim cities sometimes widely separated have given their names or the names of their institutions to our everyday languages. And here bear we in mind how men travelled all over the world they knew after a famous teacher or to collect traditions of the founder of the faith authentic or unauthentic. The Mediterranean world has traces all over of Islamic geographers.

Great names are attached to essays in this book, Continental and British and we are not disappointed; but Sir Thomas Arnold's essay remains unfinished. His fellow Editor recalls the fact that he was "a personal friend of every contributor" and we would add friend and teacher of many readers too.

E.F.F.B.

*The Science of the Soul*; Sermon Outlines based on the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius. By the REV. MARCUS DONOVAN. (Mowbray). 3s. 6d. net.

THIS volume of one hundred and thirty one pages may provoke more, perhaps other, questions than the writer foresaw. It contains eighty Outline Sermons. Quoting from Canon 45, of 1604, "Every beneficed man . . . shall . . . preach one Sermon every Sunday of the year, wherein he shall soberly and sincerely divide the word of truth to the glory of God and the best (salutarem) edification of the people," Mr Donovan offers these outlines as a framework. To get through them at the rate of a Sermon a Sunday would occupy over a year and a half. What possible ingenuity of arrangement could adapt them to the Church's Seasons? Again, however urgently "Christians" need, as he suggests, "to possess a connected outline of the devotional as distinct from the doctrinal side of their religion," how many congregations would have the educated concentration of patience to listen to a connected system, doled out in weekly doses, for more than eighteen months? Further, what of the capacities and gains of the occasional and vagrant element, present in almost every church, when presented with bits of this plan?

*The Exercises* are, admittedly, among the greatest but the most difficult of the world's spiritual classics. Were they ever intended and, which is more pertinent, can they be fitted for a general congregation, gathered for public worship?

However, that is not the whole of the present writer's purpose. He has extracted a list of special courses for use at set times. To the lay person, one of the crowd whose business it is to listen, to learn, this appears a more fruitful proposition. The longest of these short courses, on *The Way of the Cross*, contains nine sermons, the next on *A Rule of Life* eight, the next on *Holy Communion* seven. Others, such as five on *Sin*, four, on the *Four Last Things*, five on

The Sorrowful Mysteries obviously suggest their use in Lent, Advent and Passion Week. It may be urged that a priest lacking capacity to make his own plans from the *Exercises* had better let them alone. However, sweeping generalisations are sometimes wrong, and "capacity," has many forms. Some of us learn better from those below the very first rank, as Walter Pater suggested once that we also love them better.

Moreover, this book might be used privately for meditation, that duty so difficult to some of us; though we can recall, to our consolation, that we share it with St. Teresa, who confessed, "Always I spend the greater part of the time reading good books . . . God did not give me the talent of discursive understanding; . . . for eighteen years . . . I never dared approach meditation without a book."

It seems wise to warn readers that while the framework is, in a measure, Ignatian, the matter, often is not. Writing in *The Cowley Evangelist* for June 1916, Fr. Longridge described those Ignatian sections entitled The Kingdom of Christ, The Two Standards, Three Couples of Men, Modes of Humility, as "the very soul of *The Exercises*." If any one will compare the second of these in the two books, he will perceive the gap which sunders them. No one who ever read that of St. Ignatius will forget "the great plain," "the bandit chief," the scattering of "countless demons" throughout the world, tempting men to "riches," to "swollen pride"; still less forget "how Christ our Lord takes his stand in a great plain . . . in a lowly place, fair and gracious," whence he dispatches "His servants and friends . . . commending them to be ready to help all," in the impending, tremendous conflict. Mr Donovan opens his chapter on the Two Standards thus; "There is always something to be said in favour of any person, cause or policy. Partly, this is creditable to Christianity . . . But with this increasing tolerance, we are losing the sense of conflict, and find it increasingly difficult to believe that 'he that is not with Me is against Me.'"

If so, no better reason is required for returning to Loyola himself, whose foundation truths are a timely tonic for the dubious. People, if they will, may call him allegorical; but surely his panoramic teaching will linger in mankind's memory long after today's tolerant balancing has ceased to satisfy.

G.H.

*Calvin's First Psalter* (1539). Edited with critical notes and modal harmonies to the melodies by SIR RICHARD TERRY, Mus.D. (Benn). 10s. 6d.

THIS is a book of real importance to all students of Church Music and of interest to an even wider public. It supplies a "missing link" or rather a missing root, for from this collection spring all the metrical psalters used in European worship since the early sixteenth century. Its very existence in printed form was doubted as recently as 1872, and though known to be located in the Royal Library at Munich from 1878 onwards, it was not until 1919 that a facsimile

edition was printed and made available to the public. Dr Terry here presents us with a further facsimile to which he has added versions of the Psalms in English and with harmonies to the tunes which he has transcribed into modern notation. Out of the full collection of twenty-one melodies only ten were published in the last edition of the Genevan psalter, and only one has found its way into any modern English hymn book, and that is in an altered form. The editor is anxious to show that metrical psalms were the invention not of Protestants but of Catholics and he gives an amusing story of their popularity in the gallant court of Francis I, drawing largely on the researches of the Rev. G. R. Woodward.

The tunes themselves are, most of them, magnificent melodies, and it is a great loss to have no more than a single representative in our modern hymn books. Some of them are strangely reminiscent of the airs of the English Lutinists and there are moments when the voice of Dowland or Cavendish seems to speak to us rather than that of the Calvinist Church. English congregations might find some of them too sombre. When compared with the melodies of Day or Ravenscroft they would appear austere in the same way as Plainsong appears austere when compared with the late French Church melodies. However, some of the tunes, such as *Sus louez Dieu serviteurs* or *Estans assis aux Rives* would soon win the affection of Churchgoers. The Editor's accompaniments to the melodies are thoroughly suitable. The translations from the old French by Mrs K. W. Simpson are tolerably satisfactory, and several are of real merit. She had a hard task.

D.C.D.

*A History of later Greek Literature.* By F. A. WRIGHT. (Routledge & Sons). 18s.

SCHOLARS know Mr Wright by the fine *History of later Latin Literature* which he wrote in collaboration with Mr Sinclair. Now he comes before us with an equally fine history of later Greek literature from the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. to the death of Justinian in A.D. 565. Of the width of his knowledge there can be as little doubt as of the depth of his insight. There is a useful bibliography in which the writings of the later commentators are printed in italics while the works themselves, with the editions the author used, are also printed. We have gone through these lists with the utmost diligence, and it is a pleasure to testify to the care with which Mr Wright has carried out his labour of love. The only book we missed was Aimé Puech's *Histoire de la Littérature Grecque Chrétienne depuis les Origines jusqu'à la Fin du IV Siècle*, and this is a real omission. For Mr Wright realizes quite well what a large share Christian thought took in shaping the mental atmosphere to the death of Justinian. In all probability a second edition of Mr Wright's able volume will be required, and if this is so we commend to his notice M. Puech's two masterly volumes.

The preface puts with pith and point the case of the author, for in it he sets forth his classical creed. In brief it is this. Classical

scholars have, for the most part, concentrated their attention on two remote periods of Greek and Latin literature, and in so concentrating they have led the world to suppose that these languages are dead. The world has accepted this estimate of the scholars at their own valuation. A new generation of scholars, however, is arising which refuses to acquiesce in this attitude. They hold that while the period of Greek literature from Homer to Aristotle is important, yet the period from the death of Alexander to the death of Justinian is also important. In a word, the note of this volume is the stress laid on the continuity of Greek literature, and we congratulate the author on the able fashion in which he successfully maintains this continuity. Nothing has served the classics so ill as this concentration on two periods to the neglect of all that comes after, and we welcome this book not only for the appreciations it contains but also for the point of view it upholds. Appropriately enough, the book groups itself around Alexandria from 325 B.C. to 31 B.C., around Rome from 31 B.C. to A.D. 313, and around Byzantium from A.D. 313 to A.D. 565.

In the Alexandrian part there is a sufficient survey of the papyri letters, which have revolutionized our view of the literary language of the New Testament, and of the Oxyrhynchus historian. This historian may be Theomompus, Ephorus, or Cratippus, a younger contemporary of Thucydides, but whoever he may be his writing is desperately dull. In the Roman section there is a notable account of the Greek Renaissance of the second century and its influence on Rome. Nothing comes amiss to the author, and in this Renaissance he has as much to say on the worth of such works of such military writers as Asclepiodorus and Onosander as those of such scientists as Claudius, Ptolemaeus and Artemidorus. Naturally we derived special pleasure in seeing the balanced estimates of the Christian literature of this Renaissance. The appreciations of such later writers as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Plotinus bear witness to the many-sidedness of the author's outlook, and in particular to his ability to sympathize with many differing types of thinkers. In the Byzantium part the whole of the first chapter is devoted to the Church Fathers, and it is refreshing to see the place they occupy in that Greek thought which begins with Homer and his predecessors. There are many signs of the returning interest in the classics, and we greet this volume specially warmly because it rightly places the whole of its emphasis on the continuity of Greek literature. The Fathers would occupy a very different position in the world of literature had such an attitude been the invariable one assumed by the historians of Literature, Greek and Latin.

R.H.M.

*Unitive Protestantism.* A Study in our Religious Resources. By JOHN T. MCNEILL. (The Abingdon Press). 3 dollars.

MR MCNEILL, who is Professor of the History of European Civilization in the Divinity School, University of Chicago, essays in effect an account of the movements towards reunion on the part of the



Protestant sects since the Reformation. Two-thirds the book are given to sixteenth century efforts while the remaining third rapidly recounts attempts towards unity from the seventeenth century to the present day. Naturally there are advantages and disadvantages in a book written with a special purpose. There is the disadvantage that the writer, in his anxiety to find a key that will fit all locks, will sometimes turn or twist some of the wards. On the other hand there is the advantage that he will throw light on the past from the attitude he has imposed upon himself. On the whole in this volume the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. The chapter that attracted us most is that in which Mr McNeill explored Cranmer's project for a Reformed consensus. It is, however, disappointing to be obliged to come to the conclusion that there is little definite indication of Cranmer's proposal, and that indeed there is no evidence that he ever drew up a cut-and-dried proposal in the direction in which the author thinks he was drifting. Accordingly we are not impressed by the author's speculations on what such a project might have effected when in truth there never was such a project.

R.H.M.

*Purpose in Evolution.* By SIR J. ARTHUR THOMSON, LL.D. (Oxford University Press. 1932). 2s. 6d. net.

READERS who are familiar with Professor Thomson's larger works will find little that is new in this short series of Riddell Lectures. But it provides an excellent summary of the author's complete Philosophy of Biology, presented throughout with that terseness and fitness of phrasing of which he is a master. As a text book for use in Study Circles, concerned with the modern implications of scientific research, it cannot be surpassed.

Prof. Thomson begins by emphasizing the principle that, with regard to evolution, the problem of Purpose is itself not purely scientific, but philosophic or even religious. Within their own specific boundaries, nevertheless, both biologists and psychologists find themselves increasingly compelled to recognize the category of Purpose as one of the most important methods of research and explanation. "Among higher animals there is perceptual purpose, and it counts." It is influential, controlling, directive; while man is uniquely characterized by the further advance to conceptual and ethical purposes. The biologist must therefore conclude that "Life in Evolution is interpenetrated with Purpose," even though when considering very lowly organisms, we must carefully distinguish the "purposive" from the "purposeful."

Yet, after all, it may be that life and purpose are confined to our own planet which, viewed against the vast background of space-time immensities, is less than a sandgrain lost in the ocean. The governing conditions of life as we know it, including of course human life, lie within very narrow limits. On the other hand, this narrowness and specialization are the consequences of the most precise and delicate adjustments in the physical environment; and this appears to imply that the environment itself, exactly like the realm of life,

is teleological throughout—is, in other terms, the indispensable “preparation for the evolutionary process.” At first sight, certainly, this process seems to be most perplexingly circuitous, slow and conservative. Yet despite these obscure aspects, man duly arises as the “present climax of creation”; and in view of this Sir Arthur Thomson concludes his first Lecture by suggesting that

“it may be our urgent duty to try to discern more of the great evolutionary trends”;

or in still more general terms,

“Science describes a world which may be philosophically or religiously interpreted as expressive of Purpose. There is behind all Evolution a Supreme Reality, of whose Spirit it is an expression.”

Not that this conclusion disposes of all the formidable difficulties. We have still to face the “seamy side, the discords and the shadows in Nature”; and with this must be connected the view that, at bottom, it is mere Chance or Fate that blindly throws the dice. Perhaps the author’s able treatment of these points forms the most valuable section of his book. He insists repeatedly that “the fortuitous dwindles as Science grows,” so that pessimistic theories may be based on sadly inadequate data; and this is the more important in the light of many current applications of the recent departure from the universality of Causation in the Physics of atoms and electrons. It is, at least, simply “grotesque to call Organic Evolution a chapter of accidents”; and equally over-hasty is the widespread opinion that Nature is essentially a realm of ugliness, cruelty and superfluous pain. All such beliefs spring from a mere casual “nodding acquaintance with Nature.” “Nature is no harlot, but rather man’s Alma Mater.” In these important respects both William James and T. H. Huxley delineated a

“picture wrong in perspective, and gave a one-sided impression of the struggle for existence.”

In many different ways, too various to detail here, earlier biologists and their plausible popular advocates unconsciously distorted the true implications of the conditions controlling the survival of the fittest; and Prof. Thomson’s saner and more expert estimate of the prevalence and functions of conflict, pain and elimination are of profound significance.

We are amply justified, therefore, in believing that

“there was progress in Organic Evolution long before man emerged to discern it; above all, there is a heightened expression of mind.”

As a rational, aesthetic, moral and religious being, man summarizes the progress of the age-old past and heralds its continuance into the illimitable future. Sentience is the prelude to instinct, and this in turn is transcended by reason, as the basis of personality endowed with inexhaustible potentialities.

“Psycho-biosis is as real as Bio-psychosis; the largest fact is the growing dominance of mind,”

as the foundation of the future development of still finer types of individual and social organisms.

J.E.T.

*God in Idea and Experience.* By REES GRIFFITHS, M.A., Ph.D.  
(T. and T. Clark. 1931). 10s. 6d. net.

THIS volume presents a competent analysis of an essentially technical subject—"the *a priori* nature of religion"—which inevitably increases in its importance with the expansion of knowledge in other fields; and the author has dealt with the difficulties inseparable from such an abstract theme with marked success. He excludes from the outset the view that

"the ground of religion lies in the intellect, and not in the concrete apprehensions of the real world."

He forcibly maintains the direct contrary—that religion is at one and the same moment autonomous, foundational and comprehensive, since it is

"based neither on hypothesis nor inference but on an experience, immediate and intuitional,"

in such a way that this experience itself controls the whole conceptual superstructure; whence it follows that

"the only true philosophy of religion is the philosophy which religion itself provides"

—a principle far too often ignored.

The term *a priori* is here employed in its Kantian sense, to denote the conditioning factors which each main type of experience shows, under analysis, to be indispensable for its own development and continuance. In other words, what is *a priori* is the "form" of the experience as distinct from its "matter"; so that in religion "apriorism means the presence of the assurance, always with us, of the reality of God, an assurance which underlies and conditions and sustains all experiencing."

Such an all-inclusive principle plainly rejects that "aposteriorism" which regards religion as derived from art, knowledge and morality. The serious obstacles confronting this viewpoint are obvious, since it must apply not only to the higher types of religion which assign some definite meaning to the term "God," but equally to those primitive forms to which the name itself is scarcely known. Once again we are driven to fall back on the general Kantian method. Just as Kant argued that Time and Space are *a priori* conditions without which knowledge could never arise, so Dr Griffiths maintains that

"the world view which is characteristic of the religious consciousness is primitive and fundamental, a factor colouring experience from the first."

The name "God" must therefore be assigned an extremely wide significance, which implies that whenever human experience is taken in its concrete completeness,

"man confronts the world religiously and views it as pulsating with divinity."

Now when we recall the age-long evolution of religion, the final situation is clearly highly intricate, exactly as it is in the case of developed knowledge. For it involves at least three outstanding

elements :—first, the animistic attitude, at once primal and persistent, which Dr Stout has recently emphasized in *Mind and Matter*<sup>1</sup>; secondly, the inseparably associated Numinous stressed by Otto; and finally, at a distinctly higher level, the eternal, absolute, self-consciousness of T. H. Green's Idealism—the divine experience which comprehends fully what man can know only fragmentarily, in such a manner that we are somehow embraced or included within the absolute, in spite of that essential independence which must characterize all personality as such. This last feature is so paradoxical that its acceptance determines one's whole philosophical outlook. The author himself has no hesitation as to its cruciality;

“religion takes its rise from an awareness of a Mind in Nature that knows us in all our knowing . . . the Other Mind, the Knower of all Knowing, the Divine Unity underlying all things—God.”

He denotes this principle by the useful variant “Gnostic”; and while he candidly admits that his own standpoint is by no means entirely original, nevertheless his critical survey of these intricately interwoven aspects of religion is of high value, equally as concerns the rapid expansion of pure knowledge and the intensified appreciation of ethical maxims strictly in themselves. For this apriority of religion governs man's pursuit of the Good;

“the awareness of an Other Mind provides the ground for the moral consciousness itself.”

The risks attending the application of the Gnostic principle to religion, as the most complex type of human experience, are clearly realized. There is first of all the danger of over-emphasizing the intellectual factors; but this is fully balanced by insisting throughout on the primacy of feeling. Similarly, the prevailing tendency to explain religion away as a mere compound of subjective elements is countered by effective criticism of Freud and Jung, and in the more specifically philosophic direction, of Otto and Kant. From first to last objectivity is presented as absolutely essential;

“we could have no self-consciousness were we not also aware of the world as the expression of the Infinite Mind”;

while if we adopt “Absolute” as the alternative for “Infinite,” then

“no Absolute can be acceptable which does not provide a God as concrete and personal as the God of religion.”

Apart from this truth

“the universe becomes depersonalized, and the finite Self must suffer eclipse and destruction.”

Although both the subject matter and the method of treatment make Dr Griffiths's volume by no means an easy one to read, it undoubtedly deserves the careful attention of all those who are interested in, and possibly perturbed by, outstanding tendencies in current philosophy and psychology.

J.E.T.

<sup>1</sup> This Journal, Vol. CXIII, p. 292.



*The Attack on the Sacramental Principle.* By J. H. F. PEILE.  
(Catholic Literature Association). 1s.

WE have been made familiar with the attack on the Sacramental Principle chiefly through the medium of the popular press. That attack has however gained strength from the weight of the names of clerical journalists who, deservedly or undeservedly, possess some theological reputation. The Archdeacon of Worcester has performed a notable service to the cause of Catholicism in producing a clear and vigorous defence of Sacramental religion, and a scholarly refutation of the arguments often adduced against it. The Catholic Literature Association, which has produced many clear and definite, if somewhat unoriginal, tracts setting forth the standpoint of a liberal Anglo-Catholicism, has produced no more important work in recent years than this.

The primitive nature of Sacramental doctrine, the Church's unbroken tradition in regard to the Sacraments, and the Catholic character of the 1662 Prayer Book are all emphasized. Modern anti-sacramentalists are divided into three classes, the "Protestant Underworld," the "Mathematical Mind" and "Modernism and Modernists." The last two classes are rightly, in our opinion, differentiated, in spite of the fact that the more intelligent contributors to the *Modern Churchman* seem slow to repudiate the views of the mentality which

"when it ventures beyond the realm of pure mathematics . . . makes its intellectual home somewhere in the third quarter of the last century, and discovers in one stage of the Darwinian Theory of Evolution the Eternal Gospel."

The author treats the Modernists with more respect than the other two classes of anti-sacramentalists; though perhaps the reader will contrast the definiteness of the objections which make their appeal to popular prejudice with the groping vagueness of the intellectualists. The penultimate section of the tract contains a defence of belief in the Dominical institution of the Sacraments.

It is difficult to assess the author's views on the vexed question of Devotion to the Reserved Sacrament. While he states at one point that "Reservation, Adoration and Devotions are held to be logically deducible from (the doctrine of the Real Presence); and it does, in fact, create a demand for them which it is difficult to gainsay or resist," he concludes his essay by quoting with approval the following statement by the Archbishop of York.

"Certainly adoration of Christ in this Sacrament cannot properly be called idolatrous . . . But it may easily be associated with ideas which contain some of the evils of idolatry."

The gist of the last sentence has often been repeated in recent years, as an argument against the *cultus* of the Reserved Sacrament; but its cogency has not yet been shown by the support of evidence from present-day fact and experience.

H.B.

*The Old Testament in the Church.* By ALEXANDER NAIRNE. (Cambridge University Press). 1s.

DR NAIRNE defends the reading of the Old Testament as part of the normal and necessary instruction of every Churchman, and makes some interesting suggestions as to the method in which it should be read. It is to be noted that the Apocrypha is not included within the scope of these suggestions.

H.B.

*A Man's Job? What it means to be a Parson.* Edited by B. K. CUNNINGHAM. (Student Christian Movement Press). 2s.

A CERTAIN layman, picking up a recent clerical symposium, remarked, "I suppose this is another of these books in which parsons talk about themselves." It is unfortunate that most of the essays in the present volume are liable to the criticism implied by those words. The book is intended to present to the younger generation a "higher ideal of the priesthood," and "an honest picture . . . of what the job really is"; thus it hopes to commend the priesthood to those who consider that "the parson's is no job for a man." But in the presentation of the picture most of the writers appear to be at pains to show how valuable and successful their own ministry has been. They do "protest too much"; and the result often gives the impression that they are suffering from a clerical inferiority complex. Perhaps this tendency is due to the title of the book, which could hardly be worse. For while it is to be expected that essays dealing with the Priest in the City Parish, the Country Parson, the Boys' Club Padre, the Public School Chaplain, etc., should be based on first-hand experience, there are ways and ways of relating that experience; and many whom the essays are intended to attract will agree in considering the following as examples of the wrong way to describe the priestly life.

"Employers came to realize that I did know the kind of boy they wanted often better than they did themselves."

"I have often faced the possibility of a vocation to devote my whole life to boys, for which my experience gives me perhaps unusual equipment."

"Do not speak like that, Canon,' one (magistrate) said to me recently. ' . . . It is I who ought to thank you, not you me ',"

"We devised a somewhat original form of a voluntary service. It was very simple, the main part of it consisting of the singing by the congregation on their knees of the hymn 'Bright the vision that delighted once the sight of Judah's seer,' while between each verse . . . there was a prayer said by the chaplain. One boy of fourteen or so went straight to his house-master and greeted him with, 'Sir, we had the most *topping* service to-night.' . . . The next day brought me the following in a letter from a universally popular young athlete of sixteen or seventeen: 'I loved that little service on Friday night.' . . . A college prefect, head of his house, and a member of both Cricket XI

and Football XV came running across the quad to say : ' I must just tell you what I thought of that service last night. It was absolutely it.' "

To three of these essays such a criticism does not apply. The Editor writes simply and clearly on Vocation, and the Reverend Cyril Tomkinson simply and clearly on the Priesthood. Neither author makes the mistake of writing about himself rather than his subject ; in contrast to the other essays they make clear the fact that the priesthood is primarily the " job " of the God who bestows it rather than of the man who administers it. The last essay (by the Rev. G. H. Woolley and Rev. P. B. Clayton) is perhaps the most original and important in the book. It contains a plea for a system of chaplaincies, based on the Talbot House model, through which much valuable work could be performed which is impossible for the parochial clergy. Many will feel that such a non-parochial ministry should supplement present parish organizations, rather than replace them as, except in the case of country parishes, the authors seem to desire. But the essay makes it clear that the Church is unnecessarily losing many souls, owing to the expenditure of her energies by methods which in many places are no longer effective. We hope that the last essay will receive consideration not only from ordination candidates and from the rank and file of the clergy, but also from those in authority in the Church of England.

H.B.

*Angelus Silesius* : Selections from " The Cherubic Wanderer." Translated with an Introduction by J. E. CRAWFORD FLITCH. (George Allen and Unwin). 8s. 6d. net.

RECENTLY, Texts of Mystics or Criticisms of Mysticism have been published, with the seeming purpose of stressing a vaguely philosophical, quasi-spiritual but definitely non-theological mystical theory : a method which has been applied to Eckhart as to some of the seventeenth century mystics, till a critic may be pardoned for fearing whether Ruysbroeck even may not be thus victimized theosophically, soon. The device might be worth while if it were not for the fact that a claim to impartiality is as disabling as any other form of *parti pris* ; possibly more so, since it is apt to lack that fervent sympathy so important an element in love, the great enlightener. Further, these presentations almost inevitably fail to convey the original author's outlook and, particularly, his debt to his own time, another vital source of illumination.

For example, in his long Introduction of 97 pages (more than one-third of the volume) Mr Flitch writes of Angelus Silesius :—

" The God of his metaphysic may have been the impassive Deity that plays its divine game for itself alone, but the God of his heart was ' a person in the sense of a self, among and over against other selves, moved by personal relations and feelings.' "

This mystic, first a Lutheran, then a Roman Catholic, in his age could surely not have been either, if he had seriously propounded this non-Christian splitting of personalities, this division into a

sort of Person and some ineffable un-knownness. Time and again, Mr Flitch busies himself with the notions of God and the "Godhead," which

"lies eternally unrevealed behind and beyond its manifestations . . . an undifferentiated unity, unknown, unknowable, anonymous, colourless."

While only giving a selection from Angelus, Mr Flitch has arranged his extracts on a scheme of his own, which accentuates the philosophical view he propounds. Under fourteen headings, beginning with *Godhead* and ending with *Thought and Deed*, he has gathered into these sections, passages from Angelus' six books; nowise at random, but with the effect, whatever his purpose, of lending to their content that extra weight which arises from juxtaposition. One example must suffice.

To support his plea of Angelus' approximation to the Nirvana of the Upanishads—and he barely qualifies his plea by writing elsewhere

"These and many other riddling statements in *The Cherubinic Wanderer* lose their effect of bewilderment if they are interpreted as expression of the inability of the human mind to describe an Absolute which transcends all distinctions—"

he makes not a little play with the aphorism numbered 25 in Book I by Angelus (numbered in his own Selection as 5, of Section I, *The Godhead*):

Gott ist ein lauter Nichts, ihn rührt kein Nun noch Hier :

Je mehr du nach ihm greifst, je mehr entwirdest du dir,  
which he renders

God is an utter Nothingness,  
Beyond the touch of Time and Place :  
The more thou graspest after Him,  
The more he fleeth thy embrace.

In his Introduction, the opening words are translated "God is a sheer Naught," and are compared with quoted phrases from Eckhart; "Nameless Nothing," the "Super-essential Naught," "the Still Wilderness where no one is at home."

Incidentally, readers might complain that the book is undocumented; quite singularly bare of references.

This particular aphorism is printed among twenty-nine others, taken from all six Books.

Probably Angelus Silesius, like Eckhart, risked falling into error in an attempt to express what human words can never express. But neither could mean to empty Christianity of a Personal God. At any rate no contemporary accusation of unorthodoxy was launched against Angelus; and it is hard to see how, if he intended all that Mr Flitch credits him with meaning, he could have escaped the Index.

The failure is of recognition that a writer's meaning is not always intact in a disparate sentence, but needs contextual elucidation. After considerable search, the couplets marked by Angelus, i, 23 and i, 24, may be found in Mr Flitch's section v, 117 (headed Inwardness), and in section vi, 139 (Self-Abandonment). The aphorism



following (i, 26), appears nowhere in the book. The two which precede are as follows :

- i, 23. Ich muss Maria sein und Gott aus mir gebären,  
Soll er mich ewiglich der Seligkeit gewähren.  
(I must be Mary and myself  
Give birth to God, would I possess  
—Nor can I otherwise—God's gift  
Of everlasting Happiness).

and :

- i, 24. Mensch, wo du noch was bist, was weisst, was liebst und hast,  
So bist du, glaube mir, nicht ledig deiner Last.  
(If thou art Somewhat to thyself,  
If Somewhat thou dost love and will,  
If Somewhat knowest, Somewhat hast—  
Thou carriest thy Burden still).

It is plain that i, 23, touching on the mystical doctrine—Augustinian not less than Eckhart's—of "the Birth of Christ in the soul," must, with its ascription of "possession" and "Happiness," at any rate attach a special and non-Oriental content to such phrases as "sheer Naught," "utter Nothingness": though i, 24, makes some approach to i, 25. When he handles theology, Mr Flitch seems, at times, to stray in logic. It would not, for instance, be easy to present more invalid antitheses, in unprecise terms, than he does in this summary account of Angelus' mysticism—

"There is no magical value in baptism—lilies can be trampled into the mire. The Eucharist is transcended in the spiritual experience of every man who has become one with God (vergöttet), for such an one eats and drinks God in every piece of bread. The authority of the Book is no more binding than that of the Church. Scripture is mere writing (*Die Schrift ist Schrift, sonst nichts*)."

(p. 67). The opening sentence, apart from obscurity lent by "magical," suggests that use can be destroyed by individual abuse of the gift. Then on the lesser, the literary side, he depreciates Angelus by claiming that if his rank

as a poet is to be measured by the degree of the resonance and sweetness of those overtones which detach themselves from the bare logical sense of the words and without which verse is only formally distinguished from prose, he can scarcely be assigned a very exalted place in the poetic hierarchy. He did not possess the poet's magical Open Sesame to aid him in forcing the locks of the doors which open on infinity.

But does the Translator always seize his drift?—*e.g.*, the original, of the couplet, numbered 197 is

Die welt ist mir zu eng, der Himmel ist zu klein :  
Wo wird doch noch ein Raum für meine Seele sein ?

Mr Flitch (possibly for the attractively easy rhyme) renders it—  
Heaven is too little for me, Earth a narrow cell :

Where shall I find a place wherein my Soul can dwell?—  
without seeming to have an inkling that by transposing the sections

he has ruined the ascending scale of desire, from contracted earth to a heaven still "so small," on to the boundless space he longs for; thus reducing poetic flight to prosaic flatness.

Yet those students who value "Texts" above criticism will be grateful to him for this Selection of 355 aphorisms out of the total six Books of *Der Cherubinische Wandersmann*: whose inaccessibility is shown by the fact that not even the name of Angelus Silesius appears in the Bibliographies of Père Poulain's *Des Grâces D'Oraison*, Monseigneur Farges' *Mystical Phenomena* or Miss Underhill's *Mysticism*. Moreover, students will be grateful for the German originals. We may be the worst linguists in Europe, but even the smatterer can do better with an original and a translation than with either alone; and after all the greatest of English educational theorists, John Locke, advocated the use of a "Crib."

G.H.

*Christian Outlines: An Introduction to Religion.* By CYRIL ALINGTON. (Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Ltd.). 2s. 6d.

DR ALINGTON covers a vast field in these 132 short pages, and he succeeds in this without superficiality or shirking issues: moreover he does not give the impression of undue "peptonising." His success may be attributed to the wise exclusion of all hortatory matter, and to strict adherence to the plan of the book, which only purports to be a bare outline. Dr Alington is much more convincing when dealing with the fundamentals of the Faith than when writing on the Sacraments. We have the impression that he is surer of his ground. An analogy drawn between Infant Baptism and the practice of putting down infant sons for a Club or a Public School is not an edifying or happy one.

F.H.

*Personal Problems of Conduct and Religion.* By J. G. MCKENZIE, M.A., B.D. (George Allan & Unwin, Ltd.). 5s.

It is not uncommon to find among Presbyterian ministers the Catholic *ethos*. This is certainly true of the author of this invaluable book. For its size it is expensive, but the contents are first-rate. The writer has a thorough knowledge of psychology both in theory and practice; but he is so skilled a teacher that his book could be understood by any ordinarily educated person. Each of the eighteen chapters gets to grips with some urgent problem in this modern world, several of which are rarely discussed in a book of this type, such as the psychology of sleeplessness. We are glad to see Mr McKenzie's emphasis on a much neglected truth (on which the late Baron von Hügel used to lay great stress)—namely that the sinner cannot expect to be as if he had never sinned. Great sinners have become great saints: but the greatest of all Saints is he who never sinned.

"We must be satisfied to be *another vessel*, not what God could and would have made us if we had not sinned" (p. 107).

We have nothing but praise for this book.

F.H.

*The Church a Necessary Evil and other Sermons.* By the late ALFRED FAWKES, M.A. With a Memoir by H. D. A. MAJOR, D.D. (Blackwell). 4s. 6d.

ALL who knew Alfred Fawkes, who died on All Souls' Day, 1930, at the age of 80, will agree with the words written of him by an intimate friend, and quoted in Dr Major's Memoir in the volume under review :

"I have not a single memory of him that is not one of un-failing goodness and kindness and unselfishness. One very striking quality was the complete absence of resentment when treated with ingratitude or unkindness."

We remember him ourselves as a courtly old gentleman, with whom it was a pleasure and privilege to be in the same room. Most readers of the *Church Quarterly Review* are probably aware of his history. From 1881 till 1909 he was a Roman Catholic priest. He then returned to the Church of England, in which he had been brought up, and ministered as an advanced Modernist. The sermons in this book reveal a deeply interesting and critical mind : the English is admirable, and the tone beyond criticism. Fawkes was evidently steeped in the works of Hooker and Butler : but his theology was less orthodox than theirs. The general view-point is that which one connects with Ripon Hall. We are far from agreeing with it, but we welcome this volume as an attractive exposition of it in some of its aspects.

F.H.

*Religion : Its Basis and Development.* By the REV. H. MONTAGUE DALE, B.D. (Allenson). 5s.

WE frequently hear from those both within and without the Church about the failure of religion, and sometimes its decay even is prophesied. It is a relief after hearing such gloomy forebodings to read Mr Dale's optimistic pages. And the comfort he gives us is far from being empty or unreasoning. He has read widely, and one would guess, travelled widely : he tells in this book (which is a simple introduction to the study of comparative religion) not only of the universal prevalence and persistence of religion, but also of its progressive influence on art, legislation, character and conduct. The valuable truths contained in non-Christian religions are emphasized, but Mr Dale shows no inclination to "water down" Christianity or minimize its altogether unique demands. It would be hard to read this book without an eager desire to study more fully the numerous vitally interesting matters which are all too briefly discussed in it.

F.H.

*Side-lights on Early Armenia.* By S. M. GREGORY. (Luzac & Co.). pp. 15. 1s. 6d.

THIS brochure consists of two short articles, summarizing what has been already told on the work of such scholars as Maspero and Mosvesian, concerning the origin of the Armenian people. Mr

Gregory is naturally anxious to claim for his people a higher antiquity than the seventh century B.C. when the present Indo-European stock entered "Armenia." He therefore claims, probably with justice, that the Armenians of to-day are one race with the people of Urartu referred to in the Assyrian records and the Van inscriptions, men who were probably of Hittite stock and like that people, worshippers of the fertility god Khaldis. The claim is a probable one in itself, though how far the present stock has been affected by later immigration is another question.

W.A.W.

*Processions : A Dissertation together with practical suggestions.* By COLIN DUNLOP. Alcuin Club Tracts XX. (Oxford University Press).

THIS is a most welcome and timely little volume, which not only maintains the high standard of scholarship which we are accustomed to expect from the Alcuin Club publications, but is also full of sound practical suggestions. The writer does not aim at giving directions for the carrying out in modern churches of the ceremonial of medieval services and processions. His aim is rather to discuss Processions as a method of supplementing our official services and to offer suggestions for experiments and developments.

There is an interesting and instructive discussion on the history of Processions and the motives which lie behind them as acts of worship. Mr Dunlop knows his authorities well, and, needless to say, reference is made to the *Processionale ad usum Insignis ac Praeclaræ Ecclesiæ Sarum*. An apt quotation is given from a paper by the late Canon T. A. Lacey, *The Liturgical use of the Litany*, in which he says :

"A Procession means going somewhere to do something : it is not necessary to say or do anything while going : but the priest and clerks must have somewhere to go and something to do when they get there."

The truth and reasonableness of this dictum is well illustrated in this book, and if only those who are responsible for the organization and direction of our Church ceremonial will realize and act on this truth, much will be gained. Mr Dunlop says very truly that even "Low" churchmen are prepared to tolerate and even to like ceremonial Processions, provided they are convinced that there is a definite objective.

There is a most valuable chapter on the details in the Procession, containing a discussion of the order of precedence, banners, music, dress and stations. And finally there is a chapter containing suggested schemes for Procession proper to the various sacred seasons. We most warmly approve of Mr Dunlop's insistence on the singing of the Litany in procession. Church people have long ago come to the conclusion that the Litany said in a hole-and-corner fashion at an hour when no one can conveniently come, or worse still as an appendage to Mattins, is a dull business. The full glory



of the language and phraseology of the Litany can never be fully appreciated until it is seen and heard sung in procession as an introduction to the Choral Eucharist. We strongly recommend all clergy to read this valuable little book if they wish to commend the Church's services to their people.

E.H.M.

*Difficulties.* Being a correspondence about the Catholic Religion between Ronald Knox and Arnold Lunn. (Eyre & Spottiswoode). 7s. 6d. net.

ONE occasionally hears a rumour that the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church find Father Ronald Knox a somewhat embarrassing acquisition. They are not of course compelled to read his detective stories: but when he commences apologist on this scale and with this public appeal, they must surely sit up and take notice. And surely they will not be very well pleased, for in almost every round of this rather unedifying sparring match their champion seems to have the worst of the exchanges. Father Knox's apologies read too like apologies, and pretty lame ones at that. Mr Lunn makes his debating points effectively and (like Carlyle's Girondius) pricks dexterously into the sore places of the Seven Hills. He leads off with the stock, but not yet finally answered, 'difficulties' about Alexander Borgia and the Inquisition. Father Knox answers in effect that it does not matter how wicked a man the Vicar of Christ is, and that the Invocation of the Holy Spirit at a papal election must not be expected to have any practical results. As to the Inquisition we ought to be contented if the methods of trial and conviction adopted by the Church are no worse, or not much worse, than the contemporary methods of secular judicature. Nor do his concessions end here. He admits, in substance, that Papal Infallibility and *extra quam nulla salus* are phrases without content: that indulgences, as taught and understood, are a fraud; or as Mr Lunn puts it that they are only of use to people who do not really need them: that "Ruling Decisions" when they turn out wrong are, not withdrawn, but "tacitly" reversed. The odd thing is that Father Knox does not see that these admissions weaken his position. Perhaps he regards his method as ju-jitsu. It is certainly not good boxing. To speak pedantically the basic fallacy of his argument is a *petitio principii*, which he sometimes states quite frankly; these awkward things have happened in the Church, but the Church is right: therefore they must fit in somehow, though we may not quite see how. Unfortunately his opponent does not accept his major premiss: but says that is exactly the point at issue. This rather blatant book may have a brief *succès de scandale*: but it has no real importance. It cannot be of comfort to any devout Roman Catholic who has retained a sense of logic. The only thing it can do is to encourage people—is it uncivil to say people like Mr Lunn? to go on "taking an interest in religion" without finding it necessary to submit themselves to any form of Religion.

J.H.F.P.

*Forschungen zur Entstehung des Urchristentums, des Neuen Testaments und der Kirche.* Von ERNST BARNIKOL. III. Personen-Probleme der Apostelgeschichte. Johannes Markus, Silas, und Titus. *Marks* 1.60. IV. Römer 15. Letzte Reiseziele des Paulus. Jerusalem, Rom, und Antiochien. *Marks* 1.20. V. Der Nichtpaulinische Ursprung des Parallelismus der Apostel Petrus und Paulus. *Marks* 1.60. (Kiel: Walter G. Mühlau. 1931).

THE first of these brochures opens with an investigation of the references to St. Mark in the New Testament. In this, as in all the studies here presented to us, the author comes to some unconventional conclusions. Thus he denies that the Mark referred to in I Peter, v, 13, is the John Mark of the Acts, and is thus able to set aside the Papias tradition which brings John Mark into intimate connection with St. Peter.

There were two people in the Acts, we are told next, with the name of Silas. The one—the "Decree-Silas"—is the individual referred to in Acts, xv, 22, 27, 32, 34; the other—the "Travel-Silas"—is referred to in Acts, xv, 40, and in the chapters which immediately follow, and is (rightly) identified with the Silvanus of St. Paul's Epistles. The author then proceeds to identify the Travel-Silas with Titus; he tries, not very successfully, to get over the difficulty that in II Corinthians the names of *both* Titus and Silvanus occur, summing up meaningly "yet no one doubts the identity of Saul and Paul." A discussion of some other modern defences of this identification follows. The final conclusion is that Silas-Titus is the author of the "We-sections" of the Acts.

The next study deals primarily with the Epistle to the Romans. XV, 22-33, is alleged to be an interpolation from a letter of St. Paul to Antioch, written from Macedonia or Corinth, and sent to its destination by the hands of Trophimus (cp. Acts, xx, 4). Verse 24b, which would conflict with this theory, is removed as an interpolation apparently, "of the second order."

The last study, perhaps the most interesting and convincing, treats of Galatians ii, 7 f. These verses, too, are alleged to be an interpolation. One of the chief evidences in support of this allegation is the form *πέρπος*; for, except in these two verses, the Prince of the Apostles is by St. Paul always termed *Κηφᾶς* either unambiguously or else by an excellently attested reading of the text. Here, on the other hand, the reading *Πέρπος* is unchallenged. There is evidence that Galatians ii, 7 f. was not read by Marcion, nor apparently by Tertullian. They were inserted, we are told, in order to show the compatibility of the "Pauline" with the "primitive" teaching, and are probably to be dated about A.D. 185. The Petro-Pauline parallelism—the earliest traces of which are to be found in *I Clement V* and, *Ignatius, Ad Rom.*, iv, 3—is thus of a late date.

If the present writer may venture an opinion on a subject about which he can speak only as a layman, he finds it very difficult to believe that an interpolation, made at such a late date as that to which Dr Barnikol attributes it, can have left no traces in the extant

MSS. Surely all our oldest MSS must have diverged from their archetype long before the last fifteen years of the second century. The absence of the verses from Marcion's text is, moreover, easily explicable. He freely used his scissors when his authorities were against him. And is it not a fact that Tertullian always sought, when possible, to refute his opponent out of his own mutilated text? This suggestion fully accounts for Tertullian's silence about the passage in his controversy with Marcion. Nevertheless, some of the other arguments which are adduced in support of the view that the passage is an interpolation are weighty. If it is, then it was probably inserted into the text long before the time of Marcion. In that case, Marcion's restoration of the true text may have rested on some remote textual tradition; more likely, it was a piece of luck.

F.L.C.

*The Church and English Life.* By THE BISHOP OF NORWICH. (Longmans). 4s. 6d.

THE publication of sermons in the form in which they have actually been delivered is often a hazardous venture. It is rare nowadays for a pulpit orator to have an equal command over the spoken and the written word; and it is rarer still for the reader of the published sermons of a "popular" or "famous" preacher, not to be oppressed by the exceedingly trivial appearance in print of what had seemed so forceful from the pulpit. This book of sermons, however, is not open to the usual criticisms which can be levelled against its fellows. The Bishop of Norwich has a remarkable command over the English language; while, he differs from many preachers, in that the character of his style does not conceal a paucity of matter. Every one of these sermons is forcibly written; every one of these sermons will provoke the reader to further thought.

The Bishop of Norwich may fairly be described as the Apostle of the educated laymen. It is to them that many of these sermons appear to have been addressed; it is their point of view which the preacher expounds and clarifies. This book is an able and attractive defence of the principles of moderate Anglicanism, of the official religion of the Church of England as it was in the days before the leaders of the Church began to yield to the demands, and partially to adopt the methods of the rebels against ecclesiastical convention, whether of the Anglo-Catholic, Modernist, or "non-party" factions. It is the religion with which we were familiar at our public schools; it is the religion which many educated laymen seek in their parish churches, and seek in vain; and it is a religion which too rarely finds a champion of sufficient intellectual and spiritual calibre.

That this form of Anglicanism cannot be dismissed as worthless conventionality, the Bishop of Norwich makes abundantly clear in this book. It may be the vehicle of a deep personal devotion to God and to Jesus Christ; and it is none the less deep for the fact that those who practise it do not wear their hearts on their sleeves

in religious matter. We commend this book to the careful consideration of those who in their anxiety to make religion real to the English layman, too often hasten to destroy the forms which convey to him a deeper reality than today's experiments, whether liturgical, theological or devotional.

H.B.

*The English Bible as Literature.* By CHARLES ALLEN DINSMORE. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.). pp. 316. 7s. 6d.

WRITERS who attempt to establish the claim of the Bible to be regarded as great literature generally succeed in establishing its claim to be something more. The value of Mr Dinsmore's book is not less because he is no exception to the rule. He does not stop short at implicit recognition of this "something more." He breaks out into open confession—

"the Bible is more than a classic"; it "becomes a Word of God because it voices those ultimate truths which give to life its meaning."

The author is at his best in the opening chapters where he discusses with insight, freshness and forcefulness the mental soil and spiritual climate in which the great "Epic of Redemption" came to flower. He unfolds the full significance of the fact that Israel sought and found God through Man and his experiences rather than through Nature and her processes. His analysis of the limitations and strength of Hebrew mentality is a penetrating study, turned to constructive account in tracing the impress of that mentality on national literature and interpretation of life.

Mr Dinsmore stands for the supremacy and literary glories of the Standard English Versions of the Bible. The enthusiasm of his championship may be gathered from this challenge.

"The English Bible . . . is a finer and nobler literature than the Scriptures in their original tongues."

He expects this dogma to produce dissent. His expectations will be realized. He is on less debatable ground in the soberer statement that

"the Bible suffers least from translation of any of the works of human genius."

In dealing with "The Diction of the English Bible" Mr Dinsmore enters the lists and tilts against the newer and more modern translations of the Bible. His thrusts are sharp and effective. He recognizes that such translations have their values as commentaries but as "helps in the art of worship" they leave much to be desired. That is undoubtedly true of the Gospels; but there are epistolary portions of the New Testament which modern translations have made not only more intelligible to the average mind but more luminous for public reading, without sacrificing charm of phrase for cheapness of phrase.

The second part of this book is occupied with an appreciation of the literary values of the individual books of the Old Testament—a difficult task ably done. In the course of it there is a strong



deprecation of the modern attempt to bind Hebrew poetry in the chains of symmetry and the oracles of the prophets with links of iron metre.

"The broken music of Hebrew poetry is a better medium for the expression of the sublimities of religion than would be mere formal art. To change this natural beauty and power into orderly time would destroy a thing of beauty, as though the sea should murmur sonatas, and the wind whistle a tune."

"Some writers lament that the English Bible presents the oracles of the prophets in prose . . . yet it is fortunate that the authorized versions have refrained from . . . experiments, for the ordinary reader comes much nearer the inner spirit and passion of the prophets through the lucidity and natural rhythms of prose than he would through poetic measures which are unfamiliar."

In the concluding section of the book—an estimate of the literary qualities of the New Testament—the author takes exception to Mr Middleton Murry's sweeping criticism of the literary quality of the Gospels which he contrasts unfavourably with the artistry of Renan's *Life of Jesus*. Mr Dinsmore rightly points out that

"the evangelists were so sincere and unambitious to obtrude themselves that they let the splendour of their Lord shine through their very weaknesses. They accomplished their purpose: the great Figure stands forth in its essential glory."

Was it not Ruskin who said

"We honour an artist most when we most forget him. He becomes great when he becomes invisible?"

This book is a winsome as well as a worthy contribution to a great subject. Apart from one bathetic lapse, its style and diction match its theme. If the concern of every artist—to quote once more from its pages—

"is not with exactitude of detail, but with releasing the energy and glory of an idea,"

then Mr Dinsmore has a place among the artists.

W.E.B.

*The Bible in Scotland.* By SIR ANDREW MACPHAIL, D.D. (John Murray). pp. 130. 3s. 6d.

DURING the past ten years south of the Tweed there has been a growing recognition of the value of religious teaching in schools, and of the need of ensuring its efficiency and of the responsibility of equipping and assisting those who undertake it. Proof of this may be found in the number of new syllabuses of religious instruction which have seen the light in the last decade. Not one of them is perfect or professes to be. Not one of them has failed to receive appreciative thanks.

The publication of a new syllabus of religious instruction north of the Tweed has roused the ire and fire of a distinguished critic. In this book he gives the syllabus anything but benediction. He proceeds to develop his attack on the syllabus into an offensive on

a wider front. With light and heavy artillery of modernism he bombards the entrenchments of the Church of Scotland with special concentration upon conservative positions. The result is much din, few direct hits, little damage.

There is no question that the author's indignation is inspired by a genuine concern for children and his honest fear that their spiritual development may be warped by misconceptions and misinterpretations of religious truth, but his indignation distorts his own vision and judgment and hurries him into mis-statement and over-statement.

Throughout his polemic the author ignores the fact that a syllabus is a syllabus, a map and not a guide-book. He seems to take for granted both the unwillingness and the incompetence of all teachers in the schools to interpret the Bible. Directly and indirectly he disparages their intelligence and their good sense. Apparently also he believes that the cowl does make the monk, or, at any rate, that a clerical collar makes a divinity lesson, for

"religious education . . . has some value even when performed by one who merely wears the garb and has the formal approval of an ordered religion. It has no value when the ministrant has none of those sanctions."

Yet we recall that among the world's great teachers have been men who were not officially commissioned or recognized, and with few exceptions the prophets of Israel were laymen.

We dissent from the author's dictum that the child who reads the Old Testament unaided will receive the impression that Noah was "a disgusting drunkard," that Abraham was a "treacherous person," and David a "disreputable man." There are other angles from which their portraits may be viewed.

Sir Andrew Macphail's viewpoint of the New Testament Scriptures may be gathered from the following quotations.

"The Evangelists wrote as opponents, the one of the other, the heathen Luke of the Jewish Matthew." "Luke makes a wide detour through Samaria to warrant the subsequent apostolic preaching to the heathen." "Matthew makes of Jesus a Jew, grudging mercy to the heathen." "It is quite certain that these epistles . . . not even the major ones, are not as they came from the hand of Paul or from any other writer of the first century, but for convenience's sake they can still be referred to as Pauline."

We refuse to take the writer seriously when he puts forward the name of Mr Rudyard Kipling as an ideal chairman of a committee of biblical experts, for

"with one of his sentences he could pierce to the inner meaning of every story, allegory, parable and miracle."

Equally fantastic is the writer's fear that the new Scottish syllabus will enrage the men of science and re-open the old and bitter conflict between science and religion.

The most tolerant and pleasing chapter of the book is that on "The Bible as Literature." It reveals the one oasis of appreciation of the syllabists in the desert of criticism, although even its waters are not entirely free from brackishness, for the framers of the

syllabus are but "unwittingly right in approaching the Bible as literature." It contains shrewd observations on the merits and deficiencies of Dr Moffatt's translation and an eulogy of the Authorized Version as a text which is "yet competent to cast the spell of literature and suggest the idea of inspiration."

Contrary to the author's desire, we hope that the Bible will not be "allowed to recede into the mild obscurity of the sanctuary." We also have the conviction that long after *The Bible in Scotland* is forgotten, the Bible in Scotland will still be flourishing.

W.E.B.

*The Bible and its Background.* By C. H. DODD, M.A., D.D. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd). pp. 90.

THE Rylands Professor of Biblical Criticism and Exegesis in the University of Manchester has achieved with distinction a difficult task. In six short chapters he has reviewed the origin and growth of the Divine Library of the Bible. Originally the chapters were talks spoken into the microphone. They are still talks. They preserve in print the intimate note. The use of sequences of short sentences without producing a staccato effect or an impression of scrappiness is a skilful feature. It would be too much to expect these printed talks to be free from limitations, for necessity was laid upon the author to shape his material to a schedule of time. Here and there one is conscious of the dropping of a stitch in the knitting of the material.

"If you wanted to know what Christianity was, here in the New Testament was the clear witness to its fundamentals. It was brief, simple, and sober . . ."

The final adjectives of that quotation are appropriate to this series of studies. Equally appropriate to Dr Dodd's style are the adjectives he uses to describe the narrative of the second creation story—"picturesque, lively, full of detail." Here is no dull précis but a miniature skilfully drawn and delicately coloured. In order that the book may be regarded not as a terminus but as a thoroughfare, Professor Dodd has set up useful signposts in his preface.

W.E.B.

*Reunion and Nonconformity.* By the REV. W. G. PECK. (A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd.). 2s. 6d. net.

IN dealing with the subject of Reunion and Nonconformity Mr Peck starts with a twofold advantage. He has a first hand knowledge of both sides, having served in the Ministry of the Methodist Church before he was received into the Church of England: and, what is almost more important, he approaches the problem in a temper which is neither sentimental nor polemical. The chapters in which he describes the history and *Wesen* of English Noncon-

formity are full of information which may already have been within the reach, but has not always been in the possession of English clergy and church people: and he makes his reader realize that a clear understanding of the fundamental principles of Nonconformity is required before his opinion on the question of Reunion can have any value. Mr Peck's own reasons for seeking admission into the Church emerge clearly at many points in the book, but he remains a sympathetic critic of the system in which he was nurtured: and his power of looking at the problem from the point of view of a conscientious Nonconformist demands special consideration for his judgment. From that point of view he sees no hope of sound reunion in the "most generous sentiment" which wants to begin at once with intercommunion.

"It is" he says "to announce the meaninglessness either of Anglican or of Nonconformist principle, or of both":

and points out, what seems to have escaped the notice of most advocates of intercommunion on the Church side, that it logically involves intercelebration.

The book ends with words of counsel and hope, hope in the growth of the will to reunion, and counsel to the Church to mend and avoid defects which were the historical justification of Nonconformity and to Nonconformists to remember the Catholic rock from which they were hewn.

J.H.F.P.

*Youth looks at Religion.* By several authors and the ARCHBISHOP OF YORK. (Philip Allan). 5s. net.

MR INGRAM in the Editor's Preface finds it necessary to make the objection that

"the seven authors who have been selected are not necessarily representative of the general standpoint of their generation": and at the same time congratulates himself on having elicited from them much that will be both instructive and startling to their elders. No one who has become at all familiar with the abundant literature of the subject since the War will be inclined to admit that he is justified in either assumption. These seven essays contain much that will be interesting, and some passages that will be touching to those who admire and sympathize with youth, but practically nothing that is new. They follow lines of thought, and often employ phraseology which by this time have become actually conventional, though it need not be doubted that for each writer the experience described is genuine and individual. The startling thing is that Mr Ingram should apparently suppose that he is making a pioneer experiment and revealing hitherto unsuspected phenomena. His clever young friends in their answers to what he himself calls his Examination Paper are so representative that they might conveniently be taken as types. To choose an example or two at random, who has not met in print or in person the young gentleman who has felt "compelled to throw over his allegiance to organized religion some years ago," and offers a jejune substitute



which he fondly imagines to be untainted with "metaphysics"? and at the other extreme it does not need a prophetic soul to trace the influence of a distinguished uncle in Miss Lowndes' engaging exercise in *petitio principii*.

The Archbishop of York's reply hints gently that the phenomena are not quite so exclusively "post-war" as the Editor supposed: and deals in a conciliatory and encouraging tone with some of the questions which are directly or indirectly raised by the Essays.

J.H.F.P.

### PERIODICALS.

*The Journal of Theological Studies* (Vol. XXXIII. No. 131. April, 1932. Milford). S. A. Cook: Robert Hatch Kennett. R. H. Connolly: The 'Didache' in relation to the Epistle of Barnabas. F. C. Burkitt: (1) 'As we have forgiven' (Matt., vi, 12); Dr I. Hall's 'Philoxenian' Codex. M. R. James: A Manual of Mythology in the Clementines. E. C. Owen: 'Doxa' and Cognate Words, II. D. W. Thomas: Zech. iii, 4. J. Oman: Tennant 'Philosophical Theology,' II; Otto 'Philosophy of Religion' and 'Religious Essays.' W. H. V. Reade: Grabmann 'Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin.' H. F. Stewart: Trotter 'Pascal's *Pensées*,' new edit. R. B. Hoyle: Schomerus 'Buddha u. Christus.' A. E. Brooke: Howard 'The Fourth Gospel'; Moulton and Howard 'Grammar of N. T. Greek, II'; Zorell 'Lexicon Graecum N.T.'; Sickenger 'Leben Jesu,' V. J. M. Creed: Dibelius 'Die Pastoralbriefe'; Windisch 'Der Hebräerbrief'; Fendt 'Die alten Pericopen'; Scholz 'Eros u. Caritas.' C. A. Scott: Manson 'The Teaching of Jesus.' A. Souter: Harnack 'Studien zur Geschichte des N.T., I.' F. C. Burkitt: Kraeling 'Anthropos and Son of Man' (4 pp.); Mingana 'Woodbrooke Studies, I-IV'; Morey-Rand-Kraeling 'The Gospel Book of Landevennec'; Best and Lawlor 'The Martyrology of Tallaght.' A. Guillaume: Smith 'Studies in Early Mysticism'; Palacios 'El Islam cristianizado'; Büber 'Jewish Mysticism.' F. S. Marsh: Rabin 'Studien zur vormosaïschen Gottesvorstellung.' B. L. Manning: Mathis 'Die Privilegien des Franziskanerordens bis zum Konzil von Vienne (1311).' A. Nairne: Rand 'Founders of the Middle Ages'; Foligno 'Latin Thought during the Middle Ages.' A. J. Macdonald: Dufourcq 'Histoire ancienne de l'Eglise, V (395-1049)'; De la Taille 'The Mystery of Faith.' L. E. Binns: Jung 'Alvaro Pelayo'; Hayward 'History of the Popes.'

*The Churchman* (Vol. XLVI. No. 2. April, 1932. London, E.C. 4: Dean Wace House). C. B. Gwynne: The Mentality of J. H. Newman. J. Knipe: The Conversion of Simon Fish. W. H. Rigg: The Godward Aspect of the Atonement, II. F. R. M. Hitchcock: The Independence of the Celtic Church. A. C. Downer: Fundamental Conceptions in Relation to Our Lord's Atonement. B. Pite: The Menace to Protestantism from the West and from the East. Brooke 'The English Church and the Papacy.' Troeltsch 'Social Teaching of the Christian Churches.' Barry 'The Relevance of Christianity.' Webb 'John of Salisbury.' Wallis 'The Church in Blackburnshire.' Kantorowicz 'Frederick II.' H. Smith 'Ecclesiastical History of Essex under the Long Parliament and the Commonwealth.'

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*The Baptist Quarterly* (Vol. VI. No. 2. April, 1932. London, W.C. 1 : 4 Southampton Row). W. H. Haden : A Doctrine of the Baptist Ministry. G. H. R. Laslett : Things I miss in the Modern Pulpit. F. Buffard : The Religious Education of Church Members. A. Collie : Evangelism. F. Beckwith : The Early Church in Leeds. I. Mann : Calendar of Letters, 1742-1831. F. G. Hastings : Richard Thomas of Harley Wood. Smith ' Ecclesiastical History of Essex ' (laudatory). H. Wheeler Robinson : Whitley (ed.) ' The Doctrine of Grace.' E. G. Braham : Troeltsch ' Social History of the Christian Churches.'

*The English Historical Review* (Vol. XLVII. No. 186. April, 1932. Longmans). G. Lapsley : Buzones, I. H. G. Richardson and G. Sayle : The King's Ministers in Parliament, II. A. Steel : Receipt Roll Totals under Henry IV and Henry V. H. Temperley : The Last Phase of Stratford de Redcliffe, 1855-8. J. C. Russell : Alexander Neckam in England. C. R. Cheney : A Visitation of St. Peter's Priory, Ipswich. T. R. Gambier-Parry : Alice Perrers and her Husband's Relatives. H. G. Wright : Richard II and the Death of the Duke of Gloucester. H. V. F. Somerset : Burke and the Cavendishes. W. R. Halliday : Myres ' Who were the Greeks ? ' H. S. Jones : Cambridge Ancient History, VIII. Sir C. Oman : Mattingly ' Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum,' II. N. H. Baynes : Caspar ' Geschichte des Papsttums, I ' (laudatory, 5 pp.). C. H. McIlwain : Cambridge Medieval History, VI. G. G. Coulton : Cheney ' Episcopal Visitation of Monasteries in the XIIIth Century.' F. Pelster : Sharp ' Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the XIIIth Century.' E. C. Lodge : Calmette et Périnelle ' Louis XI et l'Angleterre (1461-83).' Sir R. Lodge : Marriott ' The Crisis of English Liberty.' L. B. Namier : Nulle ' T. Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle.' Sir G. Hurst : Patterson ' Sir Francis Burdett and his Times (1770-1844).' G. W. Daniels : Crump ' The Leeds Woollen Industry, 1780-1820.' Z. N. B[rooke] : Sproemberg ' Alvisus, Abt von Anchin (1111-31). C. W. P[re]vit O[rton] : Güterbock ' Ottonis Morenae . . . Historia Frederici I ' ; Schirmer ' Der Englische Früh-humanismus ' (excellent) ; Shears ' Froissart, Chronicler and Poet.' W. H. V. R[eade] : Stadelmann ' Vom Geist des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Whiting ' Studies in English Puritanism, 1660-88.' Leroz ' La Critique et La Religion chez David Hume.' C. K. W[ebster] : Renier ' Gt. Britain and the Establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1813-15.' Larkin ' Property in the XVIIIth Century, with special Reference to England and Locke ' (favourable).

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of Religious Instruction. A. Lunn : Needham 'The Great Amphibium.' A. Tillyard : Osuna 'The Third Spiritual Alphabet.' R. O. P. Taylor : Otto 'Religious Essays.' H. Balmforth : Trout 'Religious Behaviour.' May. W. K. Lowther Clarke : The Atonement. An Interpretation. F. McEachran : Faust after a Hundred Years. R. S. Cripps : The Holy Spirit in the O. T. Very Rev. W. R. Inge : Joad 'Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science.' Tennant 'Philosophy of the Sciences.' L. Dewar : 'Essays in Order,' Nos. 4-7. W. K. Lowther Clarke : Dearmer 'Short Handbook of Public Worship.' F. B. Horton : Malaval 'Simple Method of Raising the Soul to Contemplation' E. H. Blakeway : Souter 'Pelagius's Expositions of the XIII Epistles of St. Paul, Part 3.' W. R. V. Brade : Hayward 'History of the Popes.'

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*Africa* (Vol. V. No. 2. April, 1932. Milford). A. I. Richards: Anthropological Problems in N. E. Rhodesia. G. G. Brown: Bride-Wealth among the Hehe. F. Clarke: The Double Mind in African Education. E. R. Hussey: The Languages of Literature in Africa. A. C. L. Donohugh and P. Berry: A Luba Tribe in Catanga; Customs and Folklore. P. Kirchhoff: Kinship Organization. A Study in Terminology. F. Grébert: La Famille Pahouine en 1931. E. W. Smith: Doke 'The Lambas of N. Rhodesia.' A. Scharff: Von Rosen 'Did Prehistoric Egyptian Culture spring from a Marsh-dwelling People?' M. Perham: Sayers (ed.) 'Handbook of Tanganyika.' A. L. James: Harman 'The Sounds of English Speech.' H. Labouret: Westermarck 'Wit and Wisdom in Morocco.' E. W. Thompson: Cooksey and McLeish 'Religion and Civilization in W. Africa.'

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*The Church Overseas* (Vol. V. No. 18. April, 1932. Westminster, S.W. 1: Press and Publications Board, Church House). K. Maclennan: Missions and the Financial Crisis. A. F. Gardiner: The Groundwork of Missionary Education. Right Rev. H. Whitehead: Christian Colleges in India. D. Shropshire: Bantu Ancestor Worship. Its Moral Value. Ven. T. S. Lindsay: The Missionary Work of the Church of Ireland. D. Jenks: Mott 'The Present-Day Summons to the World Mission of Christianity.' H. U. W. Stanton: Arnold and Guillaume (ed.) 'The Legacy of Islam.' W. E. Soothill: Millard 'The End of Exterritoriality in China.' H. F. Burroughs: Bell 'The Religion of Tibet.' O. A. C. I[rwin]: Foakes-Jackson 'The Church in England.'

## BOOKS RECEIVED.

## BIBLICAL.

WELCH, A. C.—*Deuteronomy*, pp. 215. (Oxford University Press). 12s. 6d.

BROOKE, A. E., and others, Ed. by.—*The Old Testament in Greek*. Vol. II, Part 3. (Cambridge University Press). 20s.

COOK, S. A.—*The Place of the O.T. in Modern Research*, pp. 47. (Cambridge University Press). 2s.

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HARTMANN, W.—*Ethics, Vol. II*, pp. 476. (Allen & Unwin). 16s. See Review.

RICHARD, P. S.—*Belief in Man*, pp. 193. (Farrer & Rinehart, New York). 3 dollars.

CARPENTER, S. C.—*Supernatural Religion*, pp. 320. (Ivor Nicholson & Watson). 15s.

KELLY, H. H.—*Catholicity*, pp. 158. (S.C.M.). 4s.

LAKE, M. T.—*A Monistic Dialogue*, pp. 20. (Terminal Press, Washington, D.C.).

ARPEE, L.—*The Atonement in Experience*, pp. 160. (Allen & Unwin). 5s.

## HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

James M. Wilson : *An Autobiography*, pp. 307. (Sidgwick & Jackson). 10s. 6d. See Review.

MACCULLOCH, J. A.—*Medieval Faith and Fable*, pp. 345. (Harrap). 15s. See Review.

WRIGHT, F. A.—*A History of Later Greek Literature*, pp. 415. (Routledge). 18s. See Review.

HOWARD-FLANDERS, W.—*The Church of England and her Reformations*, pp. 256. (Heath Cranton). 10s. 6d.

GREGORY, S. M.—*Sidelights on Early Armenia*, pp. 15. (Luzac & Co.). 1s. 6d. See Review.

SIKES, S. G.—*Peter Abailard*, pp. 282. (Cambridge University Press). 12s. 6d.

MITCHELL, W. F.—*English Pulpit Oratory from Andrewes to Tillotson*, pp. 516. (S.P.C.K.). 21s.

TERRY, R. R.—*Calvin's First Psalter*, pp. 112. (Benn). 10s. 6d. See Review.

*Analecta Bollandiana. Vol. L. Fasc. I & II*, pp. 240. (Bruxelles : Société des Bollandistes, Boulevard S. Michel, 24).

DUKE, J. A.—*The Columban Church*, pp. 200. (Oxford University Press). 10s.

CHEW, H. M.—*Ecclesiastical Tenants in Chief*, pp. 203. (Oxford University Press). 12s. 6d.

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TYRER, J. W.—*Historical Survey of Holy Week*, pp. 180. (Oxford University Press). 25s.

## VARIOUS.

HARDMAN, O., Ed. by.—*The Christian Life, Vol. II*, pp. 406. (S.P.C.K.). 12s. 6d.

MCNEILL, J. T.—*Unitive Protestantism*, pp. 345. (Abingdon Press, New York). 3 dollars. See Review.

LANDMAN, J. H.—*Human Sterilization*, pp. 341. (Macmillan, New York). 4 dollars.

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KITTEL, G.—*Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, pp. 65 to 128. (W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart). 2.90 marks.

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